Joseph Heath

In most liberal democracies for example, the central bank is as independent as the supreme court, yet deals with a wide range of economic, social, and political issues. How do these public servants make these policy decisions? What normative principles inform their judgments? In The Machinery of Government, Joseph Heath attempts to answer these questions. He looks to the actual practice of public administration to see how normative questions are addressed. More broadly, he attempts to provide the outlines of a "philosophy of the executive" by taking seriously the claim to political authority of the most neglected of the three branches of the state.

There is an idea, extremely common among social contract theorists, that the primary function of social institutions is to secure some form of cooperative benefit. If individuals simply seek to satisfy their own preferences in a narrowly instrumental fashion, they will find themselves embroiled in collective action problems – interactions with an outcome that is worse for everyone involved than some other possible outcome. Thus they have reason to accept some form of constraint over their conduct, in order to achieve this superior, but out-of-equilibrium outcome. A social institution can be defined as a set of norms that codify these constraints.1 Simplifying somewhat, one can then say that social institutions exist in order to secure gains in Pareto-efficiency.

Critics of mass culture often identify 1950s-style status competition as one of the central forces driving consumerism. Thomas Frank has challenged this view, arguing that countercultural rebellion now provides the primary source of consumerism in our society, and that ‘cool’ has become its central ideological expression. This paper provides a rearticulation and defense of Frank's thesis, first identifying consumerism as a type of collective action problem, then showing how the ‘hip consumer’ is one who adopts a free-rider strategy in this context

David Gauthier tries to defend morality by showing that rational agents would choose to adopt a fundamental choice disposition that permits them to cooperate in prisoner's dilemmas. In this paper, I argue that Gauthier, rather than trying to work out a prudential justification for his favored choice disposition, should opt for a transcendental justification. I argue that the disposition in question is the product of socialization, not rational choice. However, only agents who are socialized in such a way that they acquire a disposition of this type could acquire the capacity to use language. Given the internal connection between language and thought, this means that no agent endowed with such a disposition could rationally choose to adopt another. Thus rational reflection by moral agents upon their own fundamental choice disposition will have no tendency to destabilize it

Yet this is precisely what I intend to do. As a way of conferring some initial legitimacy Perhaps the most fundamental axiom of upon this enterprise, I would like to start out modern economic science is that there simply by appealing to the “no free lunch” is no such thing as a free lunch. It is principle. To adopt productivity growth as a this axiom that gives us the concept of opporsocial priority is to set aside other objectives tunity cost, an idea that has led to enormous that we might like to pursue. Therefore, one gains in the clarity of our understanding of cannot maintain rational adherence to a proindividual and societal choice. But while congram of increased productivity without a clear tinuing to endorse this fundamental axiom, sense of what the benefits of such a program many economists have also been extremely are likely to be, compared to the other things attracted by the appeal of increased economic that we might choose to do. The bulk of this efficiency. Efficiency gains are often treated, paper consists of an attempt to evaluate the if not exactly as a free lunch, certainly about size and scope of these benefits. More controas close to a free lunch as one can get in this versially, I will try to show that these benesublunar realm. As a result, economists often fits are often exaggerated. react with a certain incredulity when some- The conclusion that I draw on the basis one questions the need for such gains. It is of this survey will strike many as complacent. tempting to suppose that the critic simply But it is a principled complacency. I argue misunderstands the relevant concepts, or else that we have good reason, as a society, to strive fails to grasp the full set of constraints under for productivity gains, but that there is nothwhich economic activity occurs. ing urgent about this objective. Furthermore, Productivity growth is widely regarded we should not strive to maximize productivity as a subset of the efficiency gains that can be gains, nor should we be overly concerned realized in our economy.

Peter Jaworski objects to my “market failures” approach to business ethics on the grounds that in some cases I have mislabeled as “market failure” what are in fact instances of "government failure." While acknowledging that my overall approach might better be referred to as “Paretian,” I resist Jaworski's specific criticism. I argue that the term government failure should not be used to describe market transactions that are made less efficient through government intervention, but should be reserved for cases in which the market mechanism has been suspended and the transaction is occurring, inefficiently, through the organizational power of the state.

Recent developments in game theory have shown that the mathematical models of action so widely admired in the study of economics are in fact only particular instantiations of a more general theoretical framework. In the same way that Aristotelian logic was ‘translated’ into the more general and expressive language of predicate logic, the basic action theoretic underpinnings of modern economics have now been articulated within the more comprehensive language of game theory. But precisely because of its greater generality and expressive power, game theory has again revived the temptation to apply formal models of action to every domain of social life. This movement has been fuelled by some notable successes. Game theory has provided useful insights into the logic of collective action in the theory of public goods, and strategic models of voting have illustrated important aspects of institutional decision-making. But this extension of formal models into every area of social interaction has also encountered significant difficulties, despite the fact that contemporary decision theory has weakened its basic assumptions to the point where it teeters constantly on the brink of vacuity.

This paper raises a challenge for those who assume that corporate social responsibility and good corporate governance naturally go hand-in-hand. The recent spate of corporate scandals in the United States and elsewhere has dramatized, once again, the severity of the agency problems that may arise between managers and shareholders. These scandals remind us that even if we adopt an extremely narrow concept of managerial responsibility – such that we recognize no social responsibility beyond the obligation to maximize shareholder value – there may still be very serious difficulties associated with the effective institutionalization of this obligation. It also suggests that if we broaden managerial responsibility, in order to include extensive responsibilities to various other stakeholder groups, we may seriously exacerbate these agency problems, making it even more difficult to impose effective discipline upon managers. Hence, our central question: is a strong commitment to corporate social responsibility institutionally feasible? In searching for an answer, we revisit the history of public management, and in particular, the experience of social-democratic governments during the 1960s and 1970s, and their attempts to impose social responsibility upon the managers of nationalized industries. The results of this inquiry are less than encouraging for proponents of corporate social..

One of the most unsatisfactory sections of Robert Brandom's very complex and difficult book, Making it Explicit, is, unfortunately, the very first chapter.1 Brandom's general objective in this work is to displace the concept of representation from its position as the central explanatory concept in the philosophy of language and epistemology, and replace it with some set of explanatory concepts derived from the analysis of social action or practice. In particular, he wants to argue that the concept of a social norm – a rule that determines, implicitly or explicitly, whether an action is correct or incorrect – can serve as a primitive concept in the development of a general theory of meaning. Successful execution of such a program would therefore constitute a vindication of some of the core intuitions underlying philosophical pragmatism.

One of the unspoken assumptions quite widely shared among moral philosophers is the belief that human beings have a unified moral pyschology. Roughly speaking, morality involves action that is, at least prima facie, contrary to self-interest. This generates two immediate problems. The first involves determining whether moral action, under this description, is possible, and if it is, explaining how such action might come about. The second involves the normative task of justifying a moral course of action to an agent who, perhaps disposed to act this way, nevertheless wonders why he should not revise his goals to assign greater priority to self-interest. Attempts to address the second problem typically – although not always – presuppose some answer to the first problem, since it is difficult to know how to address an argument to a person without having at least a general sense of which intentional states of that person one is seeking to modify. Thus no matter how “metaethical” the reflections of moral philosophers may become, their theories are typically structured by a picture of how moral reflection gets translated into action. In other words, they all presuppose some characterization of the psychological mechanism that enables us to expand our circle of concern beyond self-interest, narrowly construed. Unfortunately, it is often the normative dimension – the desire to justify moral obligations – that drives the project, leading philosophers simply to posit the psychology that seems to them most conducive to the construction of such an argument.1 And since the normative argument usually has a fairly linear structure, it is only necessary to posit one psychological mechanism; as a result, only one.

Kin selection, reciprocity and group selection are widely regarded as evolutionary mechanisms capable of sustaining altruism among humans andother cooperative species. Our research indicates, however, that these mechanisms are only particular examples of a broader set of evolutionary possibilities.In this paper we present the results of a series of simple replicator simulations, run on variations of the 2–player prisoner's dilemma, designed to illustrate the wide range of scenarios under which altruism proves to be robust under evolutionary pressures. The set of mechanisms we explore is divided into four categories :correlation, group selection, imitation, and punishment. We argue that correlation is the core phenomenon at work in all four categories

Like most books in philosophy, Communicative Action and Rational Choice contains a large number of arguments. Each of these arguments I adhere to with a greater or lesser degree of conviction. Some of them I think are pretty decisive. In other cases, I was doing the philosophical equivalent of throwing things against the wall just to see what sticks. Of course, I did not present things that way in the book, choosing instead to dress up my scruffier arguments in the hope that they might appear to share the same pedigree as my more refined ones. It is thus a testament to the astuteness of my critics here that they have focused their criticism almost entirely on my more tentative arguments—especially my so-called “pragmatic theory of convergence,” which is less a theory than a set of suggestions about how a theory might be constructed. Thus my desire to defend these arguments against criticism, which predominates in what follows, should be understood also as tempered by the recognition that much of what I say may ultimately prove to be unsustainable.

Anyone who has ever lived with roommates understands the Hobbesian state of nature implicitly. People sharing accommodations quickly discover that buying groceries, doing the dishes, sweeping the floor, and a thousand other household tasks, are all prisoner's dilemmas waiting to happen. For instance, if food is purchased communally, it gives everyone an incentive to overconsume. Individuals also have an incentive to buy expensive items that the others are unlikely to want. As a result, everyone's food bill will be higher than it would be if everyone did their own shopping. Things are not much better when it comes to other aspects of household organization. Cleaning is a common sticking point. Once there are a certain number of people living in a house, cleanliness becomes a quasi-public good. If everyone ‘pitched in’ to clean up, then everyone would be happier. But there is a free-rider incentive—before cleaning, it's best to wait around a bit to see if someone else will do it. As a result, the dishes will stack up in the sink, the carpet will get grungy, and so on.

Most political theorists became acquainted with the work of Jürgen Habermas through his 1973 publication of Legitimationsprobleme im Spätkapitalismus (which became available in English two years later as Legitimation Crisis). In this work, Habermas argued that the traditional Marxist analysis of crisis tendencies in the capitalist system was outdated, given the relative success of the welfare-state compromise. He claimed instead that crisis tendencies generated in the economic sphere would be displaced, via state action, into the cultural sphere. This would in turn create problems of social integration, undermining many of the resources that the state requires for its ongoing management of the economy. In particular, it creates the possibility of a large-scale loss of legitimacy for government institutions. Even though this thesis was not especially new, Habermas’s analysis offered the promise of a more rigorous formulation of the mechanism through which these undesirable cultural sideeffects would be generated. However, Habermas billed his discussion in Legitimation Crisis as only a set of “programmatic” suggestions. Despite being provocative, they were in no sense articulated at a satisfactory level of detail. Unfortunately, despite the fact that Habermas has gone on to a considerable refinement of his broadly sociotheoretic views, he has never returned to an explicit treatment of the principal issues raised in Legitimation Crisis. Nevertheless, through a number of brief discussions that appear in his later work, it is possible to piece..

In this paper, I argue that Humean theories of moral motivation appear preferable to Kantian approaches only if one assumes a broadly foundationalist conception of rational justification. Like foundationalist approaches to justification generally, Humean psychology aims to counter the regress-of-justification argument by positing a set of ultimate regress-stoppers-in this case, unmotivated desires. If the need for regress-stoppers of this type in the realm of practical deliberation is accepted, desires do indeed appear to be the most likely candidate. But if this foundationalist strategy is rejected, there is no longer any reason to suppose that all motivation must be traceable to some extra-rational incentive. This clears the way for a rehabilitation of the Kantian claim that reasons for action can take the form of categorical imperatives. To illustrate this thesis, I show how a conception of practical rationality that incorporates a contextualist model of justification can be developed that treats social norms as reasons for action, without assigning any mediating role to agent desires. a theory of action of this type eliminates the gap between moral obligation and action, and so articulates the fundamental Kantian intuition that acting on the basis of moral principle-and with disregard for self-interest-is just one way of acting rationally.

Medical ethics has become an important and recognized component of physician training. There is one area, however, in which medical students receive little guidance. There is practically no discussion of the financial aspects of medical practice. My objective in this paper is to initiate a discussion about the moral dimension of physician billing practices. I argue that physicians should expand their conception of professional responsibility in order to recognize that their moral obligations toward patients include a commitment to honest and forthright billing practices. I argue that physicians should aspire to a standard of clinical accuracy—not legal adequacy—in describing their activities. More generally, physicians should strive to promote an integrity-based professional culture, first and foremost by stigmatizing rather than celebrating creative billing practices, as well as condemning the misguided sense of solidarity that currently makes it taboo for physicians to criticize each other on this score.

RÉSUMÉ. — Robert Brandom a tenté de déplacer le concept de représentation de sa position de concept explicatif central en philosophie du langage et de le remplacer par un ensemble de concepts explicatifs dérivés de l’analyse de l’action sociale. Il soutient que le concept de norme sociale peut servir de concept primitif dans le développement d’une théorie générale de la signification. Selon Brandom, le problème central lié au fait de considérer la représentation comme un primitif explicatif est que nous n’avons pas une compréhension claire de ce à quoi correspond la relation de « représentation ». Il est donc naturel de s’attendre à ce que Brandom utilise, dans son analyse de l’action sociale, des primitifs explicatifs qui sont, d’une certaine manière, moins mystérieux. En particulier, on s’attend à ce que Brandom démontre que le concept de « norme sociale » peut être compris en termes d’un ensemble plus simple de concepts issus de la philosophie de l’action. Malheureusement, Brandom ne fournit pas une telle explication. Dans cet article, je commence par analyser l’argument proposé par Brandom, et je tente d’expliquer pourquoi cet argument, en définitive, n’est pas concluant. J’essaie ensuite de développer l’explication des origines de la normativité dans l’action sociale que, selon moi, Brandom aurait dû donner.

In this book Joseph Heath brings Jürgen Habermas's theory of communicative action into dialogue with the most sophisticated articulation of the instrumental conception of practical rationality-modern rational choice theory. Heath begins with an overview of Habermas's action theory and his critique of decision and game theory. He then offers an alternative to Habermas's use of speech act theory to explain social order and outlines a multidimensional theory of rational action that includes norm-governed action as a specific type.In the second part of the book Heath discusses the more philosophical dimension of Habermas's conception of practical rationality. He criticizes Habermas's attempt to introduce a universalization principle governing moral discourse, as well as his criteria for distinguishing between moral and ethical problems. Heath offers an alternative account of the level of convergence exhibited by moral argumentation, drawing on game-theoretic models to specify the burden of proof that the theory of communicative action and discourse must assume.

There is considerable overlap between the interests of business ethicists and those of political philosophers. Questions about the moral justifiability of the capitalist system, the basis of property rights, and the problem of inequality in the distribution of income have been of central importance in both fields. However, political philosophers have developed, especially over the past four decades, a set of tools and concepts for addressing these questions that are in many ways quite distinctive. Most business ethicists, on the other hand, consider their field to be primarily a domain of applied ethics, and so adopt methods and conceptual frameworks developed by moral philosophers. In this paper, we discuss some of the salient differences between these two approaches, and suggest some ways in which business ethicists could benefit from taking a more “political philosophy” approach to these questions. Throughout, we underline the importance of seeking greater compatibility among the principles used in normative theorizing about markets, regulations, corporate governance, and business practices.

A notable feature of recent philosophical work on climate ethics is that it makes practically no reference to ‘traditional’ environmental philosophy. There is some irony in this, since environmental ethics arose as part of a broader movement within philosophy, starting in the 1960s, aimed at developing different fields of applied philosophy, in order to show how everyday practice could be enriched through philosophical reflection and analysis. The major goal of this paper is to explain why this branch of practical ethics has, for the most part, failed the test of practicability when it comes to formulating a response to global climate change. The central problem is that debates in environmental philosophy became absorbed by a set of metaphysical questions about the nature of value. The result has been a field dominated by views that provide unsuitable foundations for the development of public policy.