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123Pleasure as the standard of virtue in Hume's moral philosophyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2). 2004.But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind (EPM, 173)
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58On 'What makes killing wrong?'Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1): 8-8. 2013.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin Miller1 make a convincing case for their claim that what is wrong about killing someone is that one is putting the person in a state of universal and irreversible disability. Thus, killing in and of itself is not an additional harm for a person who has been universally and irreversibly disabled. The implications for such a view are, as they note, quite wide-ranging. Given advances in medical technology, there are individuals being kept alive now who are univ…Read more
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4Human Nature. The virtues and human natureIn Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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31MoralismJournal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2): 137-151. 2005.abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moral…Read more
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4Normative ethicsIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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15Book ReviewsCandace Vogler,. Reasonably Vicious.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. Pp. viii+295. $47.00 (review)Ethics 114 (4): 845-848. 2004.
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183Dream immoralityPhilosophy 82 (1): 5-22. 2007.This paper focuses on an underappreciated issue that dreams raise for moral evaluation: is immorality possible in dreams? The evaluatiotial internalist is committed to answering ‘yes.’ This is because the internalist account of moral evaluation holds that the moral quality of a person's actions, what a person does, her agency in any given case is completely determined by factors that are internal to that agency, such as the person's motives and/or intentions. Actual production of either good or …Read more
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7Book ReviewsJoel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. vi + 168. $35.00 (review)Ethics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
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52IntroductionUtilitas 13 (2): 137. 2001.The evaluation of character has taken on new significance in moral theory, and, indeed, some advocate a shift in focus away from evaluating action to evaluating character. This has been taken to pose special challenges for utilitarian and consequentialist moral theory. Utilitarianism's commitment to impartiality and its seeming failure to accommodate virtue evaluation have led to problems, some of which are developed in the essays in this volume
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100The Secret Chain: A Limited Defense of SympathySouthern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 234-238. 2011.This paper responds to criticisms of sympathy-based approaches to ethics made by Jesse Prinz, focusing on the criticism that emotions are too variable to form a basis for ethics. I draw on the idea, articulated by early sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume, that proper reliance on sympathy is subject to a corrective procedure in order, in part, to avoid the variability problem.
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33Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing GoodJournal of Philosophy 89 (7): 331. 1992.
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76The ethics of interventionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 851-870. 1997.This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers …Read more
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24Paul Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), viii + 275 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-955930-5. $60 (hbk.) (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4): 570-572. 2013.
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152MoralismJournal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2). 2005.abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moral…Read more
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4Hume's sentimentalist account of moral judgementIn Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, Continuum. pp. 279. 2012.
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17The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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38Review of Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.
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237Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics*: Julia DriverUtilitas 7 (2): 281-288. 1995.Virtue ethics has generated a great deal of excitement among ethicists largely because it is seen as an alternative to the traditional theories – utilitarianism and Kantian ethics – which have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism in the past 30 years. Rather than give up the enterprise of doing moral theory altogether, as some have suggested, others have opted to develop an alternative that would hopefully avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Several writer…Read more
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18Joel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows:Value … and What FollowsEthics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin
University of St. Andrews
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University of St. AndrewsCEPPAResearcher
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |