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169Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and StakesOxford Studies in Epistemology 6. 2019.Defenses of pragmatic encroachment commonly rely on two thoughts: first, that the gap between one’s strength of epistemic position on p and perfect strength sometimes makes a difference to what one is justified in doing, and second, that the higher the stakes, the harder it is to know. It is often assumed that these ideas complement each other. This chapter shows that these ideas are far from complementary. Along the way, a variety of strategies for regimenting the somewhat inchoate notion of st…Read more
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148Graded epistemic justificationPhilosophical Studies 178 (6): 1845-1858. 2020.The adjective ‘is justified’ has all the hallmarks of a gradable adjective. But the relationship between gradable uses and straightforward predications of the form ‘x is justified’ has been underexplored by epistemologists. In this paper we undertake to do some ground clearing as a prelude to better understanding this relationship.
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146Being in a position to knowPhilosophical Studies 179 (4): 1323-1339. 2022.The concept of being in a position to know is an increasingly popular member of the epistemologist’s toolkit. Some have used it as a basis for an account of propositional justification. Others, following Timothy Williamson, have used it as a vehicle for articulating interesting luminosity and anti-luminosity theses. It is tempting to think that while knowledge itself does not obey any closure principles, being in a position to know does. For example, if one knows both p and ‘If p then q’, but on…Read more
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146Review of Stephen Mumford's dispositions (review)Noûs 39 (1): 179-95. 2005.In Mumford’s Dispositions, the reader will find an extended treatment of the recent debate about dispositions from Ryle and Geach to the present. Along the way, Mumford presents his own views on several key points, though we found the book much more thorough in its assessment of opposing views than in the development of a positive account. As we’ll try to make clear, some of the ideas endorsed in Dispositions are certainly worth pursuing; others are not. Following Mackie, Shoemaker, and others,1…Read more
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143Gunk and Continuous VariationThe Monist 88 (4): 441-465. 2005.Let us say that a thing is gunky just in case every part of that thing has proper parts. The idea that all physical objects are gunky seems sufficiently sweeping, interesting, and plausible that it is worth examining. However, there is a difficulty. The features of an extended object can surely vary continuously. If an object is gunky then it cannot have point-sized parts which have no further parts. But how can one conceive of a continuous variation in features other than as the obtaining of di…Read more
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142Compatibilist semantics in metaphysics: A case studyAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1). 1996.(1996). Compatibilist semantics in metaphysics: A case study. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 74, No. 1, pp. 117-134. doi: 10.1080/00048409612347101.
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141Reply to ByrnePhilosophical Studies 178 (9): 3049-3054. 2020.In this reply to Alex Byrne’s comment on our book Narrow Content, we address Byrne’s claim that internalism is best framed as a thesis about properties of agents rather than properties of thoughts, arguing that a thought-based framework is better suited to standard internalist ambitions. We also discuss whether there is any prospect for a view in the internalist spirit that prescinds from multiplying indices beyond worlds, address Byrne’s ordinary language considerations against an ontology of t…Read more
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139Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and DominancePhilosophical Studies 178 (2): 515-532. 2020.Ginger Schultheis offers a novel and interesting argument against epistemic permissivism. While we think that her argument is ultimately uncompelling, we think its faults are instructive. We explore the relationship between epistemic permissivism, Margin-for-Error principles, and an epistemological version of Dominance reasoning.
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137The bundle theory of substance and the identity of indiscerniblesAnalysis 55 (3): 191-196. 1995.
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123Reply to Glanzberg, Soames and WeathersonAnalysis 71 (1): 143-156. 2011.One of Weatherson's main goals is to drive home a methodological point: We shouldn't be looking for deductive arguments for or against relativism – we should instead be evaluating inductive arguments designed to show that either relativism or some alternative offers the best explanation of some data. Our focus in Chapter Two on diagnostics for shared content allegedly encourages the search for deductive arguments and so does more harm than good. We have no methodological slogan of our own to off…Read more
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121ResponseMind and Language 29 (4): 499-510. 2014.We are very grateful to our critics for their kind words and thoughtful engagementwith The Reference Book (hereafter TRB), and also to the editors of Mind & Language for the opportunity to respond. We’ll start our reply by sketching the book’s positive thesis about specific noun phrases and names. In §2 we’ll relate the traditional semantic category we call ‘reference’ to semantic taxonomies given in terms of mechanisms of denotation. In §3, we’ll turn to acquaintance constraints on reference an…Read more
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115Are Beliefs about God Theoretical Beliefs? Reflections on Aquinas and KantReligious Studies 32 (2). 1996.The need to address our question arises from two sources, one in Kant and the other in a certain type of response to so-called Reformed epistemology. The first source consists in a tendency to distinguish theoretical beliefs from practical beliefs (commitments to the world's being a certain way versus commitments to certain pictures to live by), and to treat theistic belief as mere practical belief. We trace this tendency in Kant's corpus, and compare and contrast it with Aquinas's view and a mo…Read more
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114II—John Hawthorne: Some Comments on Fricker's‘Stating and Insinuating’Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 95-108. 2012.This discussion piece critically examines some of the key ideology that figures in Elizabeth Fricker's ‘Stating and Insinuating’, raises a number of queries about the details of Fricker's argumentation, and develops some ideas about the normative structure of testimony that relate to the themes of that paper.
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113The Necessity of MathematicsNoûs 54 (3): 549-577. 2020.Some have argued for a division of epistemic labor in which mathematicians supply truths and philosophers supply their necessity. We argue that this is wrong: mathematics is committed to its own necessity. Counterfactuals play a starring role.
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112Vagueness and the mind of GodPhilosophical Studies 122 (1). 2005.This paper examines the mind and language of an omniscient being from a supervaluationist perspective. Two questions hall receive special attention. How ought the supervaluationist explicate the concept of omniscience? And what ought the supervaluationist expect an omniscient speaker to say about a Sorites series?
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111Moral Vagueness and EpistemicismJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 23 (2). 2022.Epistemicism is one of the main approaches to the phenomenon of vagueness. But how does it fare in its treatment of_ moral_ vagueness? This paper has two goals. First, I shall explain why various recent arguments against an epistemicist approach to moral vagueness are unsuccessful. Second, I shall explain how, in my view, reflection on the Sorites can inform normative ethics in powerful and interesting ways. In this connection, I shall be putting the epistemicist treatment to work, engaging with…Read more
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111In this thesis, Semantics, Meta-Semantics, and Ontology, I provide a critique of the method of truth in metaphysics. Davidson has suggested that we can determine the metaphysical nature and structure of reality through semantic investigations. By contrast, I argue that it is not semantics, but meta-semantics, which reveals the metaphysically necessary and sufficient truth conditions of our claims. As a consequence I reject the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment. In Part I, chapter 1, I …Read more
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109Relativism and Monadic TruthAnalysis 71 (1): 109-111. 2011.The beginning of the twenty-first century saw something of a comeback for relativism within analytical philosophy. Relativism and Monadic Truth has three main goals. First, we wished to clarify what we take to be the key moving parts in the intellectual machinations of self-described relativists. Secondly, we aimed to expose fundamental flaws in those argumentative strategies that drive the pro-relativist movement and precursors from which they draw inspiration. Thirdly, we hoped that our polemi…Read more
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106Practical realism?Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1): 169-178. 2002.In ‘Normative and Recognitional Concepts’, Allan Gibbard attempts to combine a sort of naturalistic moral realism with some of the main threads of quasi-realism. While his piece is certainly rich and suggestive, I found it unpersuasive at almost every key step. Below, I detail six areas of puzzlement.
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106Oxford Studies in Epistemology (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2005.Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field.
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105Stephen Mumford. Dispositions. . Oxford: Oxford university press, 1998. 261 pp. (review)Noûs 39 (1). 2005.In Mumford’s Dispositions, the reader will find an extended treatment of the recent debate about dispositions from Ryle and Geach to the present. Along the way, Mumford presents his own views on several key points, though we found the book much more thorough in its assessment of opposing views than in the development of a positive account. As we’ll try to make clear, some of the ideas endorsed in Dispositions are certainly worth pursuing; others are not. Following Mackie, Shoemaker, and others,1…Read more
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