•  123
    Events
    Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2005.
    events all seem to have something in common, metaphysically speaking, and some philosophers have inquired into what this common nature is. The main aim of a theory of events is to propose and defend an identity condition on events; that is, a condition under which two events are identical. For example, if Brutus kills Caesar by stabbing him, are there two events, the stabbing and the killing, or only one event? Each of the leading theories of events is surveyed in this article. According to Jaeg…Read more
  •  95
    Non‐Reductive Physicalism Cannot Appeal to Token Identity
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3): 719-728. 2011.
  •  60
    Conceptual atomism rethought
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (2-3): 224-225. 2010.
    Focusing on Machery's claim that concepts play entirely different roles in philosophy and psychology, I explain how one well-known philosophical theory of concepts, Conceptual Atomism (CA), when properly understood, takes into account both kinds of roles
  •  188
    The nature of symbols in the language of thought
    Mind and Language 24 (5): 523-553. 2009.
    The core of the language of thought program is the claim that thinking is the manipulation of symbols according to rules. Yet LOT has said little about symbol natures, and existing accounts are highly controversial. This is a major flaw at the heart of the LOT program: LOT requires an account of symbol natures to naturalize intentionality, to determine whether the brain even engages in symbol manipulations, and to understand how symbols relate to lower-level neurocomputational states. This paper…Read more
  •  192
    LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room
    Synthese 170 (2). 2009.
    According to the language of thought (LOT) approach and the related computational theory of mind (CTM), thinking is the processing of symbols in an inner mental language that is distinct from any public language. Herein, I explore a deep problem at the heart of the LOT/CTM program—it has yet to provide a plausible conception of a mental symbol