Peter McLaughlin

In the final part of Hume's Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, his skeptic Philo drops his objections to the argument from design and takes a more conciliatory position. The only serious candidate for an argument that might explain Philo's “reversal”—the articulate voice in the clouds in Part 3—is almost universally considered to be irregular. However, elsewhere Hume presents the articulate-voice argument as the paradigm of regular philosophical argument. This paper explains the difference between the regular and irregular forms of articulate-voice argument, analyzing Hume's grounds for finding it convincing enough to motivate Philo's reversal.

The Mechanical Problems traditionally attributed to Aristotle is a short problem collection that also contains an ambitious project of reduction, which traces various mechanical devices back to the lever, the balance and the radii of a circle. This work is thus not just a collection of problems, but also the first theoretical mechanical treatise that has come down to us: Basic concepts of technical mechanics such as force, load, fulcrum are abstracted from an analysis of simple technology, and the workings of this technology are explained by arguments cast in syllogistic form. This chapter traces the origins of mechanical theory in this work and analyzes the form and structure of its argument. The key steps in the concept formation of basic mechanics carried out in this treatise are analyzed in detail. We focus on the special role of the balance with unequal arms in the early development of mechanics, on the interaction of various forms of explanatory practice and on their integration into systems of knowledge in the Peripatetic school.

Early modern science was deeply anti-Aristotelian and deeply Aristotelian at the same time. Although the rejection of the traditional distinction between natural and forced motion marks a clear difference between modern physics and the natural philosophy of Christian Aristotelianism, nonetheless most of the conceptual instruments available to early modern science for dealing with physical questions belonged to precisely that tradition that was being rejected. Much of the novelty of early modern science arises from the application of traditional conceptual tools to areas where they had not previously been thought to be appropriate in the service of goals for which they were not originally intended. One area where the use of traditional instruments to novel purposes is particularly striking is the theory of the basic interactions of bodies.

We claim that much of the confusion associated with the "tautology problem" about survival of the fittest is due to the mistake of attributing fitness to individuals instead of to types. We argue further that the problem itself cannot be solved merely by taking fitness as the aggregate cause of reproductive success. We suggest that a satisfying explanation must center not on logical analysis of the concept of general adaptedness but on the empirical analysis of single adapted traits and their causal relationship to changes in allele frequencies

Kants Lösung des Problems von Freiheit und Determinismus scheint nur für gute und schlechte Handlungen zu gelten, also für Handlugen, die eine moralische Dimension haben. Nach Ausführungen Kants im Kanon-Kapitel der KdrV scheint die Freiheit zweckrationaler Handlungen Gegenstand der empirischen Erfahrung zu sein, womit sie eine bloß ‚komparative‘ oder ‚psychologische‘ Freiheit und deshalb Teil der kausalen Struktur der Welt wäre. Allerdings schreibt Kant auch instrumentellen Handlungen eine moralische Dimension zu, insofern sie erlaubt sind und deshalb einen mindestens hypothetischen Bezug zum Sittengesetz haben.

This paper analyzes the remarkable popularity of William Paley’s argument from design among contemporary naturalists in biology and the philosophy of science. In philosophy of science Elliott Sober has argued that creationism should be excluded from the schools not because it is not science but because it is ‘less likely’ than evolution according to fairly standard confirmation theory. Creationism is said to have been a plausible scientific option as presented by Paley but no longer to be acceptable according to the same standards that once approved it. In biology C. G. Williams and Richard Dawkins have seen in Paley a proto-adaptationist. This paper shows that the historical assumptions of Sober’s arguments are wrong and that the philosophical arguments themselves take alternatives to science to be alternatives in science and conflate the null hypothesis, chance, with a competing explanatory hypothesis. It is also shown that the similarity of Paley’s adaptationism to that of contemporary biology is not what it is made out to be