Marek Piechowiak

Pierwszorzędnym przedmiotem badań są przyjęte w Karcie, wprost lub domyślnie, rozstrzygnięcia typu aksjologicznego. Przez „aksjologiczne podstawy” rozumiane są rozstrzygnięcia dotyczące uznania takich, a nie innych, wartości czy dóbr za przedmiot ochrony; a ponieważ chodzi o „podstawy”, przedmiotem zainteresowania są rozstrzygnięcia fundamentalne w takim sensie, że stanowią one uzasadnienie dla bardziej szczegółowych rozstrzygnięć aksjologicznych i normatywnych. Pozwala to m.in. na formułowanie wniosków co do spójności rozstrzygnięć szczegółowych. Zagadnienie aksjologicznych podstaw obejmuje także problematykę relacji między wartościami a prawami podstawowymi oraz zagadnienie ontologicznego statusu wartości i chronionych praw. Artykuł zawiera także wyniki badań nad wprowadzeniem do preambuły Karty w wersji niemieckojęzycznej zapisu o religijnym dziedzictwie, odbiegającego od brzmienia w innych językach mówiącego o dziedzictwie duchowym.

The analysis focuses on the passage of Gorgias (506c–507c) in which Plato’s Socrates is having a dialog with himself. Socrates is talking to someone who, better than any other partner of discussion, is capable to discern the truth; this is an extraordinary way of expressing philosophical views by Plato. It suggests that in this passage Plato is considering questions which are of a primary importance. There are also other signs, both in the structure of the text and in the comments made by Socrates regarding the form of discussion, which confirm that in this passage we deal with the most important matters. The analyzed passage refers to justice. First, Plato is summarizing views on justice of soul which were developed in the earlier parts of Gorgias. Then he is talking about justice of deeds as consisting in doing what is fitting as regards men. It is an addition to the earlier discussion and therefore the expression of this view can be recognized as the important reason why Socrates’ dialog with himself was constructed. Attention is paid to a certain gap in the argumentation. At the first glance it is not clear why the thesis that justice of soul is based on order and harmony of its elements justifies the thesis that justice of deeds consists in doing what is fitting as regards men. This gap can be filled in by the so-called Plato’s unwritten teaching on the good in itself. According to this teaching the good in itself is the one (the unity) which from its very nature gives existence and life by doing what is fitting as being advantageous to something. Order and harmony in the soul is the basis of its unity and therefore of its similarity to the good in itself and of the similarity of soul’s activity to the way the good is acting. Acting justly, doing what is fitting, in the sense of being advantageous to others, is the best thing a man or a woman can do, it is something which fulfills and makes him or her happy. Wisdom and — generally speaking — knowledge is clearly regarded as a means and not the aim in itself. An individual, and not an abstract idea, is the primary object of the activity which fulfills a rational being.