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90The Value of DutyAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 199-215. 2012.The obligations we owe to those with whom we share a valuable relationship (like friendship) cannot be reduced to the obligations we owe to others simply as fellow persons (e.g. the duty to reciprocate benefits received). Wallace suggests that this is because such valuable relationships are loving relationships. I instead propose that it is because, unlike general moral obligations, such valuable relationships (and their constitutive obligations) serve our normative interests. Part of what makes…Read more
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905Promises and Conflicting ObligationsJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (1): 93-108. 2016.This paper addresses two questions. First can a binding promise conflict with other binding promises and thereby generate conflicting obligations? Second can binding promises conflict with other non-promissory obligations, so that we are obliged to keep so-called ‘wicked promises’? The answer to both questions is ‘yes’. The discussion examines both ‘natural right’ and ‘social practice’ approaches to promissory obligation and I conclude that neither can explain why we should be unable to make bin…Read more
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University of ChicagoRegular Faculty
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Normative Ethics |
Social and Political Philosophy |