Jose Garcia

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Defending a Phenomenological–Behavioral Perspective: Culture, Behavior, and ExperienceMarino Pérez-Álvarez (bio), José M. García-Montes (bio), Adolfo J. Cangas (bio), and Louis A. Sass (bio)KeywordsBehavior, contextual phenomenology, culture, experienceWe should like to express our sincere thanks to all the authors for their commentaries on our articles. Given the restrictions of space (a limitation they too had to contend with), we can only respond to a few aspects of their interesting remarks. We shall reply of course on the basis of our own approach—an approach that sets out to integrate culture, behavior, and experience, and that might be termed contextual phenomenology, phenomenological behaviorism, or perhaps most accurately (albeit more awkwardly), the phenomenological–behavioral perspective.In her commentary, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008), referring to the target articles “Phenomenology and behaviorism” (Pérez-Álvarez, Sass, and Cangas 2008) and “The role of superstition in psychopathology” (García-Montes et al. 2008), wonders whether our maintaining of the spirit of Skinner, as well as our recourse to phenomenology, might not themselves represent forms of superstitious behavior. She points out that it is not always a good idea to put new wine in old barrels. For her, the new wine and new barrels would be represented by social constructivism, of which she is reminded by some aspects of our work. But in making her own case, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) reveals certain common prejudices concerning behaviorism, prejudices that have apparently persisted even after reading our article. Thus, for example, she does not see operant behavior as incorporating intentionality (what, in the target article, is presented in terms of final causality), because she assumes that intentionality would necessarily imply a mentalist and dualist notion involving a supposed internal mental entity that causes behavior. Skinner (1974) himself noted and rejected this very assumption in a passage that clearly distinguishes his own approach from what he calls a “stimulus-response formula”: “Possibly no charge,” he wrote,is more often leveled against behaviorism or a science of behavior than that it cannot deal with purpose or intention. A stimulus-response formula has no answer, but operant behavior is the very field of purpose and [End Page 281] intention. By its nature it is directed toward the future: a person acts in order that something will happen, and the order is temporal.(pp. 55–6)The place Skinner gives to intentionality and purpose is elaborated in our target article.Furthermore, Ibáñez-Guerra (2008) assumes that, on methodological grounds, Skinner rejects all that is not observable, or at least that cannot be operationalized. This, however, is simply incorrect, at least as regards Skinner’s radical behaviorism. As the reader may recall, radical (as opposed to methodological) behaviorism is neither operationalist nor does it reject private or subjective events because of their unobservability. Indeed, Skinner specifically acknowledges that such events are in fact observable—at least for one person: the subject him- or herself. The question for Skinner is to understand how the part of the world that is only observable and experiential for oneself is constructed or formed. In the end, it turns out that radical behaviorism is more radical, in the Aristotelian ontological sense (see Pérez-Alvarez, Sass, and García-Montes 2008), than post-modern constructionism. Indeed, as we remarked, radical behaviorism can still surprise us today. Similarly, phenomenology is starting to be missed in the clinical context (Andreasen 2007). We believe that radical behaviorism and phenomenology, mutually readjusted, are in fact excellent wines for the times we live in—if only we knew how to appreciate them.In their commentary on “Phenomenology and behaviorism: A mutual readjustment,” Fletcher and Hayes (2008) argue that the philosophy and theory of Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT)/Relational Frame Theory (RFT) already contain the salutary aspects of phenomenology that we highlight in our target article. Their insistence on reducing the affinities we find between phenomenology and behaviorism to ACT/RFT consists, in our view, in a scientific–technical argument that is more scientistic than strictly philosophical in nature. Their insistence on the scientific–technical argument itself implies an unclarified philosophical assumption. On what grounds do experimental data constitute the last word? Has...

Language employs various coordinators to connect propositions, a subset of which are “logical” in nature and thus analogous to the truth operators of formal logic. We here focus on two linguistic connectives and their negations: conjunction _and_ and (inclusive) disjunction _or_. Linguistic connectives exhibit a truth-conditional component as part of their meaning (their semantics), but their use in context can give rise to various implicatures and presuppositions (the domain of pragmatics) as well as to inferences that go beyond semantic/pragmatic properties (the result of reasoning processes). We provide a comprehensive review of the role of the logical connectives in language and argue that three sets of factors—semantic, pragmatic, and those related to reasoning—are separate and separable, though some details may differ cross-linguistically. As a way to showcase the argument, we present two experiments in language comprehension in Spanish wherein pragmatic content was minimised and reasoning processes neutered, thus potentially highlighting what might be the default meanings of the connectives under study. In Experiment 1 we show that the conjunctive reading of inclusive disjunction is available in positive contexts other than in syntactically intricate cases such as downward entailing and free choice contexts, contrary to what has been claimed in the literature. In Experiment 2 we show that negated conjunctions and disjunctions in Spanish can easily receive the same interpretation when contrasted against the same context and, moreover, that these interpretations match those available in English, despite claims from the literature that linguistic connectives and local negation interact differently in English and Romance languages.

Universities increasingly play an important role in entrepreneurship, which has contributed to gender equality in the business world. The aim of this study is to establish a causal model of entrepreneurial intentions and explore it by gender, based on the dimensions of the Theory of Planned Behavior, and how these are mediated by the individuals’ resilience and psychological well-being. The previous work experience was considered as one of the control variables, in order to analyze whether this influence the entrepreneurial intention. With a convenience sample of 644 Portuguese students, Structural Equation Modeling was used. For a better understanding, multivariate analyses were performed and each one was individually reported, and for appropriate comparisons by gender, the t-student test was used. The comparison of means, between genders, showed that there are differences only between perceived behavioral control, subjective norm, and entrepreneurial intention, with women scoring the highest values, and psychological well-being, with men scoring the higher. A serial mediation path was performed, and psychological resilience was found to mediate a significant effect between perceived behavioral control and intention in females, but not in males. It also mediates a significant effect between attitude and intention in females, but not in males. These results show that attitude is a determining factor for females to become entrepreneurs. Finally, after discussing the results, theoretical and practical contributions are analyzed, with regard to the field of entrepreneurship in Portugal, and alternatives are pointed out for a more entrepreneurial future, reinforcing the role of higher education institutions.

Since the birth of modern media until Internet, communication has been profoundly transformed and through it culture, society, forms of power and the creation of economic wealth. This essay examines this long-lasting process by exploring the idea of mediatization. It is a historical movement of co-implication of symbolic forms, technologies, contexts and communicative frameworks that has altered communication practices, their scope and meanings through the introduction and reception of new technologies (mechanical, electrical, digital) and by institutions (publishers, media companies, propaganda and public relations bureaux, advertising, technological platforms). We argue that it is a non-linear process, with several stages, intensified in our days, with aspects very critical to freedom and democracy, but whose outcome is open.

A través de una mirada histórica este artículo muestra cómo filosofía y literatura han mantenido una línea de relación compleja pero inevitable, mostrando esa zona en que los seres humanos, como individuos y seres sociales, han de dar respuestas a situaciones singulares desde la experiencia adquirida y la atención a la multiplicidad. Se hace hincapié en las principales etapas, se mencionan algunos autores relevantes y se ofrece al lector una reflexión que presenta ambas formas como necesarias para la construcción del orden y buscar salidas a la encrucijada de la vida pues esta, conocimiento y sentido moral, solo es viable desde esa doble atención.

This article first presents the aristotelian criticism of the conception of God as Esse ipsum subsistens in Thomas Aquinas, through one of the most important aristotelian philosophers today, Enrico Berti. Then the answer offered by the thomist Stephen L. Brock in his defense of the ipsum esse is set forth, with reference to the recent disputes regarding this issue in the so-called «analytical thomism». The aim is to determine the status of the recent debate between aristotelians and thomists regarding the question of God as Esse ipsum subsistens, in order to ascertain whether the historical incompatibility between the two metaphysical conceptions is to be considered definitive.