V. J. Thomas

It has often been observed that color is a highly preferred attribute for use in distinguishing descriptions, that is, referring expressions produced with the purpose of identifying an object within a visual scene. However, most of these observations were based on visual displays containing only colors that were maximally different in hue and for which the language of experimentation possessed basic color terms. The experiments described in this paper investigate whether speakers’ preference for color is reduced if the color of the target referent is similar to that of the distractors. Because colors that look similar are often also harder to distinguish linguistically, we also examine the impact of the codability of color values. As a third factor, we investigate the salience of available alternative attributes and its impact on the use of color. The results of our experiments show that, while speakers are indeed less likely to use color when the colors in a display are similar, this effect is mostly due to the difficulty in naming similar colors. Color use for color with a basic color term is affected only when the colors of target and distractors are very similar. The salience of our alternative attribute size, manipulated by varying the difference in size between target and distractors, had no impact on the use of color.

Fuzzy logics are in most cases based on an ad-hoc decision about the interpretation of the conjunction. If they are useful or not can typically be found out only by testing them with example data. Why we should use a specific fuzzy logic can in general not be made plausible. Since the difficulties arise from the use of additional, unmotivated structure with which the set of truth values is endowed, the only way to base fuzzy logics on firm ground is the development of alternative semantics to all of whose components we can associate a meaning. In this paper, we present one possible approach to justify ex post Łukasiewicz Logic as well as Basic Logic. The notion of ambiguity is central. Our framework consists of a Boolean or a Heyting algebra, respectively, endowed with an equivalence relation expressing ambiguity. The quotient set bears naturally the structure of an MV- or a BL-algebra, respectively, and thus can be used to interpret propositions of the mentioned logics.

Logics designed to deal with vague statements typically allow algebraic semantics such that propositions are interpreted by elements of residuated lattices. The structure of these algebras is in general still unknown, and in the cases that a detailed description is available, to understand its significance for logics can be difficult. So the question seems interesting under which circumstances residuated lattices arise from simpler algebras in some natural way. A possible construction is described in this paper.Namely, we consider pairs consisting of a Brouwerian algebra and an equivalence relation. The latter is assumed to be in a certain sense compatible with the partial order, with the formation of differences, and with the formation of suprema of pseudoorthogonal elements; we then call it an s-equivalence relation. We consider operations which, under a suitable additional assumption, naturally arise on the quotient set. The result is that the quotient set bears the structure of a residuated lattice. Further postulates lead to dual BL-algebras. In the case that we begin with Boolean algebras instead, we arrive at dual MV-algebras

It is a well-known fact that MV-algebras, the algebraic counterpart of Łukasiewicz logic, correspond to a certain type of partial algebras: lattice-ordered effect algebras fulfilling the Riesz decomposition property. The latter are based on a partial, but cancellative addition, and we may construct from them the representing ℓ-groups in a straightforward manner. In this paper, we consider several logics differing from Łukasiewicz logics in that they contain further connectives: the PŁ-, PŁ'-, PŁ'△-, and ŁΠ-logics. For all their algebraic counterparts, we characterise the corresponding type of partial algebras. We moreover consider the representing f-rings. All in all, we get three-fold correspondences: the total algebras - the partial algebras - the representing rings

Plotin considère parfois l’intellection comme une sorte de sensation, alors qu’il distingue par ailleurs fortement les deux activités. Le but de cet article est d’étudier cette description qui semble paradoxale dans la mesure où l’intellection est ramenée à un processus auquel elle est opposée en même temps. Nous devons tout d’abord mettre en lumière le lien entre la sensation et l’intellection. Il est ensuite nécessaire de montrer de quelle manière la sensation est considérée comme un modèle qui rend compte du processus de la pensée intuitive. C’est la vue qui apparaît comme le sens permettant de décrire l’intellection de la façon la plus adéquate. Mais la sensation ne constitue pas seulement un modèle et les réalités intelligibles sont appelées «les choses sensibles de là-bas», «ces corps» ou encore «les choses visibles». Nous cherchons, en un mot, à comprendre la signification de ces expressions qui semblent contraires à la doctrine platonicienne

One of the most curious events in Othello is the titular character’s epileptic fit, which does not appear in the story by Cinthio that is the accepted source of the play’s plot. Why does Shakespeare invent such an incident? The easiest direction to take is the equation of epilepsy with demonic possession, a common belief in the early modern period. In this essay, however, I argue from textual and critical evidence for a philosophical interpretation of Othello’s epilepsy: namely, that his seizure, particularly in relation to the play’s conflict of reason and emotion, can be seen as a challenge to early modern orthodoxy concerning the mind-body problem, in that it conflates the distinction between body and soul.