Norman Swazo

Contemporary Islam presents Europe in particular with a political and moral challenge: Moderate-progressive Muslims and radical fundamentalist Muslims present differing visions of the relation of politics and religion and, consequently, differing interpretations of freedom of expression. There is evident public concern about Western “political correctness,” when law or policy accommodates censorship of speech allegedly violating religious sensibilities. Referring to the thought of philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and accounting for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, and various empirical studies on the religious convictions of Muslims, it is argued here that: (1) sovereign European state powers should be especially cautious of legal censorship of speech allegedly violating Muslim religious sensibilities; and (2) instead of legal moves to censorship, European states should defer to the principle of separation of religion and state (political authority). Further, a reasonable interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence allows that matters of religious difference may be engaged and resolved by appeal to private conscience and ethical judgment, rather than by appeal to public law per se. In so far as they are 1 representative of contemporary scholarship, the interpretative positions of Ziad Elmarsafy, Jacques Derrida, and Nasr Abū Zayd are presented in illustration of this latter point.

The general task of this meditation is to understand the philosophical underpinnings of world order thinking, i.e., its grounding in the metaphysics of subjectivity of the modern age initiated by Descartes and completed by Nietzsche. The thought of Martin Heidegger, in particular his critique of the history of metaphysics, is appropriated and applied to world order thinking. The specific task here is to elucidate the consequent of a conditional proposition: If Heidegger's thinking of the history of metaphysics as the history of Being is compelling, then world order thinking rests on flawed metaphysical presuppositions. In short, ontological and epistemological difficulties remain most at issue for world order thinking, despite the urgency of global problems. ;World order thinking is understood by way of the rubrics "normative futurism" and "technocratic futurism". When examined in light of the dominance of subjectivism, however, this distinction collapses. Both modes of futurism involve a strategic rationality, what Heidegger calls "calculative thinking". That is, value-thinking which characterizes normative futurism is, metaphysically, the same as the technocratic rationality of technocratic futurism. A technocratic world order--global governance by way of the planetary domination of technology--is the tacit, if not explicit, promise of both modes of futurism. This is particularly the case with respect to the systems approach to world order, i.e., the application of systems philosophy or General Systems Theory to the problem of world order. Heidegger's "fundamental ontology", in particular his articulation of the ontological structures of human Dasein, challenges the legitimacy of all world order thinking which is governed by the metaphysics of subjectivity. This metaphysical horizon promises total conquest of the earth along the path of technologically organized man--a path which is coordinate with the hegemony of Western reason qua scientific-technological reason. ;Notwithstanding, the positive dimension of this Heideggerian critique is such as to sustain and buttress the world order movement. A critique of the metaphysics of subjectivity grants support to the movement's challenge to the logic of statecraft and its ordering principle of sovereignty. Moreover, Heidegger's thought promises to illuminate the character of planetary thinking and planetary dwelling

In 2003, philosopher Nick Bostrom presented the provocative idea that we are now living in a computer simulation. Although his argument is structured to include a “hypothesis,” it is unclear that his proposition can be accounted as a properly scientific hypothesis. Here Bostrom’s argument is engaged critically by accounting for philosophical and scientific positions that have implications for Bostrom’s principal thesis. These include discussions from Heidegger, Einstein, Heisenberg, Feynman, and Dreyfus that relate to modelling of structures of thinking and computation. In consequence of this accounting, given that there seems to be no reasonably admissible evidence to count for the task of falsification, one concludes that the computer simulation argument’s hypothesis is only speculative and not scientific.

Patents recognize economic right and are important for both individual and social economic benefit. Nonetheless, mere economic right does not eliminate the requirement for moral assessment when adjudicating intellectual property claims, especially in the case of claims associated with applications of biomedical technology [e.g., somatic cell nuclear transfer methods]. This is so for applications for patent in the case of live-born animal clones, as governed in the setting of the judicial system of the USA. Here recent federal court decisions in the USA are reviewed, and the ethical ambiguities of this judicial review are engaged in light of the current prohibitions on human reproductive cloning. It is concluded that the legal proscription of patents on animal clones bodes well for human accountability to present and future generations in the event of human reproductive cloning.

At an international conference on philosophy and anthropology held in 1968, French deconstructionist Jacques Derrida remarked that an international philosophical encounter is an extremely rare thing in the world. Twenty years later, American moral philosopher Alasdair Maclntyre argued that moral discourse today entails the recognition that there are many rationalities, each with its conception of justice, such that one must ask the questions, "Which rationality? Whose justice?" In this paper I take note of these observations with reference to the claim that human rights have universal validity, recognizing that international discussions about this claim are moments in which "the West" presumably experiences a "collocution" with discourses from "the margin". My argument proceeds to conclude that any legitimate discussion of human rights must acknowledge the need for movement from cultural hierarchy to cultural symmetry, thereby conceding that traditions alien to the Western tradition of moral discourse may be superior in rationality, both theoretical and practical, thereby being instructive about the requirements of global justice.

Rabbinic tradition, as given in the Palestinian and Babylonian versions of the Talmud, transmits an account of Rabbi Elisha ben Abuyah only to depreciate him for the “pariah” that he was during his lifetime. For one who accepts rabbinic authority, there can be no moral ambiguity about the character of the man, his beliefs, or his aspirations.1 The twelfth-century philosopher and rabbi Moses Maimonides spared no criticism of Elisha. Maimonides wrote The Guide for the Perplexed with the object of enlightening “a religious man who has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who conscientiously fulfills his moral and religious duties, and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies ..

In this paper I appropriate the philosophical critique of Michel Foucault as it applies to the engagement of Western science and indigenous peoples in the context of biomedical research. The science of population genetics, specifically as pursued in the Human Genome Diversity Project, is the obvious example to illustrate the contraposition of modern science and ‘indigenous science’, the tendency to depreciate and marginalize indigenous knowledge systems, and the subsumption of indigenous moral preferences in the juridical armature of international human rights law. I suggest that international bioethicists may learn from Foucault’s critique, specifically of the need for vigilance about the knowledge/power relation expressed by the contraposition of modern science and ‘indigeneity’

Bioethics tends to be dominated by discourses concerned with the ethical dimension of medical practice, the organization of medical care, and the integrity of biomedical research involving human subjects and animal testing. Jacques Derrida has explored the fundamental question of the “limit” that identifies and differentiates the human animal from the nonhuman animal. However, to date his work has not received any reception in the field of biomedical ethics. In this paper, I examine what Derrida’s thought about this limit might mean for the use/misuse/abuse of animals in contemporary biomedical research. For this, I review Derrida’s analysis and examine what it implies for scientific responsibility, introducing what I have coined the “Incompleteness Theorem of Bioethics.”.

Recent discussions about moral enhancement presuppose and recommend sets of values that relate to both the Western tradition of moral philosophy and contemporary empirical results of natural and social sciences, including moral psychology. It is argued here that this is a typology of thought that requires a fundamental interrogation. Proponents of moral enhancement do not account for important critical analyses of moral discourse, beginning with that of Friedrich Nietzsche and continuing with more prominent twentieth century thinkers such as the poststructuralist Michel Foucault, the deconstructionist Jacques Derrida, and the moral philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. In this paper, such analyses are taken into account to highlight the need for more fundamental philosophical interrogation of the project of moral enhancement.

Stem cell research and associated or derivative biotechnologies are proceeding at a pace that has left bioethics behind as a discipline that is more or less reactionary to their developments. Further, much of the available ethical deliberation remains determined by the conceptual framework of late modern metaphysics and the correlative ethical theories of utilitarianism and deontology. Lacking, to any meaningful extent, is a sustained engagement with ontological and epistemological critiques, such as with “postmodern” thinking like that of Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. Some basic “Heideggerian” conceptual strategies are reviewed here as a way of remedying this deficiency and adding to ethical deliberation about current stem cell research practices.

This article discusses the ideas of philosophy. A question posed by Socrates to the young Hippocrates has its contemporary application in the case of all who consider themselves professionally competent to engage the human personality, whether they call the object of their engagement the mind, the soul, or the psyche. When an individual suffering an existential crisis seeks the counsel of psychiatrist, psychotherapist, counselor, or philosophic practitioner, he places himself into a relation of trust; entrusting mind, soul, and psyche to the dialectical encounter. He expects that in so doing the practitioner represents something good and that the encounter will yield a good. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

Recently, Chinese researchers published the results of their research using a gene-editing technology on abnormal human zygotes. The research team believes this research has prospective clinical application, viz., for gene therapy for?-thalassemia, a white blood cell disorder, and plan to persist with further studies, despite technical problems in this experiment. The research has elicited international criticism from both scientific and bioethics domains, because it innovates beyond the current global consensus against human germ line modification. This paper comments on some ethical issues presented by the research report and concludes that, under present circumstances, the Chinese research team did not meet a standard of scientific responsibility.Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics 2015 Vol.6 (1):22-26.

In response to adverse events in retroviral gene therapy clinical trials conducted in France to correct for X-linked severe combined immune deficiency disorder (X-SCID), an advisory committee of the Food and Drug Administration convened in October 2002, February 2003, and March 2005, to deliberate and provide recommendations for similarly sponsored research in the United States. A similar National Institutes of Health committee met in February 2003. In this article, I review the transcripts and/or minutes of these meetings to evaluate the extent to which the ethical dimension of the research was engaged even as the molecular and clinical evidence was reviewed. I then provide representative ethical arguments to demonstrate the sort of ethical reasoning that should be included as part of the agenda of such committee meetings.

Clinical psychologists remain puzzled about the diagnostic basis and therapeutic disposition of individuals who present with a clinical profile of psychopathy. Psychopaths have been characterized as lacking in conscience and presenting a mask of sanity, thus differentiating them from psychotics and neurotics. The clinical profile of the psychopathic personality seems at odds with Kant’s moral philosophy, in which Kant characterizes not only the central role of conscience in moral judgment, but in which Kant also insists that every person has a conscience. In this paper the clinical assessments presented by Cleckley and Hare in particular are juxtaposed to Kant’s philosophical position, thereby to gain an understanding what is at the base of the psychopathic personality disorder. The clinical and the moral-philosophical assessments are reconciled, nonetheless leaving the clinical psychologist with the difficult task of therapeutic disposition.

Introduction In 2013, Dr. J. Muizelaar and Dr. R. Schrot, two neurosurgeons at the University of California Davis Medical Center (UCDMC), were found guilty of research misconduct due to failure to comply with institutional policies as well as Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations governing human subjects research. At issue here, however, is the difference between research and innovative therapy in the clinical setting of patient care where clinical judgment is reasonably to be privileged. Methods The UCDMC investigative document is reviewed along with standard literature on clinical ethics and clinical data about glioblastoma multiforme (GBM) cancer. Results In this paper I argue that, by tendentiously focusing on policies, regulations, and procedures governing human subjects research, the UCDMC investigation failed to account for the centrality of clinical judgment and clinical ethics pertinent to judicious review of this matter, especially given the unique clinical context of terminally ill patients having exhausted standard care treatment options for glioblastoma multiforme (GBM) cancer. Conclusions The UCDMC investigation raises serious problems for clinicians who are engaged in innovative therapy in the clinical setting, requiring a regulatory framework separate from the normal Institutional Review Board (IRB) process.