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Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen

  •  Home
  •  Publications
    185
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
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  •  Events
    21
  •  News and Updates
    159

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Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Social Science
  • All publications (185)
  •  92
    Brain Privacy, Intimacy, and Authenticity: Why a Complete Lack of the Former Might Undermine Neither of the Latter!
    Res Publica 23 (2): 227-244. 2017.
    In recent years, neuroscience has been making dramatic progress. The discipline holds great promise but also raises a number of important ethical concerns. Among these is the concern that, some day in the distant future, we will have brain scanners capable of reading our minds, thus making our inner thoughts transparent to others. There are at least two reasons why we might regret our resulting loss of privacy. One is, so the argument goes, that this would undermine our ability to form intimate …Read more
    In recent years, neuroscience has been making dramatic progress. The discipline holds great promise but also raises a number of important ethical concerns. Among these is the concern that, some day in the distant future, we will have brain scanners capable of reading our minds, thus making our inner thoughts transparent to others. There are at least two reasons why we might regret our resulting loss of privacy. One is, so the argument goes, that this would undermine our ability to form intimate relations. Another is that the omnipresent gaze of others would render an authentic inner life impossible. I argue that both of these concerns are exaggerated. First, intimacy might flourish through the differential acknowledgement of knowledge as common knowledge; for example, even if I know that both a friend and my taxi driver know that I have kinky sexual fantasies, I might only acknowledge this as common knowledge and, thus, an admissible piece of conversation with my friend, and this differential acknowledgement might be enforced by norms of social interaction. Second, the gaze of others would become much less oppressive if everyone’s inner lives were transparent to everyone else. I also argue that our minds are already partly transparent to others through the use of non-neuroscience-assisted mindreading techniques and, thus, that the latter offer no distinct threat to mind privacy. I offer an additional argument for this conclusion; to wit, that our minds extend beyond our brains.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, Miscellaneous
  •  40
    McMahan, Jeff: The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press 2002
    SATS 3 (2): 154-158. 2002.
    Ethics
  •  83
    Book Review: World Poverty and Human Rights (review)
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1): 97-99. 2006.
    Value TheoryHuman Rights
  •  64
    Are Killing and Letting Die Morally Equivalent?
    Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 33 (1): 7-29. 1998.
    Euthanasia
  •  103
    Kamm, Frances Myrna. Bioethical Prescriptions: To Create, End, Choose, and Improve Lives.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. Pp. 599. $35.00 (review)
    Ethics 125 (3): 879-883. 2015.
    Value TheoryValue Theory, Miscellaneous
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