Colin Tyler

This article contextualises Hegel's writings on international order, especially those concerning war and imperialism. The recurring theme is the tragic nature of the struggles for recognition which are instantiated by these phenomena. Section one examines Hegel's analysis of the Holy Roman Empire in the context of French incursions into German territories, as that analysis was developed in his early essay on ‘The German Constitution’ . The significance of his distinction between the political and civil spheres is explored, with particular attention being paid to its implications for Hegel's theory of nationalism. The second section examines Hegel's development of the latter theory in The Phenomenology of Spirit , stressing the tragic interpenetration of ‘culture’ and intersubjective recognition. A recurring theme here is the influence of this theory on Hegel's interpretation of Napoleon's World-Historic mission, as that was revealed in his contemporaneous letters. Section three traces the tragic dynamic underlying the discussion of war between civilised states in The Philosophy of Right . Section four examines three other types of imperial action in Hegel's mature writings, particularly The Philosophy of History . These are relations between civilised states and culturally developed yet politically immature societies; colonial expansion motivated by capitalist under-consumption; and conflict between civilised states and barbarous peoples. It is concluded that it is misleading to claim that Hegel glorified conflict and war, and that he did not see domination by ‘civilised states’ as the ‘final stage’ of World History

This book presents a critical reconstruction of the social and political facets of Thomas Hill Green’s liberal socialism. It explores the complex relationships Green sees between human nature, personal freedom, the common good, rights and the state. It explores Green’s analysis of free exchange, his critique of capitalism and his defence of trade union activity and the cooperative movement. It establishes that Green gives only grudging support to welfarism, which he saw as a conservative mechanism in effect if not conscious design. It is shown that he believes state provision of welfare to be justified only to the extent that peasants and the proletariat lack a culture and institutions which enable them to assert themselves against abusive landlords and capitalists. Ultimately, it is shown that Green’s guiding ideal is the creation of a eudaimonically-enriching kingdom of ends, which favours the creation of a dynamic and free society driven by mass participation through decentralised social and political institutions. This book builds on Colin Tyler’s The Metaphysics of Self-realisation and Freedom (2010), although it can also be read as a freestanding work.

The primary purpose of this paper is to defend three controversial claims that arise out of T.H. Green’s arguments in the first two books of the Prolegomena to Ethics. The first claim—which I defend in §1—is that one should not try to separate the aspects of Green’s metaphysical theory that are set out in book one of the Prolegomena from the theory of the will he developed in book two. The second claim—defended in §2—is that it is possible for an atheist to accept Green’s arguments for the existence of an eternal consciousness. The third claim—again, defended in §2—is that the eternal consciousness is a potential of every individual mind, rather than being some type of mystical ‘super-person’ of which any particular human consciousness is a mere adjunct.