James Conant

As we have seen, the crucial step in Nietzsche’s argument for his early doctrine is summed by in the following remark: ‘If we are forced to comprehend all things only under these forms, then it ceases to be amazing that in all things we actually comprehend nothing but these forms’ (1979, pp. 87–8). Before eventually learning to be suspicious of it, Nietzsche spends a good deal of time wondering instead what it would mean to live with the conclusion that (what he calls) “the Kantian philosophy” apparently thus forces upon one, if one allows oneself to take this step. The different ways of living with its implications that Nietzsche goes on to distinguish in his early writings play an important role in his own subsequent retrospective understanding of the stations of the dialectic through which his thought had to traverse in its movement towards his mature perspectivism. Nietzsche contrasts these, in turn, with different possible versions of stage-two perspectivism. It is these finer discriminations that Nietzsche makes among the possible ways of occupying the second and third stages of the dialectic that will briefly concern us in this part of the paper.

This paper comes in three parts. In the first part, I explore the question of the relation between the philosophies of the early and the later Wittgenstein as they are standardly distinguished, with the aim of raising some questions about whether that standard distinction might not obstruct our view of certain significant aspects of the development of Wittgenstein’s thought. In the second part, drawing on the work of Marie McGinn and Warren Goldfarb, I distinguish two senses in which these two commentators have been moved to call upon the expression ‘piecemeal’ in their respective attempts to characterize an important feature of Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical method. In the third part, I draw upon this distinction to help bring into focus a significant shift in Wittgenstein’s conception of philosophical method which occurs fully within the so-called “later” period—a shift which has in no small part remained invisible due to the manner in which the opposition between an early and a later Wittgenstein has hitherto been conceived.

Wittgenstein gives voice to an aspiration that is central to his later philosophy, well before he becomes later Wittgenstein, when he writes in §4.112 of the Tractatus that philosophy is not a matter of putting forward a doctrine or a theory, but consists rather in the practice of an activity – an activity he goes on to characterize as one of elucidation or clarification – an activity which he says does not result in philosophische Sätze, in propositions of philosophy, but rather in das Klarwerden von Sätzen, in our attaining clarity in our relation to the sentences of our language that we call upon to express our thoughts.1 To say that early Wittgenstein already aspired to such a conception of philosophy is not to gainsay that to aspire to practice philosophy in such a manner and to succeed in doing so are not the same thing. It is therefore not to deny that, by Wittgenstein’s later lights, the Tractatus is to be judged a work that is marked by forms of failure tied to its having failed fully to live up to such an aspiration. But if it is thus to be judged, then it is to some degree a failure even by Wittgenstein’s own earlier lights. This means that if one wants to understand the fundamental turn in Wittgenstein’s thinking as he moves from his earlier to his later philosophy, and why it is that he wanted the Tractatus to be published and read together with Philosophical Investigations, one needs to understand what sort of failure this is – and that requires coming to terms with the Tractatus’s own understanding of what sort of work it was trying to be. We think that readers of the Tractatus – be they admirers or detractors of Wittgenstein – have, on the whole, failed to do this.

1. Kierkegaard on saying and showing. The paper explores certain parallels between Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The following five parallels appear to exist between these two works: both draw a distinction between sense and nonsense; both distinguish between what can be said and what can only be shown; both aspire to show what cannot be said by drawing limits to what can be said; both end by retracting themselves; both imply that silence is the only correct form of answer to certain questions they pose. I argue that the standard interpretation of each of these works has them inside out: a proper understanding of parallels and reveals both works to be concerned with undermining a doctrine of ineffability. I try to show that although parallels , , and depend upon a misreading of these works they, too, are nevertheless connected to deep and interesting genuine parallels in the respective philosophical undertakings of these two authors. ;2. Nietzsche's perfectionism. Nietzsche has been read as advancing a form of perfectionism in both moral and political philosophy. I argue against the standard reading of Nietzsche as defending some form of moral or political elitism. The argument is based on a careful examination of Nietzsche's third Untimely Meditation--a text frequently drawn upon to support an extreme elitist interpretation of Nietzsche. I go on to suggest that Nietzsche's views are, nonetheless, aptly characterized as perfectionist in certain respects and that they represent a striking development of certain strains of perfectionist thought that have been either widely neglected or prematurely dismissed in contemporary moral and political philosophy. ;3. The James/Royce Debate on the theory of truth. The paper argues that to understand William James' mature views one needs to situate his writing within the polemical context of the period in which he wrote and, in particular, to view his development against the background of his ongoing dialogue with Josiah Royce. I outline three successive arguments Royce deploys in an attempt to show that James' pragmatic theory of truth is self-refuting. I argue that the pressure these arguments exert on James leads him to develop a more nuanced and original form of pragmatism than has hitherto generally been appreciated