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1Why the Buddha Did Not Discuss "The Problem of Free Will and Determinism"In Rick Repetti (ed.), Buddhist Perspectives on Free Will: Agentless Agency?, Routledge / Francis & Taylor. pp. 11-21. 2016.I argue that the Buddha did not discuss the free will and determinism problem because he only considered issues relating to overcoming suffering and his teaching about this did not raise the problem. As represented in the Nikāyas, the heart of his teaching was an empirically based account of the causes of suffering and how to modify these to end suffering. It was primarily a practical teaching about how to achieve this goal, more a craft knowledge than a philosophical theory of causality. Simila…Read more
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167Moral dilemmas (edited book)Oxford Uiversity Press. 1987.The essays in this volume illuminate a central topic in ethical theory: moral dilemmas. Some contemporary philosophers dispute the traditional view that a true moral dilemma -- a situation in which a person has two irreconcilable moral duties -- cannot exist. This collection provides the historical background to the ongoing debate with selections from Kant, Mill, Bradley, and Ross. The best recent work on the question is represented in essays by Donagan, Foot, Hare, Marcus, Nagel, van Fraassen, …Read more
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2Introduction. The Debate on Moral DilemmasIn Christopher W. Gowans (ed.), Moral dilemmas, Oxford Uiversity Press. pp. 3--33. 1987.
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21Reason in Action: Essays in the Philosophy of Social Science (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2): 235-236. 1997.
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23Objectivism and Realism in the Sciences and MoralityProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 59 (n/a): 308-318. 1985.
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34Intuition and Argument in PhilosophyInternational Philosophical Quarterly 24 (2): 125-140. 1984.
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2UniversalizabilityIn Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics, Blackwell. 2013.
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36Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 25 (2): 207-211. 1985.
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21An Introduction to Buddhist PhilosophyInternational Philosophical Quarterly 49 (1): 124-126. 2009.
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70Moral Dilemmas and PrescriptivismAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 26 (3). 1989.The purpose of this paper is to establish that, For an important class of moral judgments, The claim that there are moral dilemmas is false. The judgments are the judgments an agent committed to morality makes as the conclusion of deliberation about what, All things considered, He or she morally ought to do in some situation. The argument is that these judgments are prescriptive, In the sense of implying an intention to act, And that it is implausible to think there are dilemmas involving such p…Read more
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2An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4): 513-518. 2010.
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11Wittgenstein, Ethics and Aesthetics: The View from Eternity (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1): 128-129. 1994.
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25Buddhism: Introducing the Buddhist ExperienceInternational Philosophical Quarterly 42 (4): 554-556. 2002.
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139Medical Analogies in Buddhist and Hellenistic Thought: Tranquillity and AngerRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 66 11-33. 2010.Medical analogies are commonly invoked in both Indian Buddhist dharma and Hellenistic philosophy. In the Pāli Canon, nirvana (or, in Pāli,nibbāna) is depicted as a form of health, and the Buddha is portrayed as a doctor who helps us attain it. Much later in the tradition, Śāntideva described the Buddha’s teaching as ‘the sole medicine for the ailments of the world, the mine of all success and happiness.’ Cicero expressed the view of many Hellenistic philosophers when he said that philosophy is ‘…Read more
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44Intimacy, Freedom, and Unique Value: A "Kantian" Account of the Irreplaceable and Incomparable Value of PersonsAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1). 1996.
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167Virtue and natureSocial Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 28-55. 2008.The Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism of Philippa Foot and Rosalind Hursthouse purports to establish a naturalistic criterion for the virtues. Specifically, by developing a parallel between the natural ends of nonhuman animals and the natural ends of human beings, they argue that character traits are justified as virtues by the extent to which they promote and do not inhibit natural ends such as self-preservation, reproduction, and the well-being of one’s social group. I argue that the approac…Read more
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102C. I. Lewis's Critique of Foundationalism in Mind and the World-OrderTransactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 20 (3). 1984.
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174Two concepts of the given in C. I. Lewis: Realism and foundationalismJournal of the History of Philosophy 27 (4): 573-590. 1989.It is usually assumed that what Lewis says about the given in Mind and the World-Order (MWO) and An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (AKV) is essentially the same, and that both works are defenses of foundationalism. However, this assumption faces two problems: first, it is difficult to bring Lewis's diverse remarks on the given into coherence, especially when those in MWO are compared with those in AKV; and second, though AKV is a defense of foundationalism, there is much in MWO that can be …Read more
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50An Introduction to Kant’s Moral Philosophy (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4): 513-518. 2010.
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