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89Private BlameCriminal Law and Philosophy 10 (2): 215-220. 2016.This paper explores a problem for Michael McKenna’s conversation model of moral responsibility that views blame as characteristically part of a conversational exchange. The problem for this model on which this paper focuses is the problem of private blame. Sometimes when we blame we do so without any intention to engage in a communicative exchange. It is argued that McKenna’s model cannot adequately account for private blame.
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163The Conflation of Moral and Epistemic VirtueMetaphilosophy 34 (3): 367-383. 2003.Accounts of virtue suffer a conflation problem when they appear unable to preserve intuitive distinctions between types of virtue. In this essay I argue that a number of influential attempts to preserve the distinction between moral and epistemic virtues fail, on the grounds that they characterize virtuous traits in terms of ‘characteristic motivation’. I claim that this does not distinguish virtuous traits at the level of value‐conferring quality, and I propose that the best alternative is to d…Read more
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2Luck and Fortune in Moral EvaluationIn Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in philosophy, Routledge/taylor & Francis Group. 2013.
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309Uneasy VirtueCambridge University Press. 2001.The predominant view of moral virtue can be traced back to Aristotle. He believed that moral virtue must involve intellectual excellence. To have moral virtue one must have practical wisdom - the ability to deliberate well and to see what is morally relevant in a given context. Julia Driver challenges this classical theory of virtue, arguing that it fails to take into account virtues which do seem to involve ignorance or epistemic defect. Some 'virtues of ignorance' are counterexamples to accoun…Read more
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68Consequentialism and Feminist EthicsHypatia 20 (4): 183-199. 2000.This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not char…Read more
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33Review of Brad Hooker, Ideal Code, Real World (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (6). 2002.
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98Moral sense and sentimentalismIn Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, Oxford University Press. pp. 358. 2013.This chapter focuses on sentimentalism – the view that morality is based on sentiment – in particular, the sentiment of sympathy. Sentimentalism was historically articulated in opposition to two positions: Hobbesian egoism, in which morality is based on self-interest; and Moral Rationalism, which held that morality is based on reason alone. The Sentimentalists challenged both views, arguing that there is more to what motivates human beings than simple self-interest and that reason alone is insuf…Read more
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52IntroductionUtilitas 13 (2): 137. 2001.The evaluation of character has taken on new significance in moral theory, and, indeed, some advocate a shift in focus away from evaluating action to evaluating character. This has been taken to pose special challenges for utilitarian and consequentialist moral theory. Utilitarianism's commitment to impartiality and its seeming failure to accommodate virtue evaluation have led to problems, some of which are developed in the essays in this volume
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32Caesar's Wife: On the Moral Significance of Appearing GoodJournal of Philosophy 89 (7): 331. 1992.
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96The Secret Chain: A Limited Defense of SympathySouthern Journal of Philosophy 49 (s1): 234-238. 2011.This paper responds to criticisms of sympathy-based approaches to ethics made by Jesse Prinz, focusing on the criticism that emotions are too variable to form a basis for ethics. I draw on the idea, articulated by early sentimentalists such as Hutcheson and Hume, that proper reliance on sympathy is subject to a corrective procedure in order, in part, to avoid the variability problem.
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75The ethics of interventionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4): 851-870. 1997.This essay explores the obligations that may arise from benevolently intended interventions that go awry. The author argues that even when the intervening agent has acted with good intentions and in a non-negligent manner, she may be required to continue aid in cases where her initial intervention failed. This is surprising because it means that persons who perform supererogatory acts run the risk of incurring additional heavy obligations through no fault of their own. The author also considers …Read more
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24Paul Hurley, Beyond Consequentialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), viii + 275 pp. ISBN: 978-0-19-955930-5. $60 (hbk.) (review)Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (4): 570-572. 2013.
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148MoralismJournal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2). 2005.abstract In this paper moralism is defined as the illicit use of moral considerations. Three different varieties of moralism are then discussed — moral absolutism, excessive standards and demandingness, and presenting non‐moral considerations as moral ones. Both individuals and theories can be regarded as moralistic in some of these senses. Indeed, some critics of consequentialism have regarded that theory as moralistic. The author then describes the problems associated with each sense of ‘moral…Read more
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4Hume's sentimentalist account of moral judgementIn Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume, Continuum. pp. 279. 2012.
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17The Reconciliation Project in EthicsInternational Journal of Applied Philosophy 19 (2): 271-276. 2005.
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38Review of Nomy Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (11). 2003.
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232Monkeying with Motives: Agent-Basing Virtue Ethics*: Julia DriverUtilitas 7 (2): 281-288. 1995.Virtue ethics has generated a great deal of excitement among ethicists largely because it is seen as an alternative to the traditional theories – utilitarianism and Kantian ethics – which have come under considerable scrutiny and criticism in the past 30 years. Rather than give up the enterprise of doing moral theory altogether, as some have suggested, others have opted to develop an alternative that would hopefully avoid the shortcomings of both utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. Several writer…Read more
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18Joel J. Kupperman, Value … and What Follows:Value … and What FollowsEthics 111 (2): 424-427. 2001.
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1870Ethics: The FundamentalsWiley-Blackwell. 2006._Ethics: The Fundamentals_ explores core ideas and arguments in moral theory by introducing students to different philosophical approaches to ethics, including virtue ethics, Kantian ethics, divine command theory, and feminist ethics. The first volume in the new Fundamentals of Philosophy series. Presents lively, real-world examples and thoughtful discussion of key moral philosophers and their ideas. Constitutes an excellent resource for readers coming to the subject of ethics for the first time
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485The virtues of ignoranceJournal of Philosophy 86 (7): 373-384. 1989.In The Virtues of Ignorance the author demonstrates that classical theories of virtue are flawed and developes a consequentialist theory of virtue. ;Virtues are excellences of character. They are traits which are considered to be valuable in some way. A person who is virtuous is one who has a tendency to act well. Classical philosophers, such as Plato and Aristotle, believed that virtues, as human excellences, could not involve ignorance in any way. On their view, the virtuous agent, when acting…Read more
Julia Driver
University of Texas at Austin
University of St. Andrews
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University of St. AndrewsCEPPAResearcher
Austin, Texas, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |
Areas of Interest
Value Theory |