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9Klein on Relative CertaintyPhilosophy Research Archives 13 271-274. 1987.Peter Klein claims to have explicated the notion of relative certainty and shown how it is related to the notion of absolute evidential certainty in his book Certainty. I argue that he has not succeeded at this because the account of relative certainty provided only applies to a subset of the pairs of propositions about which we make judgments of relative certainty.
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40Klein on Relative CertaintyPhilosophy Research Archives 13 271-274. 1987.Peter Klein claims to have explicated the notion of relative certainty and shown how it is related to the notion of absolute evidential certainty in his book Certainty. I argue that he has not succeeded at this because the account of relative certainty provided only applies to a subset of the pairs of propositions about which we make judgments of relative certainty.
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13Elementary Prepositions, Independence, and PicturesJournal of Philosophical Research 16 53-61. 1991.Wittgenstein initially endorsed but then abandoned, by the time of “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, the view that elementary propositions are logically independent. In this paper it is argued that the doctrine of logical independence is in fact inconsistent with the intuitions and examples that motivated the picture theory of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This leaves the question of whether the logical independence of elementary propositions can be reconciled with the theory itself; the pap…Read more
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24Demonstratives and intentions, ten years laterCommunication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal. forthcoming.
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30Donnellan's distinctionsAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (4). 1986.This Article does not have an abstract
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68Elementary Prepositions, Independence, and PicturesJournal of Philosophical Research 16 53-61. 1991.Wittgenstein initially endorsed but then abandoned, by the time of “Some Remarks on Logical Form”, the view that elementary propositions are logically independent. In this paper it is argued that the doctrine of logical independence is in fact inconsistent with the intuitions and examples that motivated the picture theory of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This leaves the question of whether the logical independence of elementary propositions can be reconciled with the theory itself; the pap…Read more
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24Context and What is SaidCanadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (sup1): 97-109. 1980.A popular answer to the question of what, In addition to what a sentence means, Determines what a speaker who utters that sentence says, Is the context in which it is uttered. While this answer is often not developed in any detail, Paul ziff in "what is said" attempts to specify just what contextual features are relevant and how they operate. This paper argues that the factors ziff offers are in fact irrelevant to the determination of what is said. The general outline of an alternative approach …Read more
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6Context and What is SaidCanadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 6 (n/a): 97-109. 1980.As interest in the study of natural languages has increased, philosophers of language and logicians have, along with linguists, begun to pay more attention to sentences whose truth value varies from context to context. Alternatively, to sentences which are such that, if different speakers utter them, those speakers may say different things. For example, it is well-known that two different people who utter ‘I am hot’ will be saying different things, that two different people who utter ‘Billy is a…Read more
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7Conventions and CoreferentialityJournal of Philosophical Research 19 257-262. 1994.In Frege’s Puzzle, Nathan Salmon takes it to be obvious that the fact that names such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are coreferential is purely a matter of arbitrary linguistic convention, while the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus is by no means a conventional matter. Salmon also takes these points to be ones to which Frege appeals in the opening paragraph of “On Sense and Reference,” and hence finds it ironic that these points undercut the theory of sense that Frege develops in that paper. It…Read more
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58Conventions and CoreferentialityJournal of Philosophical Research 19 257-262. 1994.In Frege’s Puzzle, Nathan Salmon takes it to be obvious that the fact that names such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are coreferential is purely a matter of arbitrary linguistic convention, while the fact that Hesperus is Phosphorus is by no means a conventional matter. Salmon also takes these points to be ones to which Frege appeals in the opening paragraph of “On Sense and Reference,” and hence finds it ironic that these points undercut the theory of sense that Frege develops in that paper. It…Read more
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5Are there indirect speech actsIn Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed.), Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives, Routledge. pp. 335--349. 1994.
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15A Realist Conception of Truth William P. Alston Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, ix + 274 pp., $35.00 (review)Dialogue 37 (3): 648-. 1998.
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List of contrlbutorsIn Dunja Jutronić (ed.), The Maribor papers in naturalized semantics, Pedagoška Fakulteta Maribor. pp. 415. 1997.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |