Stathis Livadas

In this article I deal with the notion of observation, from a phenomenologically motivated point of view, and its representation mainly by means of the formal language of quantum mechanics. In doing so, I have taken the notion of observation in two diverse contexts. In one context as a notion related with objects of a logical-mathematical theory taken as registered facts of phenomenological perception ( Wahrnehmung ) inasmuch as this phenomenological idea can also be linked with a process of measurement on the quantum-mechanical level. In another context I have taken it as connected with a notion of temporal constitution basically as it is described in E. Husserl’s texts on the phenomenology of temporal consciousness. Given that mathematical objects as formal-ontological objects can be thought of as abstractions of perceptual objects by means of categorial intuition, the question is whether and under what theoretical assumptions we can, in principle, include quantum objects in abstraction in the class of formal-ontological objects and thus inquire on the limits of their description within a formal-axiomatical theory. On the one hand, I derive an irreducibility on the level of individuals taken in formal representation as syntactical atoms-substrates without any further content and on the other hand a transcendental subjectivity of consciousness objectified as a self-constituted temporal unity upon which it is ultimately grounded the possibility of generation of an abstract predicative universe of discourse

In this article I deal with time as a notion of epistemological content associated though with the notion of a subjective consciousness co-constitutive of physical reality. In this phenomenologically grounded approach I attempt to establish a ‘metaphysical’ aspect of time, within a strictly pistemological context, in the sense of an underlying absolute subjectivity which is non-objectifiable within objective temporality and thus non-susceptible of any ontological designation. My arguments stem, on the one hand, from a version of quantum-mechanical theory in view of its formal treatment of two different aspects of time within a quantum context. The discrete, partial-ordering properties and the dynamical-parameter properties reflected in the wave equations of motion. On the other hand, to strengthen my arguments for a transcendental factor of temporality, I attempt an interpretation of some relevant conclusions in the work of J. Eccles and of certain results of experimental research of S. Deahaene et al. and others

This article attempts to link the notion of absolute ego as the ultimate subjectivity of consciousness in continental tradition with a phenomenology of Mathematical Continuum as this term is generally established following Cantor’s pioneering ideas on the properties and cardinalities of sets. My motivation stems mainly from the inherent ambiguities underlying the nature and properties of this fundamental mathematical notion which, in my view, cannot be resolved in principle by the analytical means of any formal language not even by the addition of any new axioms to a consistent first-order axiomatical system such as the Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory. In this phenomenologically motivated approach I deal, to some extent, with the undecidability of a fundamental statement about the cardinality of Continuum inside ZFC theory, namely the Continuum Hypothesis, and also with the underlying root of Gödel’s first incompleteness result.Este artigo procura conectar a noção de ego absoluto enquanto subjetividade última da consciência na tradição continental com a fenomenologia da matemática do contínuo tal como este termo foi estabelecido seguindo as idéias pioneiras de Cantor sobre as propriedades e cardinalidade de conjuntos. Minha motivação deriva basicamente das ambigüidades subjacentes à natureza e propriedades desta noção matemática fundamental as quais, no meu entender, não podem, em princípio, ser resolvidas pelos meios analíticos de qualquer linguagem formal e nem mesmo pela adição de novos axiomas a um sistema axiomático consistente de primeira ordem como a teoria de conjuntos de Zermelo Fraenkel . Neste tratamento fenomenológica-mente motivado eu lido em certa medida com a indecidibilidade de uma tese fundamental sobre a cardinalidade do contínuo em ZFC, a saber, a Hipótese do Contínuo, e também com aquilo que está na base do primeiro resultado de incompletude de Gödel

This article deals with a question of a most general, comprehensive and profound content as it is the nature of mathematical–logical objects insofar as these are considered objects of knowledge and more specifically objects of formal mathematical theories. As objects of formal theories they are dealt with in the sense they have acquired primarily from the beginnings of the systematic study of mathematical foundations in connection with logic dating from the works of G. Cantor and G. Frege in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Largely motivated by a phenomenologically founded view of mathematical objects/states-of-affairs, I try to consistently argue for their character as objects shaped to a certain extent by intentional forms exhibited by consciousness and the modes of constitution of inner temporality and at the same time as constrained in the form of immanent ‘appearances’ by what stands as their non-eliminable reference, that is, the world as primitive soil of experience and the mathematical intuitions developed in relations of reciprocity within-the-world. In this perspective and relative to my intentions I enter, in the last section, into a brief review of certain positions of G. Sher’s foundational holism and R. Tieszen’s constituted platonism, among others, respectively presented in Sher and Tieszen.

In this article I intend to show that certain aspects of A.N. Whitehead's philosophy of organism and especially his epochal theory of time, as mainly exposed in his well-known work Process and Reality, can serve in clarify the underlying assumptions that shape nonstandard mathematical theories as such and also as metatheories of quantum mechanics. Concerning the latter issue, I point to an already significant research on nonstandard versions of quantum mechanics; two of these approaches are chosen to be critically presented in relation to the scope of this work. The main point of the paper is that, insofar as we can refer a nonstandard mathematical entity to a kind of axiomatical formalization essentially 'codifying' an underlying mental process indescribable as such by analytic means, we can possibly apply certain principles of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme focused on the key notion of process which is generally conceived as the becoming of actual entities. This is done in the sense of a unifying approach to provide an interpretation of nonstandard mathematical theories as such and also, in their metatheoretical status, as a formalization of the empirical-experimental context of quantum mechanics.

In this article I intend to show that certain aspects of the axiomatical structure of mathematical theories can be, by a phenomenologically motivated approach, reduced to two distinct types of idealization, the first-level idealization associated with the concrete intuition of the objects of mathematical theories as discrete, finite sign-configurations and the second-level idealization associated with the intuition of infinite mathematical objects as extensions over constituted temporality. This is the main standpoint from which I review Cantor’s conception of infinite cardinalities and also the metatheoretical content of some later well-known theorems of mathematical foundations. These are, the Skolem-Löwenheim Theorem which, except for its importance as such, it is also chosen for an interpretation of the associated metatheoretical paradox (Skolem Paradox), and Gödel’s (first) incompleteness result which, notwithstanding its obvious influence in the mathematical foundations, is still open to philosophical inquiry. On the phenomenological level, first-level and second-level idealizations, as above, are associated respectively with intentional acts carried out in actual present and with certain modes of a temporal constitution process

This article attempts a subjectively based approach, in fact one phenomenologically motivated, toward some key concepts of forcing theory, primarily the concepts of a generic set and its global properties and the absoluteness of certain fundamental relations in the extension to a forcing model M[G]. By virtue of this motivation and referring both to the original and current formulation of forcing I revisit certain set-theoretical notions serving as underpinnings of the theory and try to establish their deeper subjectively founded content and also their influence in reaching relative consistency results by the forcing method. In this perspective, the present approach may be seen as offering an alternative view of the consistency results of K. Gödel and P. Cohen in mathematical foundations reaching a subjective level that may be taken as ultimately conditioning the non-decidability of key infinity statements on the level of formal theory