Paul Horwich

This article explores Ludwig Wittgenstein’s ideas about the nature of philosophy, with particular emphasis on his rejection of “T-philosophy”—a traditionally dominant form of philosophy that, although self-consciosly a priori, is shaped by theoretical goals and methods of reasoning that closely resemble those of the sciences. After discussing the goals and methods that characterize T-philosophy, the article presents a formidable Wittgensteinian argument against that practice. It proceeds to describe the sort of treatment of particular philosophical problems that is called for by this argument; and it assesses the common complaint against Wittgenstein that his overall position is self-undermining—an anti-theoretical theory. It goes on to consider whether Wittgenstein’s perspective involves an objectionable prioritization of language over reality, that is, an objectionable “linguistic turn”. Finally, it compares Wittgenstein’s arguments with the Oxonian “ordinary language philosophy” of philosophers such as Austin, Ryle, and Strawson.

Thomas Kuhn is viewed as one of the most influential philosophers of science, and this re-release of a classic examination of one of his seminal works reflects his continuing importance. In _World Changes,_ the contributors examine the work of Kuhn from a broad philosophical perspective, comparing earlier logical empiricism and logical positivism with the new philosophy of science inspired by Kuhn in the early 1960s. The nine chapters offer interpretations of his major work _The Structure of Scientific Revolutions_ and subsequent writings. The introduction outlines the significant concepts of Kuhn's work that are examined and is followed by a brief appraisal of Kuhn by Carl Hempel. The chapters discuss topics that include: a systematic comparison of Kuhn and Carnap viewing similarities and differences; the disputation of absolute truth; rational theory evaluation and comparison; applying theory to observation and the relation of models in a new conceptualization of theory content; and interpreting Kuhn's plurality-of-worlds thesis. The volume also presents four historical papers that speak to Kuhn's views on lexical structures and concept-formation and their antecedents. The afterward, by Kuhn himself, reviews his own philosophical development, his thoughts on the dynamics of scientific growth, and his response to issues raised by the contributors and other interpreters of his work

According to the ancient sorites paradox, zero grains of sand is not enough to make a heap, and adding one single grain can never transform a non-heap into a heap, so there can be no heaps of sand! Similar reasoning applies to all vague terms. In view of this problem, some philosophers have suggested that we must modify classical logic. This chapter argues that there is no need for this, for we should allow that one grain of sand can make the crucial difference, and more generally, that even vague terms have sharp boundaries. This idea is defended by reference to three considerations: the conclusion of Chapter 3, which implies that one should not expect to be able to explain the extension of a predicate in terms of its use; an identification of what sort of meaning-constituting use-practice would engender the distinctive symptoms of vagueness, namely the existence of ‘borderline cases’ to which it is impossible to know whether the predicate applies; and a characterization and invocation of the difference between truth and determinate truth.

This chapter presents an overview of central issues that must be confronted in developing a decent account of meaning, with various positions that might be taken with respect to them, and with some of the arguments that can be given for and against these positions. Topics addressed include forms of scepticism about meaning, the pros and cons of reductionism, the relationship between language and thought, the compositionality of sentence-meanings from word-meanings, the normative import of meaning, individualism, externalism, and the promise of a deflationary theory.

A widespread concern within philosophy has been, and continues to be, to determine which domains of discourse address real, robust, not‐merely‐deflationary facts, and which do not. But a threat to the legitimacy of this concern is the extreme lack of consensus amongst philosophers on the question of how to tell whether or not a given domain is oriented towards ‘robust reality’. The present paper criticizes Kit Fine’s attempt to settle that question. This discussion is followed by some considerations suggesting that there is no good answer to it, that the notion of ‘robust reality’ is defective and ought to be abandoned

The purpose of this chapter is to specify the adequacy conditions for a complete account of truth, to suggest that these desiderata are satisfied by the deflationary conception known as ‘minimalism’, and to make sure that this proposal is not confused with various superficially similar views, such as Tarski's and the redundancy/performative account. The axioms of the minimal theory are all the propositions of the form, ‘ is true ↔ p’—at least, those that do not fall foul of the ‘liar’ paradoxes. It is argued that this theory—weak as it is—is nevertheless strong enough to account for the conceptual utility of truth, and to explain the facts in which truth is a constituent. Moreover, the single unattractive feature of the theory—its infinite list‐like character—is not mitigated by accounts of truth in terms of reference or substitutional quantification. Thus, the chapter goes some way towards justifying the minimalist conception—the view that the minimal theory is the theory of truth, to which nothing more should be added.

It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of all dogs and only of dogs. This chapter makes explicit and criticizes the assumptions on which Kripke’s position is founded. First, that in order for the meaning of a given word to be constituted by its having a given use, we would have to be able to read off the word’s extension on the basis of that use. Second, for this to be possible, there would have to be some way of weeding out those uses that are errors. It is argued that these assumptions are incorrect, since they are affiliated with an anti-deflationary conception of truth.

The book begins by noting that the sense of mystery surrounding truth stems from the fact that we insist on an answer to the question ‘What is truth?’, and are perplexed when no decent one can be found. But once the mundane generalizing function of this concept is appreciated, we can see that a reductive analysis of truth should never have been expected. The chapter continues with brief discussions of such theories. It ends with a summary of the objections to minimalism that are addressed in subsequent chapters.