-
34Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2): 207-211. 1985.
-
21An Introduction to Buddhist PhilosophyInternational Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1): 124-126. 2009.
-
69Moral Dilemmas and PrescriptivismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3). 1989.The purpose of this paper is to establish that, For an important class of moral judgments, The claim that there are moral dilemmas is false. The judgments are the judgments an agent committed to morality makes as the conclusion of deliberation about what, All things considered, He or she morally ought to do in some situation. The argument is that these judgments are prescriptive, In the sense of implying an intention to act, And that it is implausible to think there are dilemmas involving such p…Read more
-
2An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4): 513-518. 2010.
-
11Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1): 128-129. 1994.
-
25Buddhism: Introducing the Buddhist ExperienceInternational Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4): 554-556. 2002.
-
138Medical Analogies in Buddhist and Hellenistic Thought: Tranquillity and AngerRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 66 11-33. 2010.Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy. In the Pāli Canon, nirvana (or, in Pāli,nibbāna) is depicted as a form of health, and the Buddha is portrayed as a doctor who helps us attain it. Much later in the tradition, Śāntideva described the Buddha’s teaching as ‘the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness.’ Cicero expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when he said that philosophy is ‘…Read more
-
44Intimacy, Freedom, and Unique Value: A "Kantian" Account of the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Value of PersonsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1). 1996.
-
165Virtue and natureSocial Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 28-55. 2008.The Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse purports to establish a naturalistic criterion for the virtues. Specifically, by developing a parallel between the natural ends of nonhuman animals and the natural ends of human beings, they argue that character traits are justified as virtues by the extent to which they promote and do not inhibit natural ends such as self-preservation, reproduction, and the well-being of one’s social group. I argue that the approac…Read more
-
173Two concepts of the given in C. I. Lewis: Realism and foundationalismJournal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4): 573-590. 1989.It is usually assumed that what Lewis says about the given in Mind and the World-Order (MWO) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV) is essentially the same, and that both works are defenses of foundationalism. However, this assumption faces two problems: first, it is difficult to bring Lewis's diverse remarks on the given into coherence, especially when those in MWO are compared with those in AKV; and second, though AKV is a defense of foundationalism, there is much in MWO that can be …Read more
-
102C. I. Lewis's Critique of Foundationalism in Mind and the World-OrderTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 20 (3). 1984.
New York City, New York, United States of America