Riccardo Manzotti

It is customary to assume that agents receive information from the environment through their sensors. It is equally customary to assume that an agent is capable of information processing and thus of computation. These two assumptions may be misleading, particularly because so much basic theoretical work relies on the concepts of information and computation. In similarity with Dennett's intentional stance, I suggest that a lot of discussions in cognitive science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence is biased by a naïve notion of computation resulting from the adoption of a computational stance. As a case study, I will focus on David Chalmers' view of computation in cognitive agents. In particular, I will challenge the thesis of computational sufficiency. I will argue that computation is no more than the ascription of an abstract model to a series of states and dynamic transitions in a physical agent. As a result, computation is akin to center of masses and other epistemic shortcuts that are insufficient to be the underpinnings of a baffling-yet-physical phenomenon like consciousness.

What distinguishes a whole from an arbitrary sum of elements? I suggest a temporal and causal oriented approach. I defend two connected claims. The former is that existence is, by every means, coextensive with being the cause of a causal process. The latter is that a whole is the cause of a causal process with a joint effect. Thus, a whole is something that takes place in time. The approach endorses an unambiguous version of Restricted Composition that suits most commonsensical intuitions about wholes.

Throughout much of the modern period, the human mind has been regarded as a property of the brain and therefore something confined to the inside of the head—a view commonly known as ‘internalism’. But recent works in cognitive science, philosophy, and anthropology, as well as certain trends in the development of technology, suggest an emerging view of the mind as a process not confined to the brain but spread through the body and world—an outlook covered by a family of views labelled ‘externalism’. In this paper, we will suggest there is now sufficient momentum in favour of externalism of various kinds to mark a historical shift in the way the mind is understood. We dub this emerging externalist tendency the ‘New Mind’. Key properties of the New Mind will be summarised and some of its implications considered in areas such as art and culture, technology, and the science of consciousness

What is the goal of creativity? Is it just a symbolic reshuffling or a moment of semantic extension? Similar to the contrast between syntax and semantics, creativity has an internal and an external aspect. Contrary to the widespread view that emphasises the problem-solving role of creativity, here we consider whether creativity represents an authentic moment of ontological discovery and semantic openness like Schopenhauer and Picasso suggested. To address the semantic aspect of creativity, we take advantage of recent externalist models of the mind suggesting that the mind is more than symbol recombination.