Sally J. Scholz

Iris Marion Young took a strong stance against humanitarian intervention and other so-called legitimate instances of what she calls ‘official violence’. Nevertheless, she was also aware that there may be some situations for which military humanitarian intervention should at least be considered. Young was concerned that some states will use their obligation to defend against human rights violations as a mechanism in securing or maintaining global dominance. In addition, she recognized that what counts as a violation of human rights is not uncontroversial; human rights norms and conventions are interpreted, negotiated, and otherwise contested. In this article, I build on Young’s arguments for a social connection model of responsibility by applying it to a situation where a forceful response to violence might be justified. I juxtapose Young’s position with the emerging international standard called ‘the responsibility to protect’ in order to suggest an account of intervention for global governance relations.

This paper looks at some prominent discussions of rape in war as a violation of human rights within Radical Feminism. I begin with a brief overview of United Nations declarations and actions on the subject of rape in war. I then look at some radical feminist accounts of rape in war as a violation of human rights with particular emphasis on the discussions of Susan Brownmiller and Catharine MacKinnon. I conclude the paper with a critical analysis of these radical feminist accounts and show how our human rights talk must distinguish between types of rape in war situations or risk silencing the individual victims.

In this dissertation I argue that the dichotomy of the public and the private legitimates the marginalization and/or exclusion of individuals identified as members of oppressed social groups from active participation in the public sphere. I begin by delineating the conditions of systemic oppression and the role of the dichotomy of the public and the private in that particular form of oppression. Next, I critique a traditional usage of the dichotomy based on the systemic exclusion of women in the social contract theory of John Locke. The next two chapters discuss the efficacy of two different feminist reconceptualizations of the dichotomy. The first is Jean Bethke Elshtain's communitarianism which attempts to preserve the dichotomy by revaluing the private sphere. The second is the reconceptualization of the dichotomy by Frances Olsen who suggests transcending the split and recreating our lives to enforce an ideology free from a public/private distinction. Finally, in the last chapter I use the dialogic community and work-place democracy of Iris Marion Young to argue that in order to eradicate systemic oppression, social theory, in expanding the notion of the public, must be guided by the concerns of oppressed and differently situated groups

This paper attends to the question of how to effectively teach ethics in universities. The author challenges the accepted skepticism amongst other disciplines that philosophers are no longer equipped to teach ethics courses to accommodate the moral demands of the contemporary world. Philosophers are believed to merely focus on abstract issues concerning moral attitudes and behavior. Currently, ethics courses in universities have replaced abstract moral issues of moral theory with concrete issues such as, homosexuality, the green house effect, pornography, and gender and race issues. This paper seeks to offer an alternative way to think about the abstractness of moral theories that focus on moral attitudes, which will alleviate concerns about their validity and application to concrete ethical concerns.

This study provides a representation of the broad spectrum of theoretical work on topics related to business ethics, with a particular focus on corporate citizenship. It considers relations of business and society alongside social responsibility and moves on to examine the historical and systemic foundations of business ethics, focusing on the concepts of social and ethical responsibilities. The contributors explore established theories and concepts and their impact on moral behaviour. Together, the contributions offer varied philosophical theories in approaches to business ethics. The book will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers with an interest in the theoretical development of business ethics. Reviews: 'The rapidly expanding business ethics field is often populated by thinly theorised work. This book is a welcome exception. It is also distinctive in that it embraces a clear macro perspective whereas much of the debate is rather stuck at the level of the individual or the organisation. As such the book has a distinctively European flavour and should be considered as an intellectually stimulating collection offering original perspectives on business ethics.' Laura J. Spence, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK 'This book makes an important contribution to our knowledge and understanding of corporations especially in the areas of corporate citizenship and responsibility as well as ethics and economic ethics. In addition the relationship of these areas with the social contract is well argued.' Australian Journal of Corporate Law.

What is at stake when students sell the highly sought-after basketball tickets they receive for free through a university’s lottery system? This article discusses a case in applied ethics taken from the experience of college students and extrapolates from that to the distribution of other scarce resources using lotteries. By examining an event relevant to the actual experience of students, we challenge them to see how normative moral theory may be used and what values are central to moral decision-making. The case includes four analyses from different perspectives and a teaching note.

Catholic Social Teaching of late has a lot more in common with feminist moral theory than might be evident at first glance. After a brief explanation of Catholic Social Teaching’s duty of solidarity, and a look at some of the feminist critiques of this solidarity, I point out some of the significant similarities between feminist ethics and the duty of solidarity. The last section focuses on community and care, the epistemological role of experience and the world view of the other, the centrality of self-determination, and the final goal of both the duty of solidarity and feminist ethics: liberation from oppression.

In Stephen Nathanson’s important new book, he offers and defends a definition of terrorism that relies on a conception of innocence that blends both moral innocence and status innocence. I argue that this understanding of innocence needs to be modified in two ways. First, status innocence ought to incorporate the notion of opposition. It is not just in becoming a soldier that one sacrifices status innocence; it is in the context of war or opposition. Second, I argue that moral innocence understood according to a liability-based notion of responsibility is insufficient. It does not address the various relational elements of responsibility. To remedy that gap, I suggest that we add a vulnerability-based notion of responsibility together with the liability-based model for a more complete account of moral innocence.

In this article I define civil disobedience and classify it into four forms based on motive and extent of dissent. I then present Thomas Aquinas's account for justified civil disobedience. After first determining how a law or system of laws is unjust, the duty (virtue) of obedience to just and unjust laws is discussed. Finally, I argue that of the four possible forms of civil disobedience, Aquinas's natural Law Theory only clearly allows the fourth, i.e., altruistic disobedience of an unjust system of rule, while at times also apparently allowing the third, i.e., altruistic disobedience of an unjust law

This article examines the particular moral obligations of solidarity focusing on the solidary commitment against injustice or oppression. I argue that political solidarity entails three relationships—to other participants in action, to a cause or goal, and to those outside the unity of political solidarity. These relationships inform certain obligations. Activism is one of those obligations and I argue that violent activism is incompatible with the other relations and duties of solidarity. Activists may find themselves confronted with a difficult choice between respecting the relationships of political solidarity or employing physical violence in resistant self-defense against oppressive practices.

This article examines some of the conceptual history of collective political action within feminist movements beginning with sisterhood and moving to feminist political solidarity. I argue that feminist political solidarity is built on a commitment by individuals to form a unity in opposition to injustice or oppression. Three moral relations emerge from this understanding of feminist political solidarity: the relation to the cause, the relation among members of the solidary group, and the relation between the solidary group and the larger society. These relations evoke certain obligations and responsibilities which I present and defend. Feminist political solidarity is informed by the particularities of the cause and thus any theoretical account of the moral obligations is necessarily limited, but by looking at these three relations together with a sociological account of transnational feminist political solidarity drawn from Clare Weber’s sociological description of the Women’s Empowerment Project, a clearer picture of some of the moral requirements of a commitment to feminist political solidarity emerges.

Recent decades have witnessed rape and sexual violence used on such a massive scale and often in a widespread and systematic program that the international community has had to recognize that rape and sexual violence are not just war crimes but might be crimes against humanity or even genocide. I suggest that just war theory, while limited in its applicability to mass rape, might nevertheless offer some framework for making the determination of when sexual violence and rape constitute war crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. In addition, just war theory can provide the normative justification individual soldiers need to resist orders and actions that demonstrate egregious moral breakdown as found in instances of mass rape and systematic use of sexual violence, and just war criteria demonstrate that the use of rape and sexual violence in war time can never be legitimated, especially in the case of prisoner interrogation.