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222A simple theory of promisingPhilosophical Review 115 (1): 51-77. 2006.Why do human beings make and accept promises? What human interest is served by this procedure? Many hold that promising serves what I shall call an information interest, an interest in information about what will happen. And they hold that human beings ought to keep their promises because breaches of promise threaten this interest. On this view human beings take promises seriously because we want correct information about how other human beings are going to act. Some such view is taken for grant…Read more
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100The problem with promisingIn H. Sheinman (ed.), Promises and Agreements: Philosophical Essays, . pp. 58-79. 2011.Why have philosophers since Hume regarded promising as problematic? I distinguish two problems raised by Hume. The problem of the bare wrong is the problem of how it can make sense to avoid a wrong when the wrong does not affect any intelligible human interest. The problem of normative power is the problem of how something can be a wrong simply because it has been declared to be a wrong. I argue that the problem of the bare wrong is more basic. I then examine the attempts of practice theorists l…Read more
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920Promises and Conflicting ObligationsJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1): 93-108. 2016.This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make bin…Read more
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University of ChicagoRegular Faculty
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |