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302Derek Parfit finally meets the Buddha -- on Tralfamadore! This paper is also archived at SSRN
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642Practical ReflectionPrinceton University Press. 1989.“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, Practical Reflection develops philosophical accounts of inten…Read more
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1746How to Share an IntentionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1): 29-50. 1997.Existing accounts of shared intention (by Bratman, Searle, and others) do not claim that a single token of intention can be jointly framed and executed by multiple agents; rather, they claim that multiple agents can frame distinct, individual intentions in such a way as to qualify as jointly intending something. In this respect, the existing accounts do not show that intentions can be shared in any literal sense. This article argues that, in failing to show how intentions can be literally shared…Read more
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205DoablesPhilosophical Explorations (1): 1-16. 2013.Just as our scientific inquiries are framed by our prior conception of what can be observed ? that is, of observables ? so our practical deliberations are framed by our prior conception of what can be done, that is, of doables. And doables are socially constructed, with the result that they vary between societies. I explore how doables are constructed and conclude with some remarks about the implications for moral relativism.
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576Epistemic freedomPacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1): 73-97. 1989.Epistemic freedom is the freedom to affirm anyone of several incompatible propositions without risk of being wrong. We sometimes have this freedom, strange as it seems, and our having it sheds some light on the topic of free will and determinism. This paper sketches a potential explanation for our feeling of freedom. The freedom that I postulate is not causal but epistemic (in a sense that I shall define), and the result is that it is quite compatible with determinism. I therefore claim that ins…Read more
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2154The Guise of the GoodNoûs 26 (1). 1992.The agent portrayed in much philosophy of action is, let's face it, a square. He does nothing intentionally unless he regards it or its consequences as desirable. The reason is that he acts intentionally only when he acts out of a desire for some anticipated outcome; and in desiring that outcome, he must regard it as having some value. All of his intentional actions are therefore directed at outcomes regarded sub specie boni: under the guise of the good. This agent is conceived as being capable …Read more
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60Reply to Catriona MacKenziePhilosophical Explorations 10 (3). 2007.In her excellent critique of my book Self to Self (2006), Catriona Mackenzie highlights three gaps in my view of the self. First, my effort to distinguish among different applications of the concept 'self' is not matched by any attempt to explain the interactions among the selves so distinguished. Second, in analyzing practical reasoning as aimed at self-understanding, I speak sometimes of causal-psychological understanding (e.g. in the paper titled 'The Centered Self') and sometimes of narrativ…Read more
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69Narrative ExplanationPhilosophical Review 112 (1): 1-25. 2003.A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding. We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative as a genre of explanation. When the police invite a suspect to “tell his story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is judged to have a “good story” will depend on its adequacy as an explanation. Can we…Read more
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1096From Self Psychology to Moral PhilosophyPhilosophical Perspectives 14 349-377. 2000.I have therefore decided to venture out of the philosophical armchair in order to examine the empirical evidence, as gathered by psychologists aiming to prove or disprove motivational conjectures like mine. By and large, this evidence is indirect in relation to my account of agency, since it is drawn from cases in which the relevant motive has been forced into the open by the manipulations of an experimenter. The resulting evidence doesn’t tend to show the mechanism of agency humming along in ac…Read more
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113XIV. Don't Worry, Feel GuiltyRoyal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52 235-248. 2003.One can feel guilty without thinking that one actually is guilty of moral wrongdoing. For example, one can feel guilty about eating an ice cream or skipping aerobics, even if one doesn't take a moralistic view of self-indulgence. And one can feel guilty about things that aren't one's doing at all, as in the case of survivor's guilt about being spared some catastrophe suffered by others. Guilt without perceived wrongdoing may of course be irrational, but I think it is sometimes rational, and I wa…Read more
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962The self as narratorIn Joel Anderson & John Christman (eds.), Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism: New Essays, Cambridge University Press. 2005.
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243Foundations for Moral RelativismOpenBook Publishers. 2013.In Foundations for Moral Relativism, J. David Velleman shows that different communities can indeed be subject to incompatible moralities, because their local mores are rationally binding. At the same time, he explains why the mores of different communities, even when incompatible, are still variations on the same moral themes. The book thus maps out a universe of many moral worlds without, as Velleman puts it, "moral black holes”. The five self-standing chapters discuss such diverse topics as on…Read more
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231Practical reflectionPhilosophical Review 94 (1): 33-61. 1985.“What do you see when you look at your face in the mirror?” asks J. David Velleman in introducing his philosophical theory of action. He takes this simple act of self-scrutiny as a model for the reflective reasoning of rational agents: our efforts to understand our existence and conduct are aided by our efforts to make it intelligible. Reflective reasoning, Velleman argues, constitutes practical reasoning. By applying this conception, _Practical Reflection_ develops philosophical accounts of int…Read more
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503How We Get AlongCambridge University Press. 2009.In How We Get Along, philosopher David Velleman compares our social interactions to the interactions among improvisational actors on stage. He argues that we play ourselves - not artificially but authentically, by doing what would make sense coming from us as we really are. And, like improvisational actors, we deal with one another in dual capacities: both as characters within the social drama and as players contributing to the shared performance. In this conception of social intercourse, Vellem…Read more
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150DyingThink 11 (32): 29-32. 2012.Some people hope to die in their sleep. Not me. I don't regret having been oblivious at my birth, but I don't want death to catch me napping
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1871What good is a will?In Anton Leist (ed.), Action in Context, De Gruyter. 2007.As a philosopher of action, I might be expected to believe that the will is a good thing. Actually, I believe that the will is a great thing - awesome, in fact. But I'm not thereby committed to its being something good. When I say that the will is awesome, I mean literally that it is a proper object of awe, a response that restrains us from abusing the will and moves us rather to use it respectfully, in a way that does it justice. To say that the will is a good thing, however, would imply that h…Read more
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88Replies To Discussion On The Possibility of Practical ReasonPhilosophical Studies 121 (3): 277-298. 2004.
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1246On the aim of beliefIn The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford University Press. pp. 244--81. 2000.This paper explores the sense in which belief "aims at the truth". In this course of this exploration, it discusses the difference between belief and make-believe, the nature of psychoanalytic explanation, the supposed "normativity of meaning", and related topics
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1063Against the Right to DieJournal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (6): 665-681. 1992.How a "right to die" may become a "coercive option".
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1831The voice of conscienceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1). 1999.I reconstruct Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative (CI) as an argument that deduces what the voice of conscience must say from how it must sound - that is, from the authority that is metaphorically attributed to conscience in the form of a resounding voice. The idea of imagining the CI as the voice of conscience comes from Freud; and the present reconstruction is part of a larger project that aims to reconcile Kant's moral psychology with Freud's theory of moral development. As I reco…Read more
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1124Color as a secondary qualityMind 98 (January): 81-103. 1989.Should a principle of charity be applied to the interpretation of the colour concepts exercised in visual experience? We think not. We shall argue, for one thing, that the grounds for applying a principle of charity are lacking in the case of colour concepts. More importantly, we shall argue that attempts at giving the experience of colour a charitable interpretation either fail to respect obvious features of that experience or fail to interpret it charitably, after all. Charity to visual experi…Read more
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192Self to SelfPhilosophical Review 105 (1): 39-76. 1996.Images of myself being Napoleon can scarcely merely be images of the physical figure of Napoleon.... They will rather be images of, for instance, the desolation at Austerlitz as viewed by me vaguely aware of my short stature and my cockaded hat, my hand in my tunic.
Princeton
Department Of Philosophy
Alumnus
Areas of Specialization
Moral Psychology |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Action |
Meta-Ethics |