James P. Sterba

In this paper, I argue that the U.S. and its coalition partners should announce that they intend to completely withdraw from Iraq within six months or less. And if this announcement did bring a suspension or reduction of hostilities against them, then, I argue, they should leave even sooner. For the most part, my grounds for holding this view are based on the lack of a justification for going to war against Iraq in the first place. But part of the grounds for an immediate withdrawal turns on what has transpired since the U.S. and its coalition partners invaded Iraq.

In their critiques of my book, Julia Driver, Brad Hooker, and Alastair Norcross have focused on my argument from rationality to morality that attempts to complete the Kantian project of justifying morality and my use of the “ought” implies “can” principle to reconcile the differences between Kantian and utilitarian ethical perspectives. While treating respectfully the ingenious arguments and counterexamples that each of my critics employs against my views, I explain, in detail, why their arguments and counterexamples do not work against my views, properly interpreted, although they do suggest ways that I might better present my views in the future in order to attract more adherents to my reconciliationist project.

In this unique work, James P. Sterba argues that traditional ethics has yet to confront the three significant challenges posed by environmentalism, feminism, and multiculturalism. He maintains that while traditional ethics has been quite successful at dealing with the problems it faces, it has not addressed the possibility that its solutions to these problems are biased in favor of humans, men, and Western culture. In Three Challenges to Ethics: Environmentalism, Feminism, and Multiculturalism, Sterba examines each of these challenges. In the case of environmentalism, he argues that traditional ethics must incorporate conflict resolution principles that favor nonhumans over humans in a significant range of cases. In terms of feminism, he maintains that traditional ethics should rule out gendered family structures and implement an ideal of androgyny. In regard to multiculturalism, he contends that traditional ethics must endorse an ethics that is secular in character and that can survive an extensive comparative evaluation of both Western and non-Western moral ideals and cultures. The only textbook devoted to this topic, Three Challenges to Ethics is an engaging text for introductory courses in ethics and moral problems and is also interesting and provocative reading for scholars and general readers.

Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives offers students a unique introduction to ethics by integrating the historical development of Western moral philosophy with both feminist and multicultural approaches. Engaging and accessible, it provides an introductory sampling of several of the classical works of the Western tradition in ethics and then situates these readings within feminist and multicultural perspectives so that they can be better understood and evaluated in our contemporary environment. While some of the non-Western works parallel the views defended in the Western works (e.g., Confucius's work echoes that of Plato or Aristotle), others question the Western perspectives (e.g., American Indian works provide an interesting challenge to Western moral philosophy). Confucius, Jorge Valadez, Ward Churchill, Moshoeshoe II, and Eagle Man present multicultural perspectives to the works of Plato, Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, Sartre, Rawls, MacIntyre, Korsgaard, and others. Noted feminists Christine de Pizan, Simone de Beauvoir, Carol Gilligan, Annette Baier, Susan Okin, and Rosemarie Radford Ruether also offer alternative views. Ideal for courses in introduction to ethics, history of ethics, and feminist ethics, Ethics: Classical Western Texts in Feminist and Multicultural Perspectives is also intriguing reading for interested general readers.

Kurt Baier’s The Rational and the Moral Order, is the long-awaited sequel to his The Moral Point of View. Like the earlier work, Baier’s new book provides a characterization and defense of morality. It begins with a general account of reason, moves on to a detailed account of practical reason which includes an important distinction between “self-anchored” and “society-anchored” reasons. Morality is then characterized and defended as a system of society-anchored reasons. To illustrate its practical utility, Baier then uses his account of morality to answer specific moral questions relating to killing and letting die. Throughout, the book is a treasure trove of philosophical riches that bears reading and re-reading.

In this paper, I argue that even a libertarian ideal of liberty, which initially seems opposed to welfare rights, can be seen to require a right to a basic needs minimum that extends to distant peoples and future generations and is conditional upon the poor doing whatever they reasonably can to meet their own basic needs, including bringing their population growth under control. Given that, as I have argued elsewhere, welfare liberal, socialist, communitarian and feminist political ideals can be easily seen to support this same right to a basic needs minimum, showing how a libertarian ideal of liberty supports the right should go a long way toward solving the problem of what all people, whether near or distant, present or future, deserve, which is the basic problem of global justice.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.2 (2002) 27-38 [Access article in PDF] On the Possibility of Grounding a Defense of Ecofeminist Philosophy James P. Sterba It is a pleasure to comment on Karen Warren's excellent book. 1 The book is a treasure trove of discussions in ecofeminist philosophy that I am sure people will be drawing upon for years to come. In the introduction to the book, Warren says that her main goal is to present and defend a particular version of ecofeminist philosophy (xiii). In my brief comments, I want to consider how Warren understands that defense, consider how strong it is, and consider further how one might add to it to make it even stronger.As I was trying to figure out how best to understand Warren's defense of ecofeminist philosophy, I kept being reminded of Warren's conception of philosophy as quiltmaking. 2 According to this conception, in philosophizing we bring together a wide array of ideas like patches with some prima facie constraining conditions, and we don't quite know what will emerge until we put all the ideas or patches together. Well, I sort of felt that way about Warren's various remarks throughout the book on how she understands herself to be defending a particular version of ecofeminist philosophy. They were like various patches that needed to be brought together to illuminate her defense. Moreover, according to Warren's conception of philosophy as quiltmaking, we will sometimes need to repair or replace certain ideas or patches in our philosophical quilt patches that we [End Page 27] have come to recognize do not fit well with the rest of the quilt. Similarly, when I was trying to bring together Warren's various remarks on how she was defending a particular version of ecofeminist philosophy; some of her remarks did not seem to fit well with her overall purpose of defending ecofeminist philosophy. These remarks did not seem to belong to her own ecofeminist philosophy quilt, or at least they needed to be repaired to make a better fit. But, of course, this is just what one would expect given Warren's quiltmaking conception of doing philosophy; repairing and replacing patches in one's philosophical quilt is business as usual according to Warren's preferred way of doing philosophy. Or, as Warren herself puts it, correcting such mistakes is "simply a lovely and welcome part of the process of theorizing" (102).As her book makes abundantly clear, Warren is against both the domination of women and the domination of nature. Early in the book, she considers how we might defend her perspective against someone who was against the domination of women but not against the domination of nature, presumably because the person did not think that nonhuman nature deserved moral consideration (57). Warren's defense here is to appeal to the very definition of environmental ethics. Warren distinguishes environmental ethics, an ethics of the environment, from an ethics concerning the environment. An environmental ethics, by definition, Warren tells us, takes nonhuman nature to deserve moral consideration whereas an ethics concerning the environment does not. So for those committed to an environmental ethics, so defined, it is not an open question whether to be against the domination of nonhuman nature, or, presumably, the domination of women. They must be against both forms of domination. Now while this part of Warren's defense of ecofeminist philosophy does work to some extent, it is worth noting how close the premises are to the desired conclusion. The defense is directed at those who regard both women and nonhuman nature as deserving moral consideration. The conclusion that is drawn is that those same individuals should be against both the domination of women and against the domination of nonhuman nature.Later in the book, in another related philosophical patch, Warren considers whether she can provide an argument in defense of the moral considerability of nonhuman nature, and she claims that she cannot (74-76). This is because, she claims, the moral considerability of nonhuman nature is groundless.Here Warren compares her view...

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Demanding Environmental Ethics for the FutureJames P. Sterba (bio)As we contemplate the present and future effects of global climate change, it is hard not to be disillusioned by what we see. Melting glaciers, rising sea levels, more intense and erratic weather patterns, wide-scale extinction of endangered species—what can we as environmental philosophers do that might be helpful in this regard? My suggestion is that we respond by drawing on the resources of traditional normative philosophy to ground a demanding environmental ethics that will justify the kind of sacrifices that are needed to cope with our unsettling future.This is a project that, with a lot of help from others, I have been working on for the last twenty years. I will present it, at least in outline, in my presidential address at the APA Central Division Meeting next spring, entitled "Completing the Kantian Project: From Rationality to Equality." By equality here I mean substantive intergenerational equality. This will require that we limit our current use of resources to simply meeting our basic needs. So the argument moves from a neutral nonmoral rational foundation to a very demanding set of practical moral requirements. So far sketched, the argument does not yet take into account the requirements that nonhuman living nature places upon us. But surprisingly, so demanding is this morality as sketched so far, that when additional considerations are introduced to take nonhuman living nature into account, not much more is required of us other thansome further constraints on population policy.Now I know some environmental philosophers are more skeptical than I am about the usefulness of traditional moral philosophy. Even I am unhappy with certain debates currently raging among contemporary moral philosophers, such as the realist/anti-realist debate. In fact, my argument is designed to make that very debate unnecessary. Still, if we leave most of traditional moral philosophy behind, what do we as philosophers bring with us to the new disciplines with which we now propose to collaborate? Do we bring an ability to do values clarification and a good sense of argument? I don't think these skills and others like them alone will be enough for the task at hand. We need a very demanding ethics, and if we don't look to philosophy to ground such an ethics, where do we look? [End Page 146]There is also an additional advantage here to grounding a demanding environmental ethics in traditional normative philosophy. Such an approach is more likely to force traditionalists and conservatives, philosophers and otherwise, to take notice of our arguments. If we are out in "left" field just talking to those both inside and outside of philosophy who happen to agree with our practical agenda, it is easier for us to be dismissed by others who are not committed to that same practical agenda. By contrast, if we address our opponents by appealing to very traditional values by which they claim to live their lives, then we do have at least a fighting chance of changing the way they do live their lives. At least, as moral philosophers, we would have then done our best to respond to the environmental crisis. Provided of course that we are also willing to reach out with our demanding ethics in hand and do that interdisciplinary collaboration that needs to be done to secure fully practical and effective solutions to the problems we face.James P. Sterba James P. Sterba is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Notre Dame. He has published 24 books, including the award-winning Justice for Here and Now (Cambridge, 1998), Three Challenges to Ethics (Oxford, 2001). Terrorism and International Justice (Oxford, 2003), Affirmative Action and Racial Preference: A Debate, co-authored with Carl Cohen (Oxford, 2003) and The Triumph of Practice Over Theory in Ethics (Oxford, 2005) He is president of the American Philosophical Association, Central Division. E-mail: [email protected] © 2007 Indiana University Press...

Libertarianism has long been known for its opposition to a right to welfare, In this paper, I will oppose this view of libertarianism, maintaining that the libertarian’s own ideal of liberty requires just such a right to welfare. I begin by showing that there are conflicts of negative liberty between the rich and the poor. I then argue that when these conflicts are evaluated by the “ought “ implies “can” principle, the liberty of the poor has priority over the liberty of the rich, and it is this priority that provides the grounds for a right to welfare. Along the way, I argue that there are not two interpretations of libertarianism - an ideal based versionand a rights-based version - but only one and this interpretation supports a right to welfare.

Professor Hill delivered these comments as part of the International Society for Environmental Ethics panels on Environmental Virtue Ethics, held at the annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association, April 2000, in Albuquerque, NM Philip Cafaro’s paper “Thoreau, Leopold and Carson: Toward an Environmental Virtue Ethics” appears in Environmental Ethics 23(2001), 3-17. Geoffrey Frasz’s paper “What is Environmental Virtue Ethics That We Should Be Mindful of It?” is published as part of this special issue of Philosophy in the Contemporary World.