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196Timothy Williamson, vagueness: London and new York: 1994 (review)Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (2): 221-235. 1998.
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165Thought, thoughts, and deflationismPhilosophical Studies 173 (12): 3153-3168. 2016.Deflationists about truth embrace the positive thesis that the notion of truth is useful as a logical device, for such purposes as blanket endorsement, and the negative thesis that the notion doesn’t have any legitimate applications beyond its logical uses, so it cannot play a significant theoretical role in scientific inquiry or causal explanation. Focusing on Christopher Hill as exemplary deflationist, the present paper takes issue with the negative thesis, arguing that, without making use of …Read more
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2The analysis of" a; is true" asIn Anil Gupta & Andre Chapuis (eds.), Circularity, Definition, and Truth, Indian Council of Philosophical Research. pp. 255. 2000.
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195Conditional probabilities and compounds of conditionalsPhilosophical Review 98 (4): 485-541. 1989.
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60Review: John Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3): 379-380. 2001.
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136Learning the ImpossibleIn Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision, Cambridge University Press. pp. 179-199. 1994.
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222000 Annual Meeting of the Association for Symbolic LogicBulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (3): 361-396. 2000.
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248Inscrutability and its discontentsNoûs 39 (3). 2005.That reference is inscrutable is demonstrated, it is argued, not only by W. V. Quine's arguments but by Peter Unger's "Problem of the Many." Applied to our own language, this is a paradoxical result, since nothing could be more obvious to speakers of English than that, when they use the word "rabbit," they are talking about rabbits. The solution to this paradox is to take a disquotational view of reference for one's own language, so that "When I use 'rabbit,' I refer to rabbits" is made true by …Read more
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50Vagueness, and Paradox: An Essay in the Logic of Truth (review)Philosophical Review 103 (1): 142-144. 1994.
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57The complexity of the modal predicate logic of "true in every transitive model of ZF"Journal of Symbolic Logic 62 (4): 1371-1378. 1997.
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14Etchemendy John. The concept of logical consequence. An unaltered republication of jsl lvii 254. The David Hume series of philosophy and cognitive science reissues. Center for the study of language and information, Stanford 1999, also distributed by cambridge university press, new York, VII + 174 pp (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (3): 379-380. 2001.
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18Logic, logic, and logic, by Boolos George, with introductions and afterword by John P. Burgess, edited by Jeffrey Richard, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1998, ix+ 443 pp (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 7 (1): 58-62. 2001.
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2Universal Universal Quantification: Comments on Rayo and WilliamsonIn Jc Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox, Clarendon Press. pp. 357-364. 2003.
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143How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative resultJournal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4). 1985.
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4There's a Rule for EverythingIn Agustín Rayo & Gabriel Uzquiano (eds.), Absolute Generality, Oxford University Press. pp. 179--202. 2006.
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29Review: John Etchemendy, The Concept of Logical Consequence (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1): 254-255. 1992.
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145Maximal consistent sets of instances of Tarski’s schemaJournal of Philosophical Logic 21 (3). 1992.
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Structures and the Hyperarithmetical Hierarchy. Knight has directed or co-directed seven doctoral dissertations in mathematics and one in electrical engineering. She served on selection panels for the NSF Postdoctoral Fellowships, on program committees of numerous meetings, and as an editor of The Journal of Symbolic Logic (1989-1995) (review)Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (1). 2000.
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175KilimanjaroCanadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1): 141-163. 1997.This is not an overly ambitious paper. What I would like to do is to take a thesis that most people would regard as wildly implausible, and convince you that it is, in fact, false. What's worse, the argument I shall give is by no means airtight, though I hope it's reasonably convincing. The thesis has to do with the fuzzy boundaries of terms that refer to familiar middle-sized objects, terms like ‘Kilimanjaro’ and ‘the tallest mountain in Africa.’ It is intuitively clear that Kilimanjaro has a f…Read more
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