Nicole Hassoun

Is nanotechnology-based human enhancement morally permissible? One reason to question such enhancement stems from a concern for preserving our species. It is harder than one might think, however, to explain what could be wrong with altering our own species. One possibility is to turn to the environmental ethics literature. Perhaps some of the arguments for preserving other species can be applied against nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter human nature. This paper critically examines the case for using two of the strongest arguments in the environmental ethics literature to show that nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible: 1) Our species, like many other naturally occurring species, has aesthetic value. So, nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species should be prohibited. 2) Our species plays valuable ecological roles. Nanotechnology-based human enhancements that alter our species are likely to interfere with our species playing our ecologically valuable roles. So, such enhancements should be prohibited. Neither argument, ultimately, proves conclusive. The paper concludes, however, that considerations underlying both arguments may show us that some nanotechnology-based human enhancements are impermissible.

What should environmentalists say about free trade? Many environmentalists object to free trade by appealing the “Race to the Bottom Argument.” This argument is inconclusive, but there are reasons to worry about unrestricted free trade’s environmental effects nonetheless; the rules of trade embodied in institutions such as the World Trade Organization may be unjustifiable. Programs to compensate for trade-related environmental damage, appropriate trade barriers, and consumer movements may be necessary and desirable. At least environmentalists should consider these alternatives to unrestricted free trade if they do not prevent the achievement of other important moral objectives, can efficiently reduce environmental problems, and institutional safeguards can prevent their abuse

Is there a human right to health? If so, what are its grounds? Can a legal or moral human right to health provide any practical guidance when it comes to making decisions about, for instance, the allocation of scarce health resources? There are many possible answers to these questions in the literature. This article surveys some of these replies. First, however, it examines the distinctions between legal and moral human rights and rights to health vs. health care. It then surveys the literature on potential grounds for a moral human right to health. It concludes by considering replies to several common objections to the existence of a human right to health

This paper examines how people think about aiding others in a way that can inform both theory and practice. It uses data gathered from Kiva, an online, non-profit organization that allows individuals to aid other individuals around the world, to isolate intuitions that people find broadly compelling. The central result of the paper is that people seem to give more priority to aiding those in greater need, at least below some threshold. That is, the data strongly suggest incorporating both a threshold and a prioritarian principle into the analysis of what principles for aid distribution people accept. This conclusion should be of broad interest to aid practitioners and policy makers. It may also provide important information for political philosophers interested in building, justifying, and criticizing theories about meeting needs using empirical evidence.

This paper presents new data on the representation of women who publish in 25 top philosophy journals as ranked by the Philosophical Gourmet Report for the years 2004, 2014, and 2015. It also provides a new analysis of Schwitzgebel’s 1955–2015 journal data. The paper makes four points while providing an overview of the current state of women authors in philosophy. In all years and for all journals, the percentage of female authors was extremely low, in the range of 14–16%. The percentage of women authors is less than the percentage of women faculty in different ranks and at different kinds of institutions. In addition, there is great variation across individual journals, and the discrepancy between women authors and women faculty appears to be different in different subfields. Interestingly, journals which do not practice anonymous review seem to have a higher percentage of women authors than journals which practice double anonymous or triple anonymous review. This paper also argues that we need more data on academic publishing to better understand whether this can explain why there are so few full-time female faculty in philosophy, since full-time hiring and tenuring practices presumably depend on a candidate’s academic publishing.

At first blush, debt‐for‐nature swaps seem to provide win‐win solutions to the looming problems of environmental degradation and extreme poverty. So, one might naturally assume that they are morally permissible, if not obligatory. This article will argue, however, that debt‐for‐nature swaps are sometimes morally questionable, if not morally impermissible. It suggests that some criticisms of traditional (economic) conditions placed on loans to poor countries also apply to the (environmental) conditionality implicit in such swaps. The article's main theoretical contribution is to suggest a general argumentative strategy for posing a challenge to the moral acceptability of many seemingly innocuous, or even apparently good, policies in the real world. Its discussion of how we should respond to seemingly tragic dilemmas (e.g. between protecting nature and respecting human rights) may also be of general interest.

The problems of global health are truly terrible. Millions suffer and die from diseases like tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS, and malaria. One way of addressing these problems is via a Global Health Impact labeling campaign. If even a small percentage of consumers promote global health by purchasing Global Health Impact products, the incentive to use this label will be substantial. One might wonder, however, whether consumers are morally obligation to purchase any these goods or whether doing so is even morally permissible. This paper suggests that if the proposal is implemented, purchasing Global Health Impact labelled goods is at least morally permissible, if not morally required. Its argument should, moreover, be of much more general interest to those considering different kinds of ethical consumption.

A recent trend in international development circles is ‘New Institutionalism’. In a slogan, the idea is just that good institutions matter. The slogan itself is so innocuous as to be hardly worth comment. But the push to improve institutional quality has the potential to have a much less innocuous impact on aid efforts and other aspects of international development. This paper provides a critical introduction to some of the literature on institutional quality. It looks, in particular, at an argument for the conclusion that making aid conditional on good institutional quality will promote development by reducing poverty. This paper suggests that there is little theoretical or empirical evidence that this kind of conditionality is good for the poor.

In “World Poverty and Individual Freedom”, I argue that the global order—because it is coercive—is obligated to do what it can to ensure that its subjects are capable of autonomously agreeing to its rule. This requires helping them meet their basic needs. In “World Poverty and Not Respecting Individual Freedom Enough,” Jorn Sonderholm asserts that this argument is invalid and unsound, in part, because it is too demanding. This article explains why Sonderholm’s critique is mistaken and misses the main point of WPIF’s argument. It also explains why WPIF is important—it can address some of those most resistant to significant obligations of global justice—libertarians, actual consent theorists, and statists.

All people have human rights and there is a close connection between human rights, needs, and autonomy. Accounting for this connection is difficult on many of the traditional rights theories. On many traditional theories, human rights protect individuals’ important interests. These theories are well suited to account for the fact that human rights protect individuals from dire need. Even the non-autonomous have some needs, which constitute some of their important interests. But because these theories sometimes say autonomy is not constitutive of the interests human rights protect they can fail to capture the close relationship between human rights and autonomy. On other traditional human rights theories, human rights only protect individuals’ autonomy. These theories avoid the problem sketched above. But, purely autonomy-based theories cannot explain the universality of rights -- some people lack autonomy. Furthermore, if human rights only protect individuals’ autonomy, human rights can be fulfilled and yet some can be left in dire need. So, some of the best known attempts to justify human rights either cannot appropriately connect human rights and autonomy or cannot account for the human right of all to meet their basic needs. This paper suggests that a theory on which human rights protect individuals’ ability to live minimally good lives should be taken seriously because it can avoid this dilemma. For, it argues, people need whatever will enable them to live such lives and autonomy is partly constitutive of such a life