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116Pleasure as the standard of virtue in Hume's moral philosophyPacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (2). 2004.But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind (EPM, 173)
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58On 'What makes killing wrong?'Journal of Medical Ethics 39 (1): 8-8. 2013.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin Miller1 make a convincing case for their claim that what is wrong about killing someone is that one is putting the person in a state of universal and irreversible disability. Thus, killing in and of itself is not an additional harm for a person who has been universally and irreversibly disabled. The implications for such a view are, as they note, quite wide-ranging. Given advances in medical technology, there are individuals being kept alive now who are univ…Read more
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30MoralismJournal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2): 137-151. 2005.abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moral…Read more
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4Normative ethicsIn Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2005.
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4Human Nature. The virtues and human natureIn Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues, Oxford University Press. 1996.
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15Book ReviewsCandace Vogler,. Reasonably Vicious.Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. Pp. viii+295. $47.00 (review)Ethics 114 (4): 845-848. 2004.
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179Dream immoralityPhilosophy 82 (1): 5-22. 2007.This paper focuses on an underappreciated issue that dreams raise for moral evaluation: is immorality possible in dreams? The evaluatiotial internalist is committed to answering ‘yes.’ This is because the internalist account of moral evaluation holds that the moral quality of a person's actions, what a person does, her agency in any given case is completely determined by factors that are internal to that agency, such as the person's motives and/or intentions. Actual production of either good or …Read more
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7Book ReviewsJoel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Pp. vi + 168. $35.00 (review)Ethics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
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17The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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38Review of Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.
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232Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics*: Julia DriverUtilitas 7 (2): 281-288. 1995.Virtue ethics has generated a great deal of excitement among ethicists largely because it is seen as an alternative to the traditional theories – utilitarianism and Kantian ethics – which have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism in the past 30 years. Rather than give up the enterprise of doing moral theory altogether, as some have suggested, others have opted to develop an alternative that would hopefully avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Several writer…Read more
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18Joel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows:Value … and What FollowsEthics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
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1870Ethics: The FundamentalsWiley-Blackwell. 2006._Ethics: The Fundamentals_ explores core ideas and arguments in moral theory by introducing students to different philosophical approaches to ethics, including virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, divine command theory, and feminist ethics. The first volume in the new Fundamentals of Philosophy series. Presents lively, real-world examples and thoughtful discussion of key moral philosophers and their ideas. Constitutes an excellent resource for readers coming to the subject of ethics for the first time
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486The virtues of ignoranceJournal of Philosophy 86 (7): 373-384. 1989.In The Virtues of Ignorance the author demonstrates that classical theories of virtue are flawed and developes a consequentialist theory of virtue. ;Virtues are excellences of character. They are traits which are considered to be valuable in some way. A person who is virtuous is one who has a tendency to act well. Classical philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, believed that virtues, as human excellences, could not involve ignorance in any way. On their view, the virtuous agent, when acting…Read more
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190Consequentialism and feminist ethicsHypatia 20 (4): 183-199. 2000.: This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not ch…Read more
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5The Ethics of InterventionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 851-870. 1997.This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers …Read more
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Ificial etwtc^In Christopher Grau (ed.), Philosophers Explore the Matrix, Oxford University Press. pp. 208. 2005.
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9The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin
University of St. Andrews
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University of St. AndrewsCEPPAResearcher
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |