•  25
    Thought Experiments
    Oup Usa. 1992.
    In this book, Sorensen presents the first general theory of the thought experiment. He analyses a wide variety of thought experiments, ranging from aesthetics to zoology, and explores what thought experiments are, how they work, and what their positive and negative aspects are. Sorensen also sets his theory within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science.
  •  25
    'P, therefore, P' without Circularity
    Journal of Philosophy 88 (5): 245-266. 1991.
  •  24
    What lies behind misspeaking
    American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4): 399. 2011.
  •  23
    Rationality as an Absolute Concept
    Philosophy 66 (258): 473-486. 1991.
    My thesis is that ‘rational’ is an absolute concept like ‘flat’ and ‘clean’. Absolute concepts are best defined as absences. In the case of flatness, the absence of bumps, curves, and irregularities. In the case of cleanliness, the absence of dirt. Rationality, then, is the absence of irrationalities such as bias, circularity, dogmatism, and inconsistency.
  •  22
    Vagueness
    In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
  •  21
    Logically Equivalent—But Closer to the Truth
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2): 287-297. 2007.
    Verisimilitude has the potential to deepen the understanding of mathematical progress, the principle of charity, and the psychology of regret. One obstacle is the widely held belief that two statements can vary in truthlikeness only if they vary in what they entail. This obstacle is removed with four types of counterexamples. The first concerns necessarily coextensive measurements that differ only with respect to their units. The second class of counterexamples is composed of mathematical falseh…Read more
  •  20
    Vagueness and the logic of ordinary language
    In Dale Jacquette (ed.), Philosophy of Logic, North Holland. pp. 155. 2006.
  •  18
    Contagious Blindspots: Formal Ignorance Spreads to Peers
    American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (4): 335-344. 2015.
    A blindspot is a consistent but inaccessible proposition. For instance, I cannot know 'The test is on Friday but I do not know it'. No contradiction follows from the supposition that you know my blindspot. But could you know my blindspot if we are epistemic peers? Epistemic peers have the same evidence and reasoning ability. So either both peers know a proposition or both are ignorant. Since I cannot know my blindspot, neither can my peer. Thus the formal ignorance associated with blindspots spr…Read more
  •  18
    Ducking Harm
    with Christopher Boorse
    Journal of Philosophy 85 (3): 115-134. 1988.
  •  16
    Smartfounding is the opposite of “dumbfounding” introduced by Jonathan Haidt’s research on disgust. Dumbfounders have general competence at thought experiment. However, they are flustered by thought experiments that support repugnant conclusions. Instead of following the supposition wherever it leads, they avoid unsettling implications by adding extraneous information or ignoring stipulated conditions. The dumbfounded commit performance errors, often seeming to regress to the answers of people w…Read more
  •  16
    The Earliest Unexpected Class Inspection
    Analysis 53 (4). 1993.
  •  16
    Commandments Thou Shalt Not Break
    Philosophia 51 (3): 1643-1662. 2022.
    Commanders gain authority from obedience and lose authority from disobedience. We should expect commanders to therefore devise commands that reduce the probability of disobedience. To aid recognition of these techniques for reducing the risk of disobedience, I focus on the extreme of case of commands that reduce the probability to zero. Each of my ten commandments illustrates a logical technique for engineering out disobedience. Once you master these safety measures, you can confidently legislat…Read more
  •  16
    Hearing silence: The perception and introspection of absences
    In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), Sounds and Perception, Oxford University Press. 2009.
    in Sounds and Perception: New Philosophical Essays, ed. by Matthew Nudds and Casey O’Callaghan (Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2008)
  •  15
    Philoso
    with Abigail L. Rosenthal, Hallvard Lillehammer, Nml Nathan, William Lane Craig, and Christopher Miles Coope
    Philosophy 86 (2). 2011.
  •  15
    The Metaphysics of Precision and Scientific Language
    Noûs 31 (S11): 349-374. 1997.
  •  13
    Thought Experiments
    Oxford University Press USA. 1992.
    Can merely thinking about an imaginary situation provide evidence for how the world actually is--or how it ought to be? In this lively book, Roy A. Sorensen addresses this question with an analysis of a wide variety of thought experiments ranging from aesthetics to zoology. Presenting the first general theory of thought experiment, he sets it within an evolutionary framework and integrates recent advances in experimental psychology and the history of science, with special emphasis on Ernst Mach …Read more
  •  13
    The number of unknown paradoxes
    with Mark Sainsbury
    Philosophy 95 (2): 155-159. 2020.
    ‘A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science’.How many paradoxes are there? By 1920, Bertrand Russell's star student had concluded that there are few or zero paradoxes in philosophy. Most philosophical propositions ‘are not false but nonsensical’.
  •  13
    Review: A Reply to Critics (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3). 2005.
  •  11
    Self-Strengthening Empathy
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 75-98. 1998.
    Stepping into the other guy’s shoes works best when you resemble him. After all, the procedure is to use yourself as a model: in goes hypothetical beliefs and desires, out comes hypothetical actions and revised beliefs and desires. If you are structurally analogous to the empathee, then accurate inputs generate accurate outputs---just as with any other simulation. The greater the degree of isomorphism, the more dependable and precise the results. This sensitivity to degrees of resemblance sugges…Read more
  •  11
    Das Chinesische Musikzimmer
    Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 59 (1): 61-63. 2011.
    The founder of formalism, Eduard Hanslick compared listening to music to looking through a kaleidoscope. Unlike listening to a story, one can understand music without understanding what it is about. This contrast with language suggests a thought experiment that echoes John Searle′s Chinese Room. Instead of featuring a man who reliably manipulates Chinese symbols without knowing what they represent, consider a man who reliably manipulates sounds . Given formalism, the Turing Test should be an app…Read more
  •  10
    This chapter contains sections titled: Paradoxes Stimulate Theory Development An Analogy with Perceptual Illusions Do Logical Paradoxes Exist? Imagination Overflows Logical Possibility Paradoxes Evoke Logical Analogies An Implication about the Nature of Paradox.
  •  10
    Sorensen's Reply to Bunzl and Feldman
    Informal Logic 17 (3). 1995.
  •  10
    Debunkers and assurers
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4). 1991.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  9
    A Cabinet of Philosophical Curiosities is a collection of puzzles, paradoxes, riddles, and miscellaneous logic problems. Depending on taste, one can partake of a puzzle, a poem, a proof, or a pun.
  •  8
    Dark Matters
    The Philosophers' Magazine 56 42-46. 2012.
    Shadows haunt the world of common sense by being “out there” independently of whether anyone is looking. Yet they are confi ned to a single sense: sight. Like ghosts, shadows evade tactile corroboration. They do not obey the laws governing material things.
  •  8
    Para‐reflections
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 54 (1): 93-101. 2003.
    A para‐reflection is a privational phenomenon that is often mistaken for a reflection. You have seen them as the ‘reflection’ of your pupil in the mirror. Your iris reflects light in the standard way but your pupil absorbs all but a negligible amount of light (as do other dark things such as coal and black velvet). Para‐reflections work by contrast. Since they are parasitic on their host reflections, para‐reflections are relational and dependent in a way that reflections are not. Nevertheless, p…Read more
  •  7
    Nonspecific perjury
    Jurisprudence 1-17. forthcoming.
    Since 1970, a United States prosecutor can prove perjury without specifying which statement is perjurious. A bold prosecutor could concede ignorance of which statement is false. A bolder prosecutor could further concede that the witness himself does not know. The boldest prosecutor could concede there is no specific lie. Instead of there being a statement that is intrinsically perjurious, the perjury is relational. Just as two statements can be inconsistent without either being inconsistent, two…Read more