Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen

Using experimental philosophy methodologies, this paper explores standing to blame and praise, specifically within respect to health and health advice. Our primary aim is to contribute insights to the literature on standing, while also addressing work in medical ethics on the appropriate roles of doctors. Two main principles regarding standing emerge from these areas: the Differential Relationship Principle and the Hypocrisy Principle. To propel the debates and test these principles, we investigate whether standing judgments are affected by factors such as relationship (whether the person giving health advice is a friend or a doctor), advisor consistency (whether the advisor themselves follow the health advice they offer), and advisee consistency (whether the advice-recipient follows the advice). Moreover, we explore how participants perceive the degree of blame or praise individuals deserve for following health advice or for their health outcome. Our main findings indicate that, surprisingly, doctors are judged to have a higher standing compared to friends, and that hypocritical behavior does not significantly reduce the perceived standing of either doctors or friends. We conclude by discussing the significance of our findings and outlining potential directions for future research.

Social relations play a crucial role in relational egalitarian accounts of justice. Intuitively, however, we can stand in relations of justice to future generations with whom we do not overlap in time and to whom we for that reason are not socially related. This is the background to the Argument from Temporal Non-Overlap and its conclusion that relational egalitarianism offers an incomplete theory of justice. I rebut attempts to resist the argument, or its conclusion, based on Sommers’ distinction between relationships and social relations; Karnein’s Rawlsian account of intergenerational social cooperation; and the distinction between the ground and the content of norms of justice. More generally, I suggest that relational egalitarians face a dilemma in trying to specify what qualifies as social relations from the point of view of justice in such a way that, plausibly, social relations form the content and ground of obligations of justice, but that relations between individuals that do not qualify as social in this sense do not.

In the US context, critics of court use of algorithmic risk prediction algorithms have argued that COMPAS involves unfair machine bias because it generates higher false positive rates of predicted recidivism for black offenders than for white offenders. In response, some have argued that algorithmic fairness concerns, either also or only, calibration across groups–roughly, that a score assigned to different individuals by the algorithm involves the same probability of the individual having the target property across different groups of individuals–and that, for mathematical reasons, it is virtually impossible to equalize false positive rates without impairing the calibration. I argue that in standard non-algorithmic contexts, such as hirings, we do not think that lack of calibration entails unfair bias, and that it is difficult to see why algorithmic contexts, as it were, should differ fairness-wise from non-algorithmic ones in this respect. Hence, we should reject the view that calibration is necessary for fairness in an algorithmic context.

The last two decades have seen an increasing interest in exploring philosophical questions using methods from empirical sciences, i.e., the so-called experimental philosophy approach. Political philosophy has so far been relatively unaffected by this trend. However, because political philosophers typically rely on traditional philosophical methods—most notably reflective equilibrium in a form which requires neither empirical examination of people’s considered beliefs nor experimental attention to psychological studies of the mechanisms affecting those beliefs—it is as proper a target of the standard challenges from experimental philosophers as any other philosophical discipline. Sometimes experimental philosophers modestly present their approach as a supplement to traditional philosophical methods. I argue that the arguments in favour of experimental philosophy are such that if they are sound, then the use of empirical methods should drastically change how political philosophy is done.

According to an influential account of standing, hypocritical blamers lack standing to blame in virtue of their lack of commitment to the norm etc. which they invoke. Nevertheless, the commitment account has the wrong shape for it to explain why hypocrites lack standing to blame. Building on the lessons of that critique I propose a novel account of what undermines standing to blame – the comparative fairness account. This differs from the commitment account and the other prominent account of why hypocrites lack standing to blame offered in the literature: the moral equality account. Finally, I observe that, intuitively, lack of commitment undermines standing to blame and that many hypocrites might lack standing for that reason also. Moreover, typically the hypocrite's failure to address their own faults is a feature in virtue of which, other things being equal, the hypocrite is less committed to the norm in question. These two observations provide the basis for an error theory of the commitment account's appeal, despite its inability to explain why, qua hypocritical blamer, one lacks standing to blame.

This special issue consists of four articles, contributed by David Owen; Désirée Lim, Sahar Akhtar and (as co-authors) Mollie Gerver, Miranda Simon, Patrick Lown and Dominik Duell. These contributions address issues related to migration policies with the aim of bringing normative theories of migration and discrimination into dialogue. These theories describe the various types of discrimination inherent in the domestic and global migration systems, as well as assess arguments, pro et contra, about whether these forms of discrimination are permissible.

Discrimination laws usually prohibit discrimination based on some traits, like race, caste, and sex, and not on others, like sports team allegiance. Should socioeconomic class be included among the protected traits? We examine an argument for the view that it should which leads to the conclusion that both direct and indirect socioeconomic discrimination should be prohibited by the state. The argument has three premises: (1) direct paradigmatic discrimination should be prohibited by law; (2) if direct paradigmatic discrimination should be prohibited by law, then so should direct socioeconomic discrimination; and (3) where direct discrimination based on a certain trait should be prohibited by law, so should indirect discrimination on the basis of the same trait. Since we assume most readers will accept (1), the paper is largely devoted to the defense of (2) and (3). The outlawing of direct socioeconomic discrimination would involve an adjustment of the political and legal status quo, but we argue that it should nevertheless be implemented. By contrast, a prohibition on indirect socioeconomic discrimination would require a radical change to the way in which our societies are structured, because many of our laws, policies, and practices systematically (re)produce inequality to the disproportionate detriment of the poor. Our main aim, therefore, is not to defend the prohibition of indirect socioeconomic discrimination, but to show that most people’s views about discrimination are in deep tension with their attitude to current law. Resolving this tension would require for most of us to revise our beliefs either about whether indirect socioeconomic discrimination should be prohibited or about (1)–(3). One might reject the view that law should prohibit socioeconomic discrimination and still accept this claim about a deep tension in most people’s views on discrimination.

Laborde contrasts Default Republicanism with Labordian Republicanism. The latter view ‘answers’ the Probabilistic and the Anti-Psychology Objections to Default Republicanism. The former objection holds that the mere possibility of unconstrained intervention does not matter for unfreedom, whereas the latter contends that it is by virtue of the experience-independent fact of servitude that one is unfree. I argue that people sympathetic to these objections should have reservations about Labordian Republicanism. In any case, republicans should reject the Anti-Psychology Objection. More generally, Pluralist Republicanism might be preferable to Labordian Republicanism.

In the Standard View, a blamee can dismiss another's blaming of her as hypocritical and thus standingless if, and only if, the blamer's violations of the norm he is invoking are as bad as the blamee's. I defend a counterexample to this view showing that blame can be hypocritical and thus standingless when, simultaneously with blaming, the blamer willingly violates, in a minor way, the norm he is invoking. If correct, this has important implications for accounts of what makes hypocritical blame standingless. Hypocritical blame of the sort involved in my counterexample cannot be accommodated by the moral equality account of standing to blame. Nor can existing commitment accounts accommodate it without revising the way we think about standing-relevant commitment. Hence, this article points to a need for both revising the common view of when blame can be dismissed as hypocritical and rethinking the two standard accounts of that in virtue of which we have or lack standing to blame. Specifically, it points to an interesting way in which standing to blame appears to be time-relative.

Employers sometimes use personality tests in hiring or specifically look for candidates with certain personality traits such as being social, outgoing, active, and extraverted. Therefore, they hire based on personality, specifically extraversion in part at least. The question arises whether this practice is morally permissible. We argue that, in a range of cases, it is not. The common belief is that, generally, it is not permissible to hire based on sex or race, and the wrongness of such hiring practices is based on two widely accepted principles: the Relevance Principle and the Fairness Principle. The Relevance Principle states that hiring should be based on what is relevant to job performance, while the Fairness Principle states that hiring should be based on features that individuals can control. Since hiring based on sex or race violates these principles, it is wrong. However, we argue that, in a range of cases, hiring based on extraversion also violates these principles, and assuming the validity of the Relevance and the Fairness Principles, it follows that personality discrimination is morally wrong in those cases.

What do we owe to the lazy? On the assumption that the lazy are a paradigmatic case of people who are worse off, when they are through a fault, or choice, of their own, one might suspect that the answer is: not very much. This article shows that this suspicion is simple-minded. Four notions of laziness are distinguished. It is then shown that these notions differ – even from a luck egalitarian perspective – in ways bearing on the question of what is owed to the lazy. It is claimed that in some – but not all – cases, being lazy grounds a claim to compensation rather than forming a ground for withholding it.

Herjeet Kaur Marway recently proposed the Principle of Procreative Justice, which says that reproducers have a strong moral obligation to avoid completing race and colour injustices through their selection choices. In this article, we analyze this principle and argue, appealing to a series of counterexamples, that some of the implications of Marway's Principle of Procreative Justice are difficult to accept. This casts doubt on whether the principle should be adopted. Also, we show that there are some more principled worries regarding Marway's idea of a strong pro tanto duty not to complete injustices through one's procreative choices. Nonetheless, we believe Marway's arguments point in the right general direction regarding duties and structural injustice. Thus, in the final part, we suggest a positive proposal on how it would be possible to respond to the cases we raise. More specifically, we explore the suggestion that agents have a pro tanto duty to participate in eliminating structural injustice. Importantly, this duty can be satisfied, not only in procreation choices but in multiple ways.

According to many theorists, discrimination either requires a better treated comparator or can occur only if the discriminator belongs to a socially salient group different from that of the discriminatee. Both claims are philosophically important since they have important implications for which account of the moral wrongness of discrimination is correct, e.g., if no comparator is required, the wrongness of discrimination cannot result from treating different people as unequals since the unequal treatment of persons is not an essential feature of discrimination. Most theorists who have written on the topic see their account as articulating the folk concept of discrimination. However, none have subjected their putative articulations thereof to experimental testing. This is what the present study does. Its results are mixed, interesting, and call for further studies. Regarding comparativity, surprisingly, respondents are more disposed to classify a situation as discriminatory when there is no comparator than when there is one. Regarding reflexivity, respondents are more likely to classify our vignettes as involving discrimination when the discriminator is from another socially salient group than the discriminatee as to ethnicity but not when it comes to gender. Hence, non-reflexivity does not appear to be a conceptual requirement on discrimination. Remarkably, our study also shows that the mere reference to a majority, outgroup person in our vignettes makes respondents more likely to classify the vignette as involving discrimination against a minority person, even when the majority group person does not play the role of a comparator.

Construed as a theory of justice, relational egalitarianism says that justice requires that people relate as equals. Construed as a theory of what makes democracy valuable, it says that democracy is a necessary, or constituent, part of the value of relating as equals. Typically, relational egalitarians want their theory to provide both an account of what justice requires and an account of what makes democracy valuable. We argue that relational egalitarians with this dual ambition face the justice-democracy dilemma: Understanding social relations in such a way that renders relational egalitarianism plausible as an answer to what makes democracy valuable comes at the price of understanding social relations in a way that makes it less plausible as a theory of justice, and vice versa. We also argue that there is no easy way out of the dilemma and that relational egalitarians, who want relational equality to provide both accounts mentioned, may simply have to set their ambitions lower on behalf of relational equality.

Several leading theorists embrace the Simple Desert Account of Discrimination. This account involves two claims: it claims that a mismatch between what people deserve, on the one hand, and what they get, on the other hand, is (a) integral to discrimination, and (b) wrong. I shall query (a). First, I challenge what I see as the principal, positive argument for the Simple Desert Account. Second, in some cases wrongful discrimination brings about a better match between desert and what people get. Situations in which this could be the case include those where: the discriminatee is a serial discriminator herself; the person wrongfully discriminated in favour of deserves greater advantages than she enjoys; by engaging in wrongful discrimination the discriminator reduces her moral deservingness and thereby the gap between her level of deservingness and her otherwise unfittingly low level of advantage.

Heloise Robinson argues that pregnant women have a higher moral status than non-pregnant persons and that, for this reason, pregnant women ought to be treated ‘noticeably’ better than non-pregnant persons.1 In this commentary, we present two challenges to Robinson’s argument. First, the compounding disadvantage objection: treating involuntarily, non-pregnant women worse than voluntarily pregnant women unjustly compounds their disadvantage. Second, the identity objection: treating non-pregnant people worse than pregnant people amounts to pro tanto wrongful discrimination based on a fundamental aspect of people’s identity. We conclude that either pregnant persons do not have a higher moral status than non-pregnant persons, or they do, but higher moral status so grounded does not justify better treatment. According to the standard view of moral status: (1) most human beings are persons; (2) persons have a higher moral status than non-persons; and (3) persons have an equal moral status. Many believe: (1) is true because most human beings have a sufficiently high level of personhood-generating psychological capacities; (2) is true because moral status is tied to personhood; and (3) is true because variations in the level of personhood-generating psychological capacities do not matter to an individual’s moral status once that individual’s level surpasses the threshold required for personhood.2 (3) is significant …

A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in recent years. By contrast, no attention has been given the possibility that, likewise, refraining from blaming can be hypocritical and dismissed as standingless. I argue that hypocritical refrainers have a duty to blame, if asked to do so, and possibly even if they are not asked to do so. Acknowledging this fact about hypocritical silence is crucial to an adequate understanding of our practice of blaming. Specifically, it bears on a worry that naturally arises when we consider cases where the blamee is blameworthy yet the blaming is problematic, because standingless. The worry is that, absurdly, the idea of standing justifies our being more interested in silencing preachers of virtue than making wrongdoers overcome vice. However, if one can lack standing not to blame, this concern is unwarranted. If there is such a thing as standing to blame, then sometimes one must, for reasons of standing, speak up in the face of wrongdoing, meaning, in effect, that one lacks the right not to challenge wrongdoers to improve.

Applied philosophy has been a growing area of research for the last 40 years. Until now, however, almost all of this research has been centered around the field of ethics. A Companion to Applied Philosophy breaks new ground, demonstrating that all areasof philosophy, including epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of science, and philosophy of mind, can be applied, and are relevant to questions of everyday life. This perennial topic in philosophy provides an overview of these various applied philosophy developments, highlighting similarities and differences between various areas of applied philosophy, and examining the very nature of this topic. It is an area to which many of the towering figures in the history of philosophy have contributed, and this timely Companion demonstrates how various historical contributions are actually contributions within applied philosophy, even if they are not traditionally seen as such. The Companion contains 42 essays covering major areas of philosophy; the articles themselves are all original contributions to the literature and represent the state of the art on this topic, as well as offering a map to the current debates.

“Applied philosophy” is used to refer to different things. I distinguish between seven different conceptions of applied philosophy – to wit, the relevance, specificity, practical, activist, methodological, empirical facts, and audience conceptions; show how the different conceptions are related; and point to various problems with or challenges to some of the conceptions. While applied philosophy has become a very active field in philosophy since 1970, many associate applied philosophy with applied ethics only. I contend that, as the variety of contributions to this Companion shows and as each of the seven conceptions identified in this chapter implies, applied philosophy is much more than applied ethics.

In this article, we critically discuss different versions of the fairness objection to the legalisation of neuro-doping. According to this objection, legalising neuro-doping will result in some enjoying an unfair advantage over others. Basically, we assess four versions. These focus on: 1) the unequal opportunities of winning for athletes who use neuro-doping and for those who do not; 2) the unfair advantages specifically for wealthy athletes; 3) the unfairness of athletic advantages not derived from athletes’ own training ; and 4) the unfair health care costs imposed on everyone as a result of athletes’ use of neuro-doping. We conclude that none of these versions offer a convincing principled fairness-based objection to legalising neuro-doping.