• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

James P. Sterba

University of Notre Dame
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    203
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  Events
    6
  •  News and Updates
    15

 More details
  • University of Notre Dame
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Areas of Specialization
Value Theory
Other Academic Areas
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
Other Academic Areas
  • All publications (203)
  •  108
    Afterthoughts
    with William Hasker, Ronald L. Hall, and Michael Tooley
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (3): 229-243. 2020.
    Epistemology of ReligionPhilosophy of Religion, Miscellaneous
  •  81
    The Moral Foundation of Rights
    Noûs 26 (2): 246-247. 1992.
  •  39
    What is ethics?
    Polity. 2020.
    Why be moral? -- Consequentialism -- Nonconsequentialism -- Reconciliation -- Morality and religion.
  •  46
    Morality: The Why and the What of It: The Why and the What of It
    with Gerald F. Gaus
    Routledge. 2012.
    Well-known philosophers from a variety of philosophical orientations vigorously discuss James Sterba's bold claims that morality is required by reason and that even a minimal morality leads to braodly egalitarian commitments--Alison M. Jaggar, on back cover.
  •  2
    There is No Free-Will Defense
    Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion 8 294-312. 2017.
  •  232
    Is a good god logically possible?
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (3): 203-208. 2020.
    Divine GoodnessPhilosophy of Religion, General WorksReligious Topics, MiscOntological Arguments for …Read more
    Divine GoodnessPhilosophy of Religion, General WorksReligious Topics, MiscOntological Arguments for Theism
  •  104
    Replies
    International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (3): 223-228. 2020.
    Evil
  •  124
    Race, Racism, and Reparations
    Mind 114 (454): 407-409. 2005.
    RacismReparations
  •  140
    Is a Good God Logically Possible?
    Springer Verlag. 2019.
    Using yet untapped resources from moral and political philosophy, this book seeks to answer the question of whether an all good God who is presumed to be all powerful is logically compatible with the degree and amount of moral and natural evil that exists in our world. It is widely held by theists and atheists alike that it may be logically impossible for an all good, all powerful God to create a world with moral agents like ourselves that does not also have at least some moral evil in it. James…Read more
    Using yet untapped resources from moral and political philosophy, this book seeks to answer the question of whether an all good God who is presumed to be all powerful is logically compatible with the degree and amount of moral and natural evil that exists in our world. It is widely held by theists and atheists alike that it may be logically impossible for an all good, all powerful God to create a world with moral agents like ourselves that does not also have at least some moral evil in it. James P. Sterba focuses on the further question of whether God is logically compatible with the degree and amount of moral and natural evil that exists in our world. The negative answer he provides marks a new stage in the age-old debate about God's existence.
  •  60
    From Rationality to Equality
    The Journal of Ethics 18 (3): 239-241. 2014.
  •  146
    Global Justice for Humans or for all Living beings and what Difference it Makes
    The Journal of Ethics 9 (1-2): 283-300. 2005.
    I begin with an account of what is deserved in human ethics, an ethics that assumes without argument that only humans, or rational agents, count morally. I then take up the question of whether nonhuman living beings are also deserving and answer it in the affirmative. Having established that all individual living beings, as well as ecosystems, are deserving, I go on to establish what it is that they deserve and then compare the requirements of global justice when only humans are taken into accou…Read more
    I begin with an account of what is deserved in human ethics, an ethics that assumes without argument that only humans, or rational agents, count morally. I then take up the question of whether nonhuman living beings are also deserving and answer it in the affirmative. Having established that all individual living beings, as well as ecosystems, are deserving, I go on to establish what it is that they deserve and then compare the requirements of global justice when only humans are taken into account with the requirements of global justice when all living beings are taken into account.
    Global Justice
  •  112
    Solving Darwin’s Problem of Natural Evil
    Sophia 59 (3): 501-512. 2020.
    Charles Darwin questions whether conflicts between species palpably captured by the conflict between Ichneumonidae and the caterpillars on which they prey could be compatible with the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God. He also questioned whether the suffering of millions of lower animals throughout our almost endless prehistory could be compatible with an all-good, all-powerful God. In this paper, I show that these two problems of natural evil that Darwin raised in his work can be resol…Read more
    Charles Darwin questions whether conflicts between species palpably captured by the conflict between Ichneumonidae and the caterpillars on which they prey could be compatible with the existence of an all-good, all-powerful God. He also questioned whether the suffering of millions of lower animals throughout our almost endless prehistory could be compatible with an all-good, all-powerful God. In this paper, I show that these two problems of natural evil that Darwin raised in his work can be resolved so as to present no objection to theism once it is recognized what the moral principles are that should govern our relationship to the natural world and analogously should govern God’s relationship to the natural world.
    Philosophy of Religion
  •  150
    The Welfare Rights of Distant Peoples and Future Generations
    Social Theory and Practice 7 (1): 99-119. 1981.
    RightsFuture Generations
  •  55
    Unselfishness (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 74 (3): 189-193. 1977.
  •  84
    Violence Against Nature
    Social Philosophy Today 10 121-131. 1995.
  •  1
    Toulmin to Rawls
    In Robert J. Cavalier, James Gouinlock & James P. Sterba (eds.), Ethics in the history of western philosophy, St. Martin's Press. pp. 399--420. 1989.
    Informal Logic
  •  17
    The Varieties of Liberty
    Philosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 3 588-593. 1988.
  •  2
    The Demands of Justice
    with William A. Galston, John Charvet, and Philip Green
    Philosophical Quarterly 33 (132): 301-305. 1983.
  •  314
    The moral presuppositions of contractual rights
    Ethics 89 (3): 298-300. 1979.
    RightsEthicsRights and Values
  •  90
    The decline of Wolff's anarchism
    Journal of Value Inquiry 11 (3): 213-217. 1977.
    Anarchism
  •  98
    The Demands of Justice (review)
    Philosophical Review 92 (4): 607-613. 1983.
    Distributive Justice
  •  38
    Some Problems with “Making Justice Practical”
    Bowling Green Studies in Applied Philosophy 4 15-19. 1982.
    Social and Political PhilosophyJusticeVarieties of Justice
  •  148
    Social Contract Theory and Ordinary Justice
    Political Theory 9 (1): 111-112. 1981.
    Social and Political PhilosophyJusticeMoral Contractarianism
  •  71
    Soft determinism, indetermbmism and the justification for punishment
    Metaphilosophy 17 (1). 1986.
    Social and Political PhilosophyCriminal Law
  •  43
    Recent Work on Alternative Conceptions of Justice
    American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1). 1986.
    Social and Political Philosophy
  •  115
    Reconciliation Reaffirmed: A Reply to Steverson
    Environmental Values 5 (4). 1996.
    In this reply to Brian Steverson's objections to my reconciliationist argument, I have clarified the requirements that follow from my principles of environmental justice. I have also clarified the notion of intrinsic value that I am endorsing and the grounds on which my claim of greater intrinsic value for humans rests
  •  159
    Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists Revisited
    Social Theory and Practice 20 (2): 135-142. 1994.
    Just War Theory
  •  77
    Prescriptivism and fairness
    Philosophical Studies 29 (2). 1976.
    Moral Prescriptivism
  •  266
    Reconciling Anthropocentric and Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics
    Environmental Values 3 (3). 1994.
    I propose to show that when the most morally defensible versions of an anthropocentric environmental ethics and a nonanthropocentric ethics are laid out, they would lead us to accept the same principles of environmental justice
    Environmental EthicsEnvironmental Value
  •  223
    Retributive justice
    Political Theory 5 (3): 349-362. 1977.
    JusticeEthicsVarieties of Justice
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • 7
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback