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74The ethics of interventionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 851-870. 1997.This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers …Read more
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24Paul Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), viii + 275 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-955930-5. $60 (hbk.) (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4): 570-572. 2013.
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148MoralismJournal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2). 2005.abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moral…Read more
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4Hume's sentimentalist account of moral judgementIn Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, Continuum. pp. 279. 2012.
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17The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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38Review of Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.
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232Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics*: Julia DriverUtilitas 7 (2): 281-288. 1995.Virtue ethics has generated a great deal of excitement among ethicists largely because it is seen as an alternative to the traditional theories – utilitarianism and Kantian ethics – which have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism in the past 30 years. Rather than give up the enterprise of doing moral theory altogether, as some have suggested, others have opted to develop an alternative that would hopefully avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Several writer…Read more
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18Joel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows:Value … and What FollowsEthics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
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1865Ethics: The FundamentalsWiley-Blackwell. 2006._Ethics: The Fundamentals_ explores core ideas and arguments in moral theory by introducing students to different philosophical approaches to ethics, including virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, divine command theory, and feminist ethics. The first volume in the new Fundamentals of Philosophy series. Presents lively, real-world examples and thoughtful discussion of key moral philosophers and their ideas. Constitutes an excellent resource for readers coming to the subject of ethics for the first time
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484The virtues of ignoranceJournal of Philosophy 86 (7): 373-384. 1989.In The Virtues of Ignorance the author demonstrates that classical theories of virtue are flawed and developes a consequentialist theory of virtue. ;Virtues are excellences of character. They are traits which are considered to be valuable in some way. A person who is virtuous is one who has a tendency to act well. Classical philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, believed that virtues, as human excellences, could not involve ignorance in any way. On their view, the virtuous agent, when acting…Read more
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189Consequentialism and feminist ethicsHypatia 20 (4): 183-199. 2000.: This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not ch…Read more
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5The Ethics of InterventionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 851-870. 1997.This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers …Read more
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Ificial etwtc^In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Oxford University Press. pp. 208. 2005.
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9The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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69Book review: Morals from motives by Michael Slote (review)The Journal of Ethics 7 (2): 233-237. 2003.
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169Response to my criticsUtilitas 16 (1): 33-41. 2004.This essay is a rejoinder to comments on Uneasy Virtue made by Onora O'Neill, John Skorupski, and Michael Slote in this issue. In Uneasy Virtue I presented criticisms of traditional virtue theory. I also presented an alternative – a consequentialist account of virtue, one which is a form of ‘pure evaluational externalism’. This type of theory holds that the moral quality of character traits is determined by factors external to agency (e.g. consequences). All three commentators took exception to …Read more
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148On virtue ethicsPhilosophical Review 111 (1): 122-127. 2002.Rosalind Hursthouse has written an excellent book, in which she develops a neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that she sees as avoiding some of the major criticisms leveled against virtue ethics in general, and against Aristotle's brand of virtue ethics in particular.
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18Love and DutyPhilosophic Exchange 44 (1). 2014.The thesis of this paper is that there is an important asymmetry between a duty to love and a duty to not love: there is no duty to love as a fitting response to someone’s very good qualities, but there is a duty to not love as a fitting response to someone’s very bad qualities. The source of the asymmetry that I discuss is the two-part understanding of love: the emotional part and the evaluative commitment part. One cannot directly, or “at will,” control an emotional response, but one can under…Read more
Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin
University of St. Andrews
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University of St. AndrewsCEPPAResearcher
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |