Edward Slowik

This essay will explore historical and conceptual analogies between emergent theories of space in the Early Modern and contemporary periods, where an emergent space (spacetime) theory regards space as an emergent property or effect of a non-spatial (non-spatiotemporal) substance or substances. While emergent spacetime hypotheses are the dominate methodology in contemporary quantum gravity research, it will be demonstrated that the basic metaphysical presuppositions underlying Kant’s precritical monadology are roughly analogous to those assumed in various modern conceptions. In addition to demonstrating that contemporary emergent space ontologies are not a unique development, since there are Early Modern historical precedents, the main goal of the essay will be to reveal the lessons that both camps can draw from each other on possible lines of development, especially as regards the “spatial presence” problem, i.e., whether non-spatial elements illegitimately presuppose spatial concepts. Whereas the spatial presence problem presented a major obstacle to Kant’s monadology, the evolution of contemporary physics provides resources that have the potential to resolve that issue.

This chapter explores the role of God’s omnipresence in Newton’s natural philosophy, with special emphasis placed on how God is related to space. Unlike Descartes’ conception, which denies the spatiality of God, or Gassendi and Charleton’s view, which regards God as completely whole in every part of space, it is argued that Newton accepts spatial extension as a basic aspect of God’s omnipresence. The historical background to Newton’s spatial ontology assumes a large part of our investigation, but with attention also focused on the details of Newton’s unique approach to these traditional Scholastic conceptions.

While Descartes was a somewhat reluctant participant in the omnipresence debates, his contribution nonetheless played a pivotal role in the development of the idea that only an immaterial being’s actions are situated in space, and not its substance, a view that Henry More would label ‘nullibism’. This essay will explore the contours of the exchange between Descartes and More on this issue, as well as explore the contributions by later Cartesian-influenced philosophers, such as Spinoza and Malebranche, and conclude with a discussion of Leibniz and the pre-critical Kant. The various omnipresence schemes that they inherited from the Scholastics are not only central to understanding the Rationalists’ conception of God’s relationship to space and matter, but the monadic metaphysics constructed by both Leibniz and Kant reflect important elements of that older tradition as well.

This essay will explore historical and conceptual analogies between emergent theories of space in the Early Modern and contemporary periods, where an emergent space (spacetime) theory regards space as an emergent property or effect of a non-spatial (non-spatiotemporal) substance or substances. While emergent spacetime hypotheses are the dominate methodology in contemporary quantum gravity research, it will be demonstrated that the basic metaphysical presuppositions underlying Kant’s precritical monadology are roughly analogous to those assumed in various modern conceptions. In addition to demonstrating that contemporary emergent space ontologies are not a unique development, since there are Early Modern historical precedents, the main goal of the essay will be to reveal the lessons that both camps can draw from each other on possible lines of development, especially as regards the “spatial presence” problem, i.e., whether non-spatial elements illegitimately presuppose spatial concepts. Whereas the spatial presence problem presented a major obstacle to Kant’s monadology, the evolution of contemporary physics provides resources that have the potential to resolve that issue.

This essay will investigate the spatial ontology debate with regards to those quantum gravity theories that posit non-spatiotemporal elements from which spacetime emerges. Whereas substantivalism and relationism both fail to capture the ontology of these non-spatiotemporal theories, such as causal set theory or loop quantum gravity, the largely neglected property theory of space (spacetime) stands out as the best ontological classification, and it also accords with the standard ontological division into substances, properties, and relations. In addition, the property theory will be shown to offer advantages over other alternative approaches, such as structural realism or spacetime functionalism.

This essay will examine and compare concepts of body and space in the respective systems of Hobbes and Descartes. Rather than provide an exhaustive analysis of these similarities and differences, several key issues will be highlighted that reveal the distinctive traits of Hobbes’s approach to these issues as compared with Descartes. While some of Hobbes’s hypotheses seem closer to Descartes, such as the importance of extension in the conception of body, others are more unique, such as Hobbes’s appeal to phantasms and imaginary space, as well as his understanding of void space. Overall, the basic similarities among their competing schemes does not obscure the importance of the many innovative, and sometimes problematic, features manifest in Hobbes’s theory.

It is well-known that Isaac Newton’s conception of space and time as absolute -- “without reference to anything external” (Principia, 408) -- was anticipated, and probably influenced, by a number of figures among the earlier generation of seventeenth century natural philosophers, including Pierre Gassendi, Henry More, and Newton’s own teacher Isaac Barrow. The absolutism of Newton’s contemporary and friend, John Locke, has received much less attention, which is unfortunate for several reasons. First, Locke’s views of space and time undergo a dramatic evolution that mirrors the overall absolutist trend of the era. Second, there are good reasons to suppose that Locke was influenced late in this evolution by Newton’s Principia, which he read and reviewed shortly after its 1687 publication. It is even possible that Locke read or knew of the earlier and unpublished, though now famous, Newtonian tract De Gravitatione. Third, despite the influence of Newton, Locke’s retains a skeptical attitude concerning our empirical knowledge of absolute space and time. He is especially cautious about absolute time, bucking a widespread tendency to treat time as strongly analogous to space. Their disagreement about the measure of absolute time, we will suggest, reflects a deeper disagreement in the philosophy of science. While Locke counts as scientific knowledge only ideas and demonstrations derivable from immediate experience, Newton endorses a more theory-driven brand of empiricism, which holds that our best explanations of the phenomena provide genuine knowledge that goes beyond what we can directly observe.

This paper investigates a famous argument, first introduced by Richard Taylor, that attempts to establish a radical similarity in the concepts of space and time. The argument contends that the spatial and temporal aspects of material bodies are much more alike, or analogous, than has been hitherto acknowledged. As will be demonstrated, most of the previous investigations of Taylor and company have failed to pinpoint the weakest link in their complex of analogies. By concentrating on their most fundamental cases, however, a substantial difference, or disanalogy, can be brought to light that undermines this purported equivalence of space and time.

The role of conventions in the formulation of Thomas Reid’s theory of the geometry of vision, which he calls the “geometry of visibles”, is the subject of this investigation. In particular, we will examine the work of N. Daniels and R. Angell who have alleged that, respectively, Reid’s “geometry of visibles” and the geometry of the visual field are non-Euclidean. As will be demonstrated, however, the construction of any geometry of vision is subject to a choice of conventions regarding the construction and assignment of its various properties, especially metric properties, and this fact undermines the claim for a unique non-Euclidean status for the geometry of vision. Finally, a suggestion is offered for trying to reconcile Reid’s direct realist theory of perception with his geometry of visibles.

This paper explores various metaphysical aspects of Leibniz’s concepts of space, motion, and matter, with the intention of demonstrating how the distinctive role of force in Leibnizian physics can be used to develop a theory of relational motion using privileged reference frames. Although numerous problems will remain for a consistent Leibnizian relationist account, the version developed within our investigation will advance the work of previous commentators by more accurately reflecting the specific details of Leibniz’s own natural philosophy, especially his handling of the dynamical interactions of plenum bodies.

This essay explores the benefits of utilizing non-scientific examples and analogies in teaching philosophy of science courses, or general introductory courses. These examples can help resolve two basic difficulties faced by most instructors, especially when teaching lower-level courses: first, they can prompt students to take an active interest in the class material, since the examples will involve aspects of the culture well-known to the students; second, these familiar, less-threatening examples will lessen the students' collective anxieties and open them up to learning the material more easily. To demonstrate this strategy of constructing and employing non-scientific examples, a lengthy analogy between musical styles and Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions is developed.

Emily Thomas’s book explores conceptions of space and time among various British early modern philosophers, with special emphasis placed on More, Barrow, Newton, Locke, and Clarke. One of the work’s strengths is its treatment of a number of neglected thinkers, such as John Jackson and Edmund Law, in addition to Clarke. Despite its title, the book treats issues in the metaphysics of space as much as it does time, and Thomas provides an engaging tour of a host of current debates in these fields. On the whole, Thomas’s book contains a number of productive discussions, and it could prove a catalyst for further investigations into early modern spatiotemporal metaphysics. Unfortunately, the book also advances many...

This essay examines recent attempts to defend holenmerism, or the ‘whole in every part’ doctrine, as the preferred view of God’s relationship to the material world in the work of Descartes. By focusing on the interrelationship between space, matter, and immaterial entities in Cartesian philosophy, I will demonstrate that the textual evidence not only fails to provide support for the holenmerist revival, but that holenmerism also runs counter to many of Descartes’s concepts regarding space and bodily extension.

While there are numerous difficulties with the standard spacetime ontological dichotomy, namely, substantivalism versus relationism, this investigation will focus on two specific issues as a means of examining and developing alternative ontological conceptions of space that go beyond the limitations imposed by the standard dichotomy. First, while Newton and Leibniz are often upheld as the progenitors of, respectively, substantivalism and relationism, their own work in the natural philosophy of space often contradicts the central tenets of that dichotomy. Second, while the modern substantivalism versus relationism dichotomy is to some extent functional within the setting of Newtonian mechanics, it has proved extremely problematic when transferred to the setting of modern field theories, in particular, general relativity, but also as regards the more recent quantum gravity hypotheses. Based on our examination of these two issues, it will be argued that the "territory" of spacetime ontology thus requires a new "map", i.e., a new conceptual system, to replace the old "map", the substantivalism versus relationism dichotomy.

What properties must space, or the modern notion of space-time, possess to allow the development of a coherent description of the natural world? My dissertation explores various aspects of this problem, both as they developed historically in a famous dispute between Descartes and Newton, and as they appear in more modern approaches to mechanics. In an early paper, De gravitatione, Newton presented an argument against Descartes' theory of space and time that has generated much controversy. Descartes had postulated a theory that regards space and time as formed merely from the relations among material bodies; yet, on the other hand, he had appealed to a particle's velocity in his theory of motion. Newton objected, claiming that, in order to define velocity or motion coherently, the natural world must possess a means of identifying the same spatial locations over time . However, if space is viewed as a special form of entity with an independent existence, as Newton believed, then the enduring spatial locations required for determining "velocity" make sense. Although philosophers for many years were receptive to Descartes' "relationalist" philosophy, modern research has tended to favor Newton's side of the dispute, for most physical theories rely upon notions of "velocity" or "acceleration" that require an independent space-time backdrop. Nevertheless, not all coherent theories meet Newton's demands--the modern theory of machines does not; thus, I explore the possibility that Newton's argument could be answered in this vein. My thesis traces through these concerns in great detail, concluding that, despite the appeal of Descartes' rejection of space as an independent entity, Cartesian science is unable to completely resolve the dilemma posed by Newton's argument

This essay explores Kant’s concept of absolute space in the Metaphysical Foundations from the perspective of the development of the relationist interpretation of bodily interactions in the center-of-mass reference frame, a strategy that Huygens had originally pioneered and which Mach also endorsed. In contrast to the interpretations of Kant that stress a non-relationist, Newton-inspired orientation in his critical period work, it will be argued that the content and function of Kant’s utilization of this reference frame strategy places him much closer to Huygens’ relationism than the absolute notions of space and motion favored by Newton and Euler.

This essay examines the relationship between monads and space in Kant’s early pre-critical work, with special attention devoted to the question of ubeity, a Scholastic doctrine that Leibniz describes as “ways of being somewhere”. By focusing attention on this concept, evidence will be put forward that supports the claim, held by various scholars, that the monad-space relationship in Kant is closer to Leibniz’ original conception than the hypotheses typically offered by the later Leibniz-Wolff school. In addition, Kant’s monadology, in conjunction with God’s role, also helps to shed light on further aspects of his system that are broadly Leibnizian, such as monadic activity and the unity of space.

This volume explores the inadequacies of the two standard conceptions of space or spacetime, substantivalism and relationism, and in the process, proposes a new historical interpretation of these physical theories. This book also examines and develops alternative ontological conceptions of space, such as the property theory of space and emergent spacetime hypotheses, and explores additional historical elements of seventeenth century theories and other metaphysical themes. Readers will learn about specific problems with the substantivalism versus relationism dichotomy. First, Newton and Leibniz are often upheld as the retrospective forerunners of, respectively, substantivalism and relationism, but their work often contradicts the central tenets of these views. Second, these theories have proven problematic when transferred to a modern setting, especially with regards to general relativity and the recent quantum gravity hypotheses. In order to address these problems, the author develops a new classificational system that provides a more accurate taxonomy for the elements of all spatial ontologies, both in the seventeenth century and for contemporary theories of physics. This classification obtains successful analogies between Newton, Leibniz, and other natural philosophers with contemporary physical theories, and it also admits a role for the current brand of emergent spacetime hypotheses and the property theory of space.