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1Causal Theories of Knowledge and PerceptionIn Helen Beebee, Christopher Hitchcock & Peter Menzies (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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169Epistemology Factualized: New Contractarian Foundations for EpistemologySynthese 150 (2): 247-280. 2006.Many epistemologists are interested in offering a positive account of how it is that many of our common sense beliefs enjoy one or another positive epistemological status (e.g., how they are warranted, justified, reasonable, or what have you). A number of philosophers, under the influence of Wittgenstein and/or J. L. Austin, have argued that this enterprise is misconceived. The most effective version of this argument is to be found in Mark Kaplan’s paper “Epistemology on Holiday”. After explaini…Read more
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8D efeating the Dogma of DefeasibilityIn Patrick Greenough, Duncan Pritchard & Timothy Williamson (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 161--82. 2009.
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796. Easy Knowledge, Transmission Failure, and EmpiricismOxford Studies in Epistemology 4 166. 2013.
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41Empiricism about Experience (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2): 482-489. 2009.According to Gupta, there is a difficulty facing any attempt to answer this question. The difficulty has to do with the following phenomenon. The impact that any particular experience has on what the experiencing subject is entitled to believe will depend upon the concepts, conceptions, and beliefs – in short, upon the view – that the experiencing subject is entitled to hold when she has that experience.1 But what view she was entitled to hold when she had that experience depends in turn upon wh…Read more
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12Fixing the Transmission: The New MooreansIn Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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56Contextualism and the Problem of the External WorldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1): 1-31. 2003.A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs a…Read more
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23Can a priori entitlement be preserved by testimonyIn Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 194--215. 2008.
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152A Refutation of Cartesian FallibilismNoûs 45 (4): 658-695. 2011.According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes w…Read more
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222Contextualism and the problem of the external worldPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1). 2003.A skeptic claims that I do not have knowledge of the external world. It has been thought that the skeptic reaches this conclusion because she employs unusually stringent standards for knowledge. But the skeptic does not employ unusually high standards for knowledge. Rather, she employs unusually restrictive standards of evidence. Thus, her claim that we lack knowledge of the external world is supported by considerations that would equally support the claim that we lack evidence for our beliefs a…Read more
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138Contextualism and a puzzle about seeingPhilosophical Studies 134 (1): 53-63. 2007.Contextualist solutions to skeptical puzzles have recently been subjected to various criticisms. In this paper, I will defend contextualism against an objection prominently pressed by Stanley 2000. According to Stanley, contextualism in epistemology advances an empirically implausible hypothesis about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions in natural language. It is empirically implausible because it attributes to knowledge ascriptions a kind of semantic context-sensitivity that is wholly unlike…Read more
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29Arguing About Knowledge (edited book)Routledge. 2008.What is knowledge? What are the sources of knowledge? What is the value of knowledge? What can we know? _Arguing About Knowledge_ offers a fresh and engaging perspective on the theory of knowledge. This comprehensive and imaginative selection of readings examines the subject in an unorthodox and entertaining manner whilst covering the fundamentals of the theory of knowledge. It includes classic and contemporary pieces from the most influential philosophers from Descartes, Russell, Quine and G.E.…Read more
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106Anti-intellectualism and the knowledge-action principle (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1). 2007.
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36Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action PrinciplePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1): 180-187. 2007.
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163A contextualist solution to the problem of easy knowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 69 (1): 183-206. 2005.Many philosophers hold some verion of the doctrine of "basic knowledge". According to this doctrine, it's possible for S to know that p, even if S doesn't know the source of her knowledge that p to be reliable or trustworthy. Stewart Cohen has recently argued that this doctrine confronts the problem of easy knowledge. I defend basic knowledge against this criticism, by providing a contextualist solution to the problem of easy knowledge.
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309Safety and epistemic luckSynthese 158 (3). 2007.There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest an alternative proposal in the same spirit as safety, and find it lacking as well.
University of Pittsburgh
PhD, 1997
Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |