Christopher Gowans

Can moral disagreements be rationally resolved? Can universal human rights be defended in face of moral disagreements? The problem of moral disagreement is one of the central problems in moral thinking. It also provides a stimulating stepping-stone to some of the perennial problems of philosophy, such as relativism, scepticism, and objectivity. _Moral Disagreements_ is the first anthology to bring together classic and contemporary readings on this key topic. Clearly divided into five parts; The Historical Debate; Voices from Anthropology; Challenges to Moral Objectivity; Defenses of Moral Objectivity; and New Directions, the anthology presents readings from the following key thinkers: * Sextus, Empiricus, Chagnon, Wong, MacIntyre * Aquinas, Shweder, Brink, Rawls * Montaigne, Turner, Nussbaum, Narayan * Hume, Mackie, Gewirth * Nietzsche, Williams, Berlin. A distinctive feature of the anthology is that it brings philosophers into dialogue with well-known anthropologists. Also included is a comprehensive introduction by Christopher Gowans, introducing the problem of moral disagreement to those coming to the topic for the first time.

The topic of the dissertation is C. I. Lewis' theory of empirical knowledge in Chapters VII and VIII of An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation. I begin by discussing Lewis' purpose in developing this theory. I argue, positively, that his principal aim was to explain the role of sense-experience in our knowledge of the physical world, and negatively, that his aim was not primarily either to clarify the meaning of our epistemic concepts or to refute skepticism . ;Lewis' theory is plainly foundationalist in orientation, and it is clear that his argument for foundationalism is based upon regress considerations. But there are two interpretations of Lewis' regress argument. They were first suggested by Reichenbach and Goodman respectively. I argue that Goodman's interpretation is the more adequate of the two. I then formalize Lewis' argument. This makes it clear that the argument is valid, and that its soundness depends upon only two questionable premises: that a non-inferentially warranted belief must be certain, and that the series of warranting grounds for a belief must come to an end. I then consider the reasons Lewis had, or might have had, for accepting these premises. ;Lewis' regress argument establishes that the warrant for an inferentially warranted belief must include a belief that is non-inferentially warranted and certain. Lewis' foundationalism is essentially an attempt to apply this conclusion to our warranted beliefs about physical objects. His defense of foundationalism has two parts. ;The first part is the doctrine of "the given." After clarifying ambiguities in this doctrine, I argue that what is essential to it is the claim that there are beliefs about how things appear--what I call sensory beliefs--and that these beliefs may be non-inferentially warranted and certain. I then consider the central objections to this claim. I begin with an objection based upon the idea that sensory beliefs are "comparative." Though I argue against this idea, I grant that sensory beliefs cannot be non-inferentially warranted because in various ways they presuppose inferential knowledge about the physical world, and second, to the effect that sensory beliefs cannot be certain because, for a variety of reasons, they can always be mistaken. I argue that all of these objections are inconclusive at best. ;The second part of Lewis' defense of foundationalism is his account of how sensory beliefs confirm physical object beliefs. Lewis believed this is possible only if physical object propositions can be "translated" into complex sensory propositions. But his account both of the nature of the relationship between physical object propositions and sensory propositions, and of how this relationship makes it possible for the latter to confirm the former, is extremely ambiguous and problematic. I thus propose a reconstruction of Lewis' position which I call statical phenomenalism. This reconstructed position seems to accomplish what Lewis was trying to do, and it seems to circumvent Chisholm's objection to phenomenalism based upon the facts of perceptual relativity. But I suggest that statistical phenomenalism nonetheless suffers from an apparently fatal defect. I conclude by arguing that Lewis did not need to defend phenomenalism in order to defend his foundationalism

Philosophy of the Buddha is a philosophical introduction to the teaching of the Buddha. It carefully guides readers through the basic ideas and practices of the Buddha, including kamma , rebirth, the not-self doctrine, the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, ethics, meditation, non-attachment, and Nibbâna . The book includes an account of the life of the Buddha as well as comparisons of his teaching with practical and theoretical aspects of some Western philosophical outlooks, both ancient and modern. Most distinctively, Philosophy of the Buddha explores how Buddhist enlightenment could enable us to overcome suffering in our lives and reach our full potential for compassion and tranquillity. This is one of the first books to introduce the philosophy of the Buddha to students of Western philosophy. Christopher W. Gowans' style is exceptionally clear and appropriate for anyone looking for a comprehensive introduction to this growing area of interest

Our lives are such that moral wrongdoing is sometimes inescapable for us. We have moral responsibilities to persons which may conflict and which it is wrong to violate even when they do conflict. Christopher W. Gowans argues that we must accept this conclusion if we are to make sense of our moral experience and the way in which persons are valuable to us. In defending this position, he critically examines the recent moral dilemmas debate. He maintains that what is important in this debate is not whether there are irresolvable moral conflicts, but whether there are moral conflicts in which wrongdoing is unavoidable. Though it would be incoherent to conclude moral deliberation by deciding to perform incompatible actions, he argues that there is nothing incoherent in supposing that we have conflicting moral responsibilities. In this way, he shows that it is possible to capture the intuitions of those who have defended the idea of moral dilemmas while meeting the objections of those who have rejected this idea. Gowans carefully evaluates utilitarian and Kantian analyses of moral dilemmas. He argues that these approaches eliminate genuine moral conflict only by displacing persons as direct objects of moral concern. As an alternative, he develops a more concrete account in which moral responsibilities to persons are central. The book also includes discussions of Melville's Billy Budd, methodology in moral philosophy, moral pluralism, moral tragedy, and "dirty hands" in politics.

The purpose of this paper is to establish that, For an important class of moral judgments, The claim that there are moral dilemmas is false. The judgments are the judgments an agent committed to morality makes as the conclusion of deliberation about what, All things considered, He or she morally ought to do in some situation. The argument is that these judgments are prescriptive, In the sense of implying an intention to act, And that it is implausible to think there are dilemmas involving such prescriptive judgments. Some of the import of this argument is shown in the fact that it supports a common objection to moral dilemmas, That they are incompatible with the principles of "agglomeration" and "'ought' implies can'." for these principles are plausible from a prescriptivist standpoint. At the end of the paper, It is suggested that there is another class of moral judgments, Nonprescriptive in their use, Concerning which there remains a substantial issue about moral dilemmas.

The integrity of corporate product advocates (advertisers and salespersons) is questionable for the same reason the integrity of lawyers is questionable. In both cases the requirements of a professional role inevitably lead to forms of deception. However, the integrity of lawyers has been taken to be a more serious issue than the integrity of product advocates. I consider why this is so, and I conclude that we should pay more attention to the integrity issue in the corporate case. In addition, I consider a parallel set of arguments that purport to justify a lack of integrity among product advocates and lawyers respectively. According to these arguments, a great social good is obtained from the institutions, corporate and legal, of which these persons are essential participants. Against these arguments, I emphasize the overriding importance of integrity, both within institutions and in society at large.

It is usually assumed that what Lewis says about the given in Mind and the World-Order (MWO) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV) is essentially the same, and that both works are defenses of foundationalism. However, this assumption faces two problems: first, it is difficult to bring Lewis's diverse remarks on the given into coherence, especially when those in MWO are compared with those in AKV; and second, though AKV is a defense of foundationalism, there is much in MWO that can be read as a critique of foundationalism. In this paper a different reading of Lewis is proposed, one that avoids these problems. This is developed by going farther back in Lewis, to his Harvard Ph.D. dissertation, The Place of Intuition in Knowledge (PIK). By tracing Lewis's discussion of the given from PIK through MWO up to AKV, it is shown that the phrase 'the given' is used to refer to two different doctrines, and that Lewis's position on foundationalism undergoes a fundamental change, roughly, from indifference to rejection to acceptance

Kant has long been taxed with an inability to explain the detailed normative content of our lives by making universalizability the sole arbiter of our values. Korsgaard addresses one form of this critique by defending a Kantian theory amended by a seemingly attractive conception of practical identities. Identities are dependent on the contingent circumstances of each person's world. Hence, obligations issuing from them differ from Kantian moral obligations in not applying to all persons. Still, Korsgaard takes Kantian autonomy to mean the normativity of all obligations is rooted in universalizability. The wealth of values informing our lives is thus said to be accommodated within a Kantian framework.After briefly explaining Korsgaard’s understanding of practical identities and their role in her reformation of Kant's moral philosophy, I argue that she gives an inadequate explanation of how the obligations that arise from a person’s practical identities derive their authority from the person's will. I then consider how her position might be developed to meet this objection in accordance with her allegiance to “constructivism” and I argue that the epistemic commitments of people’s actual identities makes it unlikely that such a development could preserve Kantian autonomy as she interprets it

Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy. In the Pāli Canon, nirvana (or, in Pāli,nibbāna) is depicted as a form of health, and the Buddha is portrayed as a doctor who helps us attain it. Much later in the tradition, Śāntideva described the Buddha’s teaching as ‘the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness.’ Cicero expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when he said that philosophy is ‘a medical science for the mind.’ He thought we should ‘hand ourselves over to philosophy, and let ourselves be healed.’ ‘For as long as these ills [of the mind] remain,’ he wrote, ‘we cannot attain to happiness.’ There are many different forms of medical analogy in these two traditions, but the most general form may be stated as follows: just as medicine cures bodily diseases and brings about physical health, so Buddhist dharma or Hellenistic philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health—where psychological health is understood as the highest form of happiness or well-being. Insofar as Buddhist dharma involves philosophy, as it does, both renditions of the analogy may be said to declare that philosophy cures mental diseases and brings about psychological health. This feature of the analogy—philosophy as analogous to medical treatment—has attracted considerable attention.

The paper is a defense of the thesis that there are situations in which morally virtuous persons who are epistemic peers may disagree about what to do without either person being rationally required to change his or her judgment (a version of the Steadfast position in the epistemology of disagreement debate). The argument is based in part on similarities between decisions of virtuous agents and other practical decisions such as a baseball manager’s decision to change pitchers during a game. In both cases, the role and responsibilities of the person making the decision and the complexities of the decision favor the Steadfast position. At the end of the paper, the argument for this position is compared with discussions of traditional arguments against moral objectivity that are based onmoral disagreements, and it is suggested that they involve rather different considerations.