Timothy Brian Noone

This lecture treats the theme of habitual cognition in both its commonplace and unusual senses in the tradition of ancient and medieval philosophy. Beginning with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and its teaching on habits, it traces how the ancient and medieval Peripatetic tradition received and developed the idea of habitual knowledge. The lecture then turns to three case-studies in which the notion of habitual knowledge is used in unusual senses: Aquinas’s treatment of self-knowledge; Scotus’s account of human awareness of the concept of being; and Peter Auriol’s observations regarding memory and subconscious awareness in ordinary reptitive acts. Aquinas and Scotus seem to identify habitual knowledge in its unusual sense with the presence of an intelligible in the mind prior to actual cognition of that object. Auriol extends habitual knowledge to cover the cognitive state of someone performing an act without any conscious attention. The uses by both Aquinas and Scotus seem somewhat parallel to the use of habit or pre-conscious knowledge in Hume and Kant.

In this clearly written and impressive volume, Giorgio Pini has provided the first systematic book-length study of Duns Scotus’s doctrine of the categories and an extremely useful sketch of his views on logic generally. Divided into six chapters, the work covers the gamut of interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories over the course of the thirteenth century, ranging from the views of Robert Kilwardby and Albertus Magnus in the 1240s to the leading opinions of the 1280s and 1290s, those held by Radulphus Brito, Simon of Faversham, and Peter of Auvergne. Through this survey of historical background to Scotus’s logical, metaphysical, and theological works, the reader becomes readily acquainted with the systematic options for understanding categories, both in logic and in metaphysics, while appreciating all the more keenly the full bearing of Scotus’s own teaching.

In this article, I argue that St. Bonaventure’s account of angelic natural knowledge of singulars is a remote source for the doctrine of intuitive cognition as this doctrine is later articulated in the writings of John Duns Scotus and his contemporaries. The article begins by reminding the reader of the essential elementsof intuitive cognition, then surveys the treatment of angelic knowledge in Bonaventure’s predecessors and contemporaries, and ends with an analysis ofBonaventure’s own teaching. The point on which Bonaventure anticipates Scotus’s teaching is his insistence that angels know truths about singulars by directlycognizing the existence and presence of singulars without receiving any species in the direct cognitive act.