Alex Neill

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:KINSHIP AND SEPARATION IN CAVELL'S PURSUITS OF HAPPINESS by Alex Neill In the second part of his article "Getting To Know You,"1 Roger A. Shiner suggests that light can be shed on various epistemological and metaphysical problems through a consideration of what Stanley Cavell has called in his book Pursuits ofHappiness "the Hollywood genre of remarriage."2 Shiner's aim is "to present the genre of remarriage as a figure for the profoundest relationships of epistemology and metaphysics.... Specifically, divorce and remarriage as part of human life are to be seen as figures for separation and kinship, avoidance and acknowledgement in the philosophical sense of those terms" (p. 80). Much of the first part of his paper is concerned with spelling out just what the philosophical sense of these terms in Cavell's work is, and in particular with attempting to draw out the conceptual relationship and balance between the twin notions of kinship and separation. Understanding this relationship is crucial to Shiner's metaphysical and metaphilosophical projects; however, he thinks that it is obscured by Cavell himself: "I believe Cavell's own account in Pursuits ofHappiness to be unstable and its instability importantly instructive" (p. 87). While I share Shiner's view that what he calls Cavell's "conceptual framework" represents an original and important contribution to our understanding of central issues in epistemology and metaphysics, and agree with much of what he has to say about its importance with regard to questions of philosophical method, I find his claim that there is an instability in Cavell's account of the roles of kinship and separation in Pursuits of Happiness unconvincing. There are two elements involved in this claim, and I think that Shiner's discussion of both is seriously misleading with regard to the conceptual relationships between kinship, separation, and acknowledgement. In what follows, I would like to consider 136 Alex Neill137 his claim in some detail, with a view to clarifying the nature of the relationships between these concepts. The standard pattern of the comedies that Cavell discusses in Pursuits ofHappiness is represented by a progression from marriage to divorce to remarriage. A central claim of Shiner's paper is that this pattern reflects a theme which runs through much of Cavell's other work, according to which our relationship to the world and to others is not one of knowing but of acknowledging. 3 Shiner's suggestion is that remarriage is a figure for the condition of acknowledgement, a condition which requires an acceptance of the facts of both human kinship (symbolized here by a first marriage) and human separation (symbolized here by divorce). Shiner's assertion that there is an instability in Cavell's account of the genre of remarriage is based on the latter's inclusion of Bringing Up Baby and It Happened One Night in the genre. His suggestion is that the inclusion of these films obscures the importance of the notion of kinship, a key notion in the genre in its own right, and an important figure for a central concept of metaphysics. The point is that in these films, the protagonists are not at first married to each other: the films begin with their meeting for the first time, and conclude with their marriages. Thus it appears that in Bringing Up Baby and It Happened One Night the kinship stage of the pattern is missing. This is the first element in the instability which Shiner is concerned to bring out. If the inclusion of Bringing Up Baby and It Happened One Night in the genre of remarriage is legitimate, then, it would seem that they must represent or express kinship in some way other than through a first marriage. That is, in order to see Cavell's account as being stable, we need an alternative formulation ofkinship that can be satisfied by these films. A candidate for such an alternative formulation is suggested by Cavell in his reading of The Philadelphia Story: "Having... in some way created a childhood past together, remains a law for the happiness of the pair in the universe of remarriage comedies" {PH, p. 136). However, Shiner finds this formulation of kinship in terms of...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXIV, Number 2, November 1998, pp. 335-354 "An Unaccountable Pleasure": Hume on Tragedy and the Passions ALEX NEILL Hume begins his essay "Of Tragedy" with a description of what he calls "a singular phaenomenon": It seems an unaccountable pleasure, which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle; and as soon as the uneasy passions cease to operate, the piece is at an end.... They are pleased in proportion as they are afflicted, and never are so happy as when they employ tears, sobs, and cries to give vent to their sorrow, and relieve their heart, swoln with the tenderest sympathy and compassion. The few critics who have had some tincture of philosophy, have remarked this singular phaenomenon, and have endeavoured to account for it.1 The account of the audience's experience of tragedy that Hume goes on to offer in "Of Tragedy" has been the target of criticism since the essay was published. My purpose in what follows is to show that some of what may appear to be the most damaging of that criticism is based on a misinterpretation of the thesis that Hume develops in the essay. I shall not attempt to argue that Hume's thesis is persuasive; indeed, I believe and have argued Alex Neill is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Southampton, Hants Sl 7 IBJ ENGLAND. 336 Alex Neill elsewhere that it is not.2 My project here is almost entirely interpretive: it is an attempt to get clear about what Hume's thesis concerning our experience of tragedy really is. To that end, it should be noted that the apparently "unaccountable" pleasure Hume describes at the beginning of "Of Tragedy" is something that he has remarked on before. In Book I of the Treatise, he notes that in matters of religion men take a pleasure in being terrify'd, and that no preachers are so popular, as those who excite the most dismal and gloomy passions. In the common affairs of life, where we feel and are penetrated with the solidity of the subject, nothing can be more disagreeable than fear and terror; and 'tis only in dramatic performances and in religious discourses, that they ever give pleasure? The phenomenon that Hume finds so remarkable in these passages from "Of Tragedy" and the Treatise is thus, at a minimum, that in certain circumstances, such as when we are at the theatre, we may find agreeable the experience of "the most dismal and gloomy passions." The explanation he gives of this phenomenon in the Treatise is as follows: In these latter cases the imagination reposes itself indolently on the idea; and the passion, being soften'd by the want of belief in the subject, has no more than the agreeable effect of enlivening the mind, and fixing the attention. (T 115) Hume's explanation of how the experience of "uneasy" passions can be enjoyed when we are in church and at the theatre thus has two components. First, because we do not believe the stories we are told in church4 and at the theatre, the uneasy passions we experience are not so very uneasy; as he puts it later in the Treatise, in such circumstances the passion in question "lies not with that weight upon us: It feels less firm and solid" (T 631). Second, a weakly disagreeable passion of this sort agreeably "enlivens" the mind and "fixes" (or as he says later, "rouzes") our attention. By the time he wrote "Of Tragedy," however, Hume had come to regard this explanation of his "singular phaenomenon" as inadequate. With regard to the idea that the passions, even if "uneasy," have the pleasurable effect of "enlivening" the mind (an idea which in "Of Tragedy" he attributes to Dubos), Hume objects that having one's mind "enlivened," one's attention "fixed" or "rouzed," need not be pleasurable: "the same object of distress, which pleases in a tragedy, were it really set before us, would give the most unfeigned uneasiness; though it...