V. J. Thomas

Individuation and organization in complex living multi-level ecosystem occurs as dynamical processes from early ontogeny. The notion of living “holon” displaying dynamic self-assertion and integration is used here to explain the ecosystems dynamic processes. The update of the living holon state according to the continuous change of the dynamic system allows for its viability. This is interpreted as adaptation, selection and organization by the human that observes the system a posteriori from its level. Our model concerns the complex dynamics of the adaptive immune system, integrating holon-lymphocytes that collectively preserve the identity and integrity of the organism. Each lymphocyte individualizes as a dynamic holon-lymphocyte, with somatic gene individuation leading to an individual, singular antigen immunoreceptor type, promoting the self-assertion. In turn, the “Immunoception” allows for perception of the environmental antigenic context, thus integration of the holon in its environment. The self-assertion/integration of holon-lymphocyte starts from fetal stages and is influenced by mother Lamarckian acquired historicity transmissions, a requisite for the integrity of the holobiont-organism. We propose a dynamic model of the perception by holon-lymphocyte, and at the supra-clonal level of the immune system functions that sustain the identity and integrity of the holon-holobiont organism.

Patrick Deneen’s criticisms of liberalism are both penetrating and persuasive. Yet, Deneen does not adequately address liberalism’s strongest arguments. Deneen’s concept of “liberalism” is problematic because it minimizes the significant distinctions between classical liberalism and progressivism. Certain principles of classical liberalism, such as the free market and an increased awareness of human beings as rights-bearing individuals, are compatible with the Catholic faith. Progressivism, on the other hand, is not. Progressivism’s moral failings are far worse than those associated with classical liberalism. Although classical liberalism is itself flawed, it remains viable to the extent that it may be integrated with core Christian teachings.

This paper presents methods and challenges attendant on the use of protocol analysis to develop a model of heuristic processing applied to research ethics. Participants are exposed to ethically complex scenarios and asked to verbalize their thoughts as they formulate a requested decision. The model identifies functional parts of the decision-making task: interpretation, retrieval, judgment and editing and seeks to reliably code participant verbalizations to those tasks as well as to a set of cognitive tools generally useful in such work. Important difficulties in the reliability and external validity of measurement are evaluated and a small set of illustrative data is used in support of that discussion. Results indicate that both intuitive emotional but also more deliberative cognition is present which is consistent with work in related literatures in expertise and in neuropsychology. Finally, the theoretical and practical potential of the approach is elaborated, particularly through links to a framing in Aristotelian ethics.

The ‘continuous’ and the ‘discrete’ in nature and in science live and fight forever. The questionnaires and the Lickert scales are indispensable and widely used tools in social sciences research. Vougiouklis & Vougiouklis bar is a new tool introduced as an alternative to Lickert scales. We believe that such an alternative might offer some solutions to problems that crop up during the fight between continuous and discrete. Nevertheless, the greatest contribution of the V&V bar is that it offers the researchers freedom in all stages of the research procedure using a questionnaire.

Vougiouklis & Vougiouklis have proposed the replacement of Likert scales, usually used in questionnaires, with a bar. With this proposal a discrete situation is replaced by a fuzzy one. There are identified certain advantages concerning the use of the bar as compared to that of a scale during both the stages of filling-in as well as processing a questionnaire. The main advantage is the fact that it is much quicker to fill in and much easier to explain to participants. The bar provides the potential for different types of processing Likert scales cannot offer. Therefore the researchers are allowed to ascertain that the given answers follow the Gauss or a parabola distribution, and they have the opportunity to ‘correct’ this tendency. In this research it is offered a possibility of choosing amongst a number of alternatives by utilizing fuzzy logic in the same way as it has already been done in industry and combining mathematical models with multivalued operations. Finally, the suggested method is applied in a Course and Teaching Evaluation process by the students of Democritus University of Thrace.

It has often been observed that color is a highly preferred attribute for use in distinguishing descriptions, that is, referring expressions produced with the purpose of identifying an object within a visual scene. However, most of these observations were based on visual displays containing only colors that were maximally different in hue and for which the language of experimentation possessed basic color terms. The experiments described in this paper investigate whether speakers’ preference for color is reduced if the color of the target referent is similar to that of the distractors. Because colors that look similar are often also harder to distinguish linguistically, we also examine the impact of the codability of color values. As a third factor, we investigate the salience of available alternative attributes and its impact on the use of color. The results of our experiments show that, while speakers are indeed less likely to use color when the colors in a display are similar, this effect is mostly due to the difficulty in naming similar colors. Color use for color with a basic color term is affected only when the colors of target and distractors are very similar. The salience of our alternative attribute size, manipulated by varying the difference in size between target and distractors, had no impact on the use of color.

Fuzzy logics are in most cases based on an ad-hoc decision about the interpretation of the conjunction. If they are useful or not can typically be found out only by testing them with example data. Why we should use a specific fuzzy logic can in general not be made plausible. Since the difficulties arise from the use of additional, unmotivated structure with which the set of truth values is endowed, the only way to base fuzzy logics on firm ground is the development of alternative semantics to all of whose components we can associate a meaning. In this paper, we present one possible approach to justify ex post Łukasiewicz Logic as well as Basic Logic. The notion of ambiguity is central. Our framework consists of a Boolean or a Heyting algebra, respectively, endowed with an equivalence relation expressing ambiguity. The quotient set bears naturally the structure of an MV- or a BL-algebra, respectively, and thus can be used to interpret propositions of the mentioned logics.

Logics designed to deal with vague statements typically allow algebraic semantics such that propositions are interpreted by elements of residuated lattices. The structure of these algebras is in general still unknown, and in the cases that a detailed description is available, to understand its significance for logics can be difficult. So the question seems interesting under which circumstances residuated lattices arise from simpler algebras in some natural way. A possible construction is described in this paper.Namely, we consider pairs consisting of a Brouwerian algebra and an equivalence relation. The latter is assumed to be in a certain sense compatible with the partial order, with the formation of differences, and with the formation of suprema of pseudoorthogonal elements; we then call it an s-equivalence relation. We consider operations which, under a suitable additional assumption, naturally arise on the quotient set. The result is that the quotient set bears the structure of a residuated lattice. Further postulates lead to dual BL-algebras. In the case that we begin with Boolean algebras instead, we arrive at dual MV-algebras

It is a well-known fact that MV-algebras, the algebraic counterpart of Łukasiewicz logic, correspond to a certain type of partial algebras: lattice-ordered effect algebras fulfilling the Riesz decomposition property. The latter are based on a partial, but cancellative addition, and we may construct from them the representing ℓ-groups in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we consider several logics differing from Łukasiewicz logics in that they contain further connectives: the PŁ-, PŁ'-, PŁ'△-, and ŁΠ-logics. For all their algebraic counterparts, we characterise the corresponding type of partial algebras. We moreover consider the representing f-rings. All in all, we get three-fold correspondences: the total algebras - the partial algebras - the representing rings

Plotin considère parfois l’intellection comme une sorte de sensation, alors qu’il distingue par ailleurs fortement les deux activités. Le but de cet article est d’étudier cette description qui semble paradoxale dans la mesure où l’intellection est ramenée à un processus auquel elle est opposée en même temps. Nous devons tout d’abord mettre en lumière le lien entre la sensation et l’intellection. Il est ensuite nécessaire de montrer de quelle manière la sensation est considérée comme un modèle qui rend compte du processus de la pensée intuitive. C’est la vue qui apparaît comme le sens permettant de décrire l’intellection de la façon la plus adéquate. Mais la sensation ne constitue pas seulement un modèle et les réalités intelligibles sont appelées «les choses sensibles de là-bas», «ces corps» ou encore «les choses visibles». Nous cherchons, en un mot, à comprendre la signification de ces expressions qui semblent contraires à la doctrine platonicienne

One of the most curious events in Othello is the titular character’s epileptic fit, which does not appear in the story by Cinthio that is the accepted source of the play’s plot. Why does Shakespeare invent such an incident? The easiest direction to take is the equation of epilepsy with demonic possession, a common belief in the early modern period. In this essay, however, I argue from textual and critical evidence for a philosophical interpretation of Othello’s epilepsy: namely, that his seizure, particularly in relation to the play’s conflict of reason and emotion, can be seen as a challenge to early modern orthodoxy concerning the mind-body problem, in that it conflates the distinction between body and soul.