David Sosa

Manley and Wasserman (2008) join the chorus of opposition to the possibility of conditional analysis of dispositions. But that score cannot be settled without more careful attention to the implicit philosophical methodology. Some of the opposition to such an analysis badly overestimates the effect of counterexamples, as if the Gettier example were sufficient to refute the possibility of conjunctive analysis of knowledge. A general objection to a form of analysis must satisfy a number of constraints, and Manley and Wasserman join the chorus too in failing to satisfy them. Most significant is the optional presupposition that the conditional used in analysis will exhibit some sort of centring. We show that even a careful effort to repair and reform Manley and Wasserman's objection to provide a satisfactory argument requires, ultimately, appeal to centring. Worse, the particular positive proposal they offer is vulnerable to a minor variant of their own counterexample

Relocating Kripke's puzzle about belief, this paper investigates i) in what the puzzle consists, exactly; ii) the method used in its construction; and iii) relations between meaning and rationality. Essential to Kripke's puzzle is a normative notion of contradictory belief. Different positions about the meaning of names yield different views of what constitutes the attribution of contradictory belief; and Kripke's puzzle unwittingly _imports a Millian assumption. Accordingly, the puzzle about belief is not independent of positions about the meaning of names

For an expression to be rigid means that it refers to one and the same thing with respect to any possible situation. But how is this in turn to be understood? An example will help us work through the definition. Take a word like ‘Aristotle.’ That word is a proper name; and proper names are a clear case of a type of word that refers. ‘Aristotle’ refers to a particular person, the last great philosopher of antiquity; in general, a name refers to the thing of which it is the name. To continue working through the definition of rigidity, we need to make sense of referring with respect to. It is tempting, for example, but mistaken, to understand a word's referring with respect to a possible situation as it's being used, in that situation, to refer to something.

Contemporary philosophy’s antipathy to intuition can come to seem baffling. There is inadequate reason to move away from the intuitively attractive view that we have a faculty of intuition, in many ways akin to our faculties of perception and memory and introspection, that gives us reason for belief, and with it, often enough, gives us knowledge. The purpose here is to consider whether scepticism about intuition is more reasonable than a corresponding scepticism about other epistemic faculties. I am sceptical that it is

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL by M. B. Ahern.MORALITY AND RELIGION by W. W. Bartley III.ROLES AND VALUES: AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ETHICS by R. S. Downie.THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE by D. W. Hamlyn.ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD by John Hick.THE LOGIC OF EDUCATION by P. H. Hirst and R. S. Peters.METALOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE METATHEORY OF STANDARD FIRST ORDER LOGIC by Geoffrey Hunter.ETHICAL KNOWLEDGE by J. J. Kupperman.LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS IN ARISTOTLE by Walter Leszl.MEMORY by Don Locke.JOHN STUART MILL. A critical study by H. J. McCloskey.ATHEISM AND ALIENATION by Patrick Masterson.REASONS FOR ACTIONS by Richard Norman.CONCEPTS OF DEITY by H. P. Owen.COLLECTED PAPERS BY GILBERT RYLE.LOGICO‐LINGUISTIC PAPERS by P. F. Strawson.TRUTH by Alan R. White.PROTOTRACTATUS, AN EARLY VERSION OF TRACTATUS LOGICO‐PHILOSOPHICUS by Ludwig Wittgenstein

What is meaning? How is linguistic communication possible? What is the nature of language? What is the relationship between language and the world? How do metaphors work? The Philosophy of Language, Sixth Edition, is an excellent introduction to such fundamental questions. Incorporating insights from new coeditor David Sosa, the sixth edition collects forty-eight of the most important articles in the field, making it the most up-to-date and comprehensive volume on the subject. Revised to address changing trends and contemporary developments, the sixth edition features eighteen new articles, including influential work by Kent Bach, Paul Boghossian, M. A. E. Dummett, Delia Graff Fara, Hartry Field, H. P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, Carl G. Hempel, Saul Kripke, Benson Mates, Hilary Putnam, Diana Raffman, Nathan Salmon, Stephen Schiffer, John R. Searle, Roy Sorenson, David Sosa, Dennis Stampe, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. A general introduction and introductions to each section give students background to the issues and explain the connections between them. A bibliography of suggested further reading follows each section.

How does mind fit into nature? Philosophy has long been concerned with this question. No contemporary philosopher has done more to clarify it than Jaegwon Kim, a distinguished analytic philosopher specializing in metaphysics and philosophy of mind. With new contributions from an outstanding line-up of eminent scholars, this volume focuses on issues raised in Kim's work. The chapters cluster around two themes: first, exclusion, supervenience, and reduction, with attention to the causal exclusion argument for which Kim is widely celebrated; and second, phenomenal consciousness and qualia, with attention to the prospects for a functionalist account of the mental. This volume is sure to become a major focus of attention and research in the disciplines of metaphysics and philosophy of mind

Any developed Millianism is forced to make an arbitrary choice. Some Millian theories are profligate: it suffices for believing that Clark flies that you assent to some way of taking that proposition. But Lois no more believes that Clark flies than she fails to believe that Superman flies. An abstemious Millianism requires for believing that Superman flies that you not refrain from assenting to any way of taking that proposition. Profligate Millianism gives subjects beliefs they do not seem to have. Abstemious Millianism takes from subjects beliefs they seem to have. The fact that Millianism confronts such a choice is itself philosophically significant