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204Autonomy and the Asymmetry Problem for Moral ExpertisePhilosophical Studies 128 (3): 619-644. 2006.We seem less likely to endorse moral expertise than reasoning expertise or aesthetic expertise. This seems puzzling given that moral norms are intuitively taken to be at least more objective than aesthetic norms. One possible diagnosis of the asymmetry is that moral judgments require autonomy of judgement in away that other judgments do not. However, the author points out that aesthetic judgments that have been ‘borrowed’ by aesthetic experts generate the same autonomy worry as moral judgments w…Read more
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235Roger Crisp, Reasons and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 178Utilitas 23 (2): 235-237. 2011.
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293Moral expertise: Judgment, practice, and analysis*: Julia driverSocial Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2): 280-296. 2013.This essay defends moral expertise against the skeptical considerations raised by Gilbert Ryle and others. The core of the essay articulates an account of moral expertise that draws on work on expertise in empirical moral psychology, and develops an analogy between moral expertise and linguistic expertise. The account holds that expertise is contrastive, so that a person is an expert relative to a particular contrast. Further, expertise is domain specific and characterized by “automatic” behavio…Read more
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119Humble arroganceMetaphilosophy 38 (4): 365-369. 2007.This essay defends consequentialist approaches to moral evaluation from a charge of moral arrogance made by Bernard Gert in “Moral Arrogance and Moral Theories.” A distinction is made between a commitment to there being a right answer to moral questions and certainty about the nature of the right answers.
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253Imaginative resistance and psychological necessitySocial Philosophy and Policy 25 (1): 301-313. 2008.Some of our moral commitments strike us as necessary, and this feature of moral phenomenology is sometimes viewed as incompatible with sentimentalism, since sentimentalism holds that our commitments depend, in some way, on sentiment. His dependence, or contingency, is what seems incompatible with necessity. In response to this sentimentalists hold that the commitments are psychologically necessary. However, little has been done to explore this kind of necessity. In this essay I discuss psycholog…Read more
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84Caesar's wife: On the moral significance of appearing goodJournal of Philosophy 89 (7): 331-343. 1992.
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540The suberogatoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 70 (3). 1992.This Article does not have an abstract
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130ConsequentialismRoutledge. 2012.Consequentialism is the view that the rightness or wrongness of actions depend solely on their consequences. It is one of the most influential, and controversial, of all ethical theories. In this book, Julia Driver introduces and critically assesses consequentialism in all its forms. After a brief historical introduction to the problem, Driver examines utilitarianism, and the arguments of its most famous exponents, John Stuart Mill and Jeremy Bentham, and explains the fundamental questions under…Read more
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The 'actual' in actualismIn Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson, Oxford University Press. 2009.
Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin
University of St. Andrews
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University of St. AndrewsCEPPAResearcher
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |