Clark Wolf

Taking his cue from a brief comment by an obscure Greek poet, Isaiah Berlin made a famous taxological distinction between intellectual hedgehogs and foxes. Intellectual hedgehogs know "one big thing." They have a key insight that gives them a perspective from which to view and discuss many different problems. Intellectual foxes "know many things." "Foxes" have many different and sometimes unrelated insights, flashes of insight and understanding that come from many different sources. When you meet a hedgehog, it's a fair bet that you can make an informed prediction about what she or he will say about many different subjects. At least, you may be able to do this if you have an understanding of the Big Underlying Insight that unifies the Hedgehog's thought. But when you meet an intellectual fox, it wiU be difficult to predict his or her perspective or opinion in novel domains. Those who have more tools to choose from have more available options, and the reason the fox is hard to catch is that it is harder to predict.

In 2002, Hugh Laddie lamented the “blind adherence to dogma” that had led to an apparent impasse in philosophical and practical discussions of intellectual property : “On the one side, the developed world side, there exists a lobby of those who believe that all IPRs [intellectual property rights] are good for business, benefit the public at large, and act as catalysts for technical progress. They believe and argue that, if IPRs are good, more IPRs must be better.”1 But “on the other side”, he continued: “there exists a vociferous lobby of those who believe that IPRs are likely to cripple the development of local industry and technology, will harm the local population, and benefit none but the developed world. They believe and argue that, if IPRs are bad, the fewer the better.” Laddie recommended reforms designed to ensure that IPR development and enforcement would better serve the interests of developing countries. He hoped these reforms would provide an effective response to those who regard IPRs as “food for the rich countries and poison for the poor”.2.

Anthropogenic climate change policy involves tradeoffs between the rights and welfare of present and future people. A theory of justice should provide guidance to help make these tradeoffs appropriately and fairly. This chapter develops a revised Rawlsian theory of intergenerational justice, and applies it to the problem of climate policy. But unlike the received Rawlsian view, the view developed in this chapter considers the incorporation of a ‘needs principle’ as a first principle of justice. This principle specifies that meeting basic needs is the first priority of justice, prior even to the principle protecting fundamental liberties.