Noel Carroll

Comprised of 45 chapters, written especially for this volume by an international team of leading experts, The Routledge Companion to the Philosophies of Painting and Sculpture is the first handbook of its kind. The editors have organized the chapters helpfully across eight parts: I: Artforms II: History III: Questions of Form, Style, and Address IV: Art and Science V: Comparisons among the Arts VI: Questions of Value VII: Philosophers of Art VIII: Institutional Questions Individual topics include art and cognitive science, evolutionary origins of art, art and perception, pictorial realism, artistic taste, style, issues of race and gender, art and religion, art and philosophy, and the end of art. The work of selected philosophers is also discussed, including Diderot, Hegel, Ruskin, Gombrich, Goodman, Wollheim, and Danto. With a volume introduction from the editors and comprehensively indexed, The Routledge Companion to the Philosophies of Painting and Sculpture serves as a point of entry to the subject for a broad range of students as well as an up-to-date reference for scholars in the field.

“Forget Taste” rejects the classical notion of taste as a viable concept for the exercise of critical evaluation and proposes an alternative approach to critical evaluation based crucially on the idea of the constitutive purpose of the artwork. The goal of this paper is to advance an approach—which I call the purpose-driven approach—to the critical evaluation of artworks that develops from and refines the views of art evaluation presented in my previous work. This approach, in virtue of its focus on the constitutive purposes of artworks, regards the artwork as typically singular. For that reason, it follows that this approach is pluralistic in contrast to the hedonic conception of the taste model popularized in the eighteenth century and which still recurs today, if sometimes only subconsciously, and that reduces critical evaluation to feelings of pleasure. I argue that the hedonic taste model, which is noncognitive and reductive, should be abandoned in favor of one that is cognitivist and pluralistic, namely, the purpose-driven approach.

INTRODUCTIONFor the last two and a half decades – perhaps spurred onwards by R. W. Hepburn's seminal, wonderfully sensitive and astute essay “Contemporary Aesthetics and the Neglect of Natural Beauty” – philosophical interest in the aesthetic appreciation of nature has been gaining momentum. One of the most coherent, powerfully argued, thorough, and philosophically compelling theories to emerge from this evolving arena of debate has been developed over a series of articles by Allen Carlson. The sophistication of Carlson's approach – especially in terms of his careful style of argumentation – has raised the level of philosophical discussion concerning the aesthetic appreciation of nature immensely and it has taught us all what is at stake, logically and epistemologically, in advancing a theory of nature appreciation. Carlson has not only presented a bold theory of the aesthetic appreciation of nature; he has also refined a methodological framework and a set of constraints that every researcher in the field must address.Stated summarily, Carlson's view of the appreciation of nature is that it is a matter of scientific understanding; that is, the correct or appropriate form that the appreciation of nature – properly so called – should take is a species of natural history; appreciating nature is a matter of understanding nature under the suitable scientific categories.

In this synthetic introduction to the history of the philosophy of art, Noël Carroll elucidates and analyzes selected writings on art by Plato, Aristotle, Hutcheson, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Tolstoy, and Bell. Carroll’s narrative tracks developments between major positions in philosophy of art, ranging from the idea that art is unavoidably embedded in society to the evolution of the notion that art is autonomous ("art for art’s sake"), thereby setting the stage for continuing debates in the philosophy of art. Presupposing no prior background, and useful on its own or accompanying the reading of primary works, _Classics in Western Philosophy of Art_ is ideal as a text for introductory undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of art and aesthetics, or for anyone interested in learning about the origin of some of our most fundamental conceptions of art in the Western tradition.

Toward the end of his book Jokes, perhaps the best known philosophical treatment of the subject, Ted Cohen includes a notorious joke about a group of young Black men who are deterred from committing a gang rape by being thrown a basketball. This is a joke that perplexes Cohen and that he admits plays into stereotypes that presuppose the mindless obsession of Black youths with basketball as well as their unbridled sexuality. He agrees that the joke is morally bad and that it would be a better world without it. But he denies that its evil compromises its alleged funniness. He writes: “Wish that there were no mean jokes. Try remaking the world so that such jokes will have no place, will not arise. But do not deny that they are funny. That denial is a pretense that will help nothing.” In this paper, I want to challenge the claim that the moral defectiveness of a joke, especially a racist joke, cannot ever compromise its capacity to be funny.

Although I am in agreement with much of Ben Ze'ev's analysis, I have a few quibbles. One reservation that I have is that in some respects Ben Ze'ev may be guilty of presentism—of generalizing contemporary viewpoints to past historical periods—as with his suggestion that sharing intrinsic activities, by which I take it he means intrinsically valuable activities, is a necessary ingredient in long-term, enduring, romantic relationships. Specifically, I wonder if the activities in question have to be intrinsically valuable. I am also not sure there is necessarily a pronounced zero-sum competition between enduring romantic love and all of the various forms of contemporary sex that diverge from enduring romantic love. Finally, despite the subtitle of Ben Ze'ev's book—How Our Romantic Lives Change over Time—there is one type of change that he does not scrutinize to any appreciable extent, namely, the permanent breakdown of long-term, romantic love as might end in divorce as a result of betrayal. I think that betrayal is a subject worthy of discussion in the context of changes in our romantic lives, since it happens so frequently.

The subject of this essay is the way in which literature, by engaging our emotions, contributes to our emotional intelligence. In reading works of literature, we are almost constantly called upon—or mandated—to mobilize our emotions in the process of understanding the text. In this way, the literary text ineludibly guides us through a rehearsal of the pertinent portions of our affective repertoire.For example, we do not fully understand Iago unless we despise him, nor do we understand Dorothea Brooke adequately without being saddened by the way in which she is entrapped in her marriage to that stick, Casaubon—that is, unless we lament "what a waste." Moreover, in order to be absorbed in a plot, we need to align...