A. Rene

Durante las últimas décadas se ha producido la revisión de nociones epistemológicas que han tendido hacia la instalación de la concepción de la realidad como construcción. Estas ideas constructivistas, que deben entenderse desde la lógica de la crítica posmoderna, suponen el rechazo a una realidad sostenida en un orden único y aprehensible y la supuesta correspondencia entre el objeto y la representación de éste. En este trabajo se examina el traslado de la noción de punto de vista desde el objeto al sujeto y el desarrollo del Impresionismo y las Vanguardias históricas a la luz de la teoría Constructivista, señalando cómo los movimientos artísticos de finales del XIX y principios del XX pueden ser leídos como antecedentes o precedentes de tales fundamentos teóricos, en la medida en que insinuaron no sólo en la práctica sino también en el discurso teórico muchos de sus principios respecto a vislumbrar la realidad como un proceso subjetivo que no existe con independencia del observador.During the last decades the revision of epistemological notions that have tended to the installation of the conception of reality as construction has been produced. These ideas that must be understood from the logic of the postmodern criticism suppose the rejection of a reality supported in only one and apprehensible order and the supposed correspondence between the object and the representation of it one. In this work, it is examined the shift from the notion of the point of view from the object to the subject, and the development of the Impressionism and the historical vanguards at the light of the Constructivist theory, indicating how the artistic movements at the ends of the XIXth and beginning of the XXth, can be read as precedents of such theoretical foundations, as they insinuated not only in the practice but also in the theoretical speech, many of their principles with regard to reality as a subjective process that does not exist with the independence of the observer

This paper aims to open up a problem for discussion and further research based on the three concepts of its title. It examines how these concepts are linked by a line of reasoning developed by the French philosopher, Louis Althusser. Althusser argues that liberal education is an ideological practice that serves to reproduce capitalist social formations. It directs people into preestablished, functional, class positions in society, yet it disguises this operation by keeping attention focused on the myth of our essential subjectivity. This myth, which permeates the discourse of liberal education, is what constitutes humanism. In response to this skeptical view of liberal education and humanism, I start to develop Althusser’s formulations in a different direction. I argue that a humanism that takes fuller responsibility for theorizing the practice of liberal education may be able to revise that practice so that it serves socially transformative, rather than reproductive, ends. Such a humanism may be able to ground itself on an understanding of our subjectivity that emphasizes its reliance on a community of learning, one whose values intrinsically oppose those of capitalism.

En primer término se analiza brevemente el contexto que posibilita en García Lorca la búsqueda de un nuevo lenguaje poético durante su estadía en Nueva York entre 1929-1930. Posteriormente se analiza el concepto de flâneur. Para ello se consideran las elaboraciones que desarrolló Walter Benjamin a propósito de la experiencia de Charles Baudelaire frente a las transformaciones urbanas y sociales que sufrió París a mediados del siglo XIX, durante el Segundo Imperio en Francia. Finalmente se indaga en la eventual configuración de la figura del flâneur en Poeta en Nueva York de Federico Garcia Lorca. First of all, it’s analyzed briefly the context that makes possible in García Lorca the search of a new poetic language during his stay in New York between 1929 and 1930. Subsequently it’s analyzed the concept of flâneur. Because of that, it must be taken into account the devise that Walter Benjamin explained according to Charles Baudelaire’s experience against the urban and social transformations that hit Paris in the 19th century during the Second French Empire. Finally it makes inquiries in the possible configuration of the flâneur in Poeta en Nueva York by Federico García Lorca

In his classic text, A Theory of Justice, John Rawls argues that the structural principles of a society are just when they issue from a procedure that is fair. One crucial feature that makes the procedure fair is that the persons who will be subjected to these principles choose them after they have deliberated together in a condition marked by a certain balance of knowledge and ignorance. In particular, these people know enough to consider principles that are workable, yet converse behind a “veil of ignorance,” unable to predict what their place in society will be and hence discouraged from slanting the principles toward any preferential interests. My paper questions whether this attempt to ensure the disinterestedness of the conversation of justice is feasible. I worry that when we approach this question practically, we discover that the education that furnishes us with the knowledge necessary to choose viable principles must at the same time preclude genuine ignorance about our social position and interests. As an alternative, I suggest that we convene the conversation of justice behind a “veil of existence.” In this condition, people possess knowledge about how their society works and even about their places in it; however, this knowledge does not foster preferential interests because all interests are subjected to the question of their existential meaning. As Jean-Paul Sartre explains in his essay, “Existentialism is a Humanism,” for our interests to be truly meaningful, they must be affirmed as free responses to our thrownness into existence. Yet how do we find the wherewithal to make such responsible choices rather than lapse into paralysis before their essentially arbitrary differences? My positive thesis is that we may do so by acknowledging how all of us in this existential predicament critically and mutually provoke each to commit oneself to depart from the others in specific ways. This process of provocation is thus educational. It broaches a conception of non-instrumental, non-mimetic, liberal study, one which I try to enact in a writing that employs direct address, regular returns to questions that put discourse at a loss, and expanding webs of association. In this manner, I hope to demonstrate that liberal study may deepen our appreciation of our communal nature, our camaraderie, and thus motivate us to participate unselfishly in the conversation of justice.

A 68-year-old patient who suffered from gastric cancer diagnosed 8 months earlier presented with multiple peritoneal and hepatic metastasis, despite several rounds of chemo- and radiotherapy. After admission to hospital, his general condition quickly became severely compromised. He was nearly emaciated, despite being on partial parenteral feeding. Four years earlier, due to a cardiac arrhythmia that was refractory to medication, the patient had a cardiac pacemaker implanted, regulated to go off at frequencies of below 70 beats per minute. Given the patient's terminal situation, the team started developing some doubts about the pacemaker's effects during his dying process. The patient had mentioned his intention to donate his pacemaker after his death, but had not asked for its deactivation. The specialists were not sure about the effect of the pacemaker in unnecessarily prolonging the patient's final hour. Nevertheless, they opposed deactivation, which they considered ethically uncertain. The family, who had been initially for the deactivation, decided against it. The patient's condition was progressively deteriorating, as he was falling into a state of sopor and, later, into a coma