James P. Sterba

This paper argues that there is no Free-Will Defense for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. It denies that God’s creating our world with the degree and amount of moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it could be defended in terms of the freedom that it provides, or has provided, to its members. It takes no stand on whether the problem could be solved by arguing that the securing of some other good, or goods in an afterlife is the justification for the degree and amount of moral evil in our world. This paper simply attempts to demonstrate the need for just such further work by showing that the freedom that exists, or has existed, in our world could not constitute a justification for the moral evil that exists, or has existed, in it.

As with the first edition, Utilitarian, Kantian, and Aristotelian viewpoints are all well represented here, and this second edition features updated sections throughout—including eighteen new readings—and an entirely new section on multiculturalism. Presents students with a unique focus on three main challenges to ethics: feminism, environmentalism, and multiculturalism Pedagogical focus on the 'big questions' motivates student interest Collects readings on all key traditional theoretical and practical questions in ethics.

For a number of years now I have argued for a reconciliation of contemporary conceptions of justice. I have argued that a libertarian conception of justice with its ideal of liberty, a welfare liberal conception of justice with its ideal of fairness, a socialist conception of justice with its ideal of equality, a communitarian conception of justice with its ideal of the common good, and a feminist conception of justice with its ideal of androgyny can all be seen to support the same practical requirements, specifically the practical requirements that are usually associated with a welfare liberal conception of justice, namely, a right to welfare and a right to equal opportunity. Since most people endorse one or another of these conceptions of justice, to reach agreement in practice it should suffice to show them that all these conceptions support the same practical requirements of a right to welfare and a right to equal opportunity.

So much of the work that we do as philosophers is published without much critical commentary from our colleagues. Only rarely do we have the chance to improve our work through the extensive critical analysis of our colleagues. That is why I am very grateful to have this opportunity to benefit from the valuable critical analysis that the contributors to this volume have directed at my practical reconciliation argument for making people just. While in this brief response I cannot hope to discuss all the interesting points that my distinguished commentators Kurt Baier, Gerald Doppelt, James Fishkin, John Hospers, Alison Jaggar, Eric Mack, Jeffrey Reiman, Rosemarie Tong and Iris Young have raised, I will try to lay to rest at least some of their doubts concerning my practical reconciliation argument for making people just.

In this article I argue that even a libertarian conception of morality leads to a right to welfare. I further argue that extending this right to welfare, particularly to future generations, as I claim we must, leads to the egalitarian requirement that as far as possible we should use up no more resources than are necessary to meet our basic needs, securing for ourselves a decent life, but no more. I further show how the egalitarian ethics I defend can be put into practice peacefully through a combination of individual and collective action.

Professor Sterba delivered these comments at the International Society for Environmental Ethics panels on Environmental Virtue Ethics, at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, April 2000, in Albuquerque, NM. The papers by L. Gerber, J. O’Neill and G. Frasz are published in Philosophy in the Contemporary World 8:2. P. Cafaro’s paper “Thoreau, Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics” was published in Environmental Ethics 23 (2001): 3-17.

Dwayne Moore’s "A Naturalistic Theodicy for Sterba’s Problem of Natural Evil," (Moore, 2024) provides a detailed critique of my logical argument from evil against the existence of the God of traditional theism. While there have been many critiques of my logical argument against the existence of the God of traditional theism from moral evil to which I have replied (2020b, 2020c, 2021, 2023), there has been only one previous critique that was directed at my logical argument from natural evil (see Jordan, 2023 ). Accordingly, I welcome this opportunity to show how my logical argument from natural evil works against Moore’s critique.