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John Hawthorne

University of Southern California
  •  Home
  •  Publications
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  • University of Southern California
    School of Philosophy
    Professor (Part-time)
  • All publications (296)
  •  2976
    Higher-order free logic and the Prior-Kaplan paradox
    with Andrew Bacon and Gabriel Uzquiano
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (4-5): 493-541. 2016.
    The principle of universal instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior’s paradox and Kaplan’s paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramifica…Read more
    The principle of universal instantiation plays a pivotal role both in the derivation of intensional paradoxes such as Prior’s paradox and Kaplan’s paradox and the debate between necessitism and contingentism. We outline a distinctively free logical approach to the intensional paradoxes and note how the free logical outlook allows one to distinguish two different, though allied themes in higher-order necessitism. We examine the costs of this solution and compare it with the more familiar ramificationist approaches to higher-order logic. Our assessment of both approaches is largely pessimistic, and we remain reluctantly inclined to take Prior’s and Kaplan’s derivations at face value.
    Higher-Order Logic, MiscLogic in PhilosophyIntensional Modal LogicParadoxes, MiscellaneousHigher-Ord…Read more
    Higher-Order Logic, MiscLogic in PhilosophyIntensional Modal LogicParadoxes, MiscellaneousHigher-Order Metaphysics
  •  1413
    Knowledge and Objective Chance
    with Maria Lasonen-Aarnio
    In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 92--108. 2009.
    We think we have lots of substantial knowledge about the future. But contemporary wisdom has it that indeterminism prevails in such a way that just about any proposition about the future has a non-zero objective chance of being false.2, 3 What should one do about this? One, pessimistic, reaction is scepticism about knowledge of the future. We think this should be something of a last resort, especially since this scepticism is likely to infect alleged knowledge of the present and past. One anti-s…Read more
    We think we have lots of substantial knowledge about the future. But contemporary wisdom has it that indeterminism prevails in such a way that just about any proposition about the future has a non-zero objective chance of being false.2, 3 What should one do about this? One, pessimistic, reaction is scepticism about knowledge of the future. We think this should be something of a last resort, especially since this scepticism is likely to infect alleged knowledge of the present and past. One anti-sceptical strategy is to pin our hopes on determinism, conceding that knowledge of the future is unavailable in an indeterministic world. This is not satisfying either: we would rather not be hostage to empirical fortune in the way that this strategy recommends. A final strategy, one that we shall explore in this paper, is one of reconciliation: knowledge of a proposition is compatible with a subject’s belief having a non-zero objective chance of error.4 Following Williamson, we are interested in tying knowledge to the presence or absence of error in close cases, and so we shall explore the connections between knowledge and objective chance within such a framework. We don’t want to get tangled up here in complications involved in attempting to formulate a necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge in terms of safety. Instead, we will assume the following rough and ready necessary condition: a subject knows P only if she could not easily have falsely believed P.5 Assuming that easiness is to be spelt..
    Epistemic PossibilityChance-Credence PrinciplesVarieties of Skepticism, Misc
  •  666
    Relativism and Monadic Truth
    with Herman Cappelen
    Oxford University Press UK. 2009.
    Cappelen and Hawthorne present a powerful critique of fashionable relativist accounts of truth, and the foundational ideas in semantics on which the new relativism draws. They argue compellingly that the contents of thought and talk are propositions that instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth and falsity.
    Relativism about TruthEpistemic Contextualism and RelativismPropositional Temporalism and EternalismRead more
    Relativism about TruthEpistemic Contextualism and RelativismPropositional Temporalism and EternalismEpistemic Relativism
  •  189
    The Principle of Necessary Reason
    with Andrew Cortens
    Faith and Philosophy 10 (1): 60-67. 1993.
    Philosophy of Religion
  •  212
    Response
    with David Manley
    Mind and Language 29 (4): 499-510. 2014.
    We are very grateful to our critics for their kind words and thoughtful engagementwith The Reference Book (hereafter TRB), and also to the editors of Mind & Language for the opportunity to respond. We’ll start our reply by sketching the book’s positive thesis about specific noun phrases and names. In §2 we’ll relate the traditional semantic category we call ‘reference’ to semantic taxonomies given in terms of mechanisms of denotation. In §3, we’ll turn to acquaintance constraints on reference an…Read more
    We are very grateful to our critics for their kind words and thoughtful engagementwith The Reference Book (hereafter TRB), and also to the editors of Mind & Language for the opportunity to respond. We’ll start our reply by sketching the book’s positive thesis about specific noun phrases and names. In §2 we’ll relate the traditional semantic category we call ‘reference’ to semantic taxonomies given in terms of mechanisms of denotation. In §3, we’ll turn to acquaintance constraints on reference and singular thought. And in §4, we’ll briefly address McGilvray’s and Devitt’s general doubts about the project of truth-conditional semantics to which our book contributes.
    NamesSingular TermsDescriptive Theories of ReferenceIndefinite DescriptionsAttributive and Referenti…Read more
    NamesSingular TermsDescriptive Theories of ReferenceIndefinite DescriptionsAttributive and Referential Uses of DescriptionsDescriptions as Predicates
  •  1293
    Pragmatic Encroachment and Closure
    with Charity Anderson
    In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, Routledge. 2018.
    Closure of KnowledgePragmatic and Moral Encroachment
  •  1
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology (edited book)
    with T. Szabo Gendler
    Oxford University Press. 2010.
    Epistemology
  •  307
    Reflexive fictionalisms
    with Daniel Nolan
    Analysis 56 (1): 23-32. 1996.
    There is a class of fictionalist strategies (the reflexive fictionalisms) which appear to suffer from a common problem: the problem that the entities which are supposedly fictional turn out, by the lights of the fictionalist theory itself, to exist. The appropriate solution is to reject so-called strong fictionalism in each case: that is, to reject the variety of fictionalism which takes appeal to the domain of fictional entities to provide an explanation or analysis of the operators or predi…Read more
    There is a class of fictionalist strategies (the reflexive fictionalisms) which appear to suffer from a common problem: the problem that the entities which are supposedly fictional turn out, by the lights of the fictionalist theory itself, to exist. The appropriate solution is to reject so-called strong fictionalism in each case: that is, to reject the variety of fictionalism which takes appeal to the domain of fictional entities to provide an explanation or analysis of the operators or predicates with which the objects are systematically correlated.
    Modal FictionalismRealism and Anti-Realism, MiscOntological Fictionalism
  • Perceptual Experience
    with T. S. Gendler
    Critica 41 (122): 124-132. 2009.
  • Ity and Possibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)
    with T. Szabo Gendler
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (10-12): 301. 2004.
  •  308
    Lewis, the lottery and the preface
    Analysis 62 (3): 242-251. 2002.
    Areas of MathematicsEpistemological States and PropertiesEpistemic ParadoxesClosure of Knowledge
  •  184
    Cretan Deductions
    with Rachel Elizabeth Fraser
    Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1): 163-178. 2015.
  •  414
    Advice for Physicalists
    Philosophical Studies 108 (1): 17-52. 2002.
    This paper engages with two compelling challenges to physicalism, each designed to show that the nature of experience is elusive from the standpoint of physical science. It is argued that the physicalist is ultimately well placed to meet both challenges
    Metaphysics of MindZombies and the Conceivability Argument
  •  218
    Haecceitism and anti-haecceitism in Leibniz's philosophy
    with J. A. Cover
    Noûs 30 (1): 1-30. 1996.
    HaecceitismLeibniz: Metaphysics
  •  270
    Freedom in Context
    Philosophical Studies 104 (1): 63-79. 2001.
    David Lewis has recently deployed a contextualist strategy for defending ordinary claims to know.1 In this paper, I wish to extend that strategy to ordinary claims about freedom.2 The result is a species of compatibilism that, while foreign to current debates, has a good deal going for it.
    Freedom and LibertyTheories of Free Will, MiscCompatibilism
  •  161
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology (edited book)
    with Tamar Szabó Gendler
    Oxford University Press. 2005.
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field.
    Evidence and KnowledgeEpistemic Contextualism and InvariantismContextualist Replies to SkepticismEpi…Read more
    Evidence and KnowledgeEpistemic Contextualism and InvariantismContextualist Replies to SkepticismEpistemic Contrastivism
  •  218
    The epistemology of possible worlds: A guided tour
    Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3). 1996.
    Conceivability, Imagination, and Possibility
  •  1063
    Conceivability and Possibility (edited book)
    with Tamar Szabo Gendler
    Oxford University Press UK. 2002.
    The capacity to represent things to ourselves as possible plays a crucial role both in everyday thinking and in philosophical reasoning; this volume offers much-needed philosophical illumination of conceivability, possibility, and the relations between them. Thirteen leading philosophers present specially-written essays, and a substantial introduction is provided by the volume editors, who demonstrate the importance of these topics to a wide range of issues in contemporary philosophy.
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentEpistemology of ImaginationConceivability, Imagination, and P…Read more
    Zombies and the Conceivability ArgumentEpistemology of ImaginationConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityModal Epistemology, MiscThought ExperimentsEpistemology of IntuitionModal RationalismSpecific ExpressionsKripke's Modal Argument Against MaterialismZombies and the Conceivability ArgumentEpistemology of ImaginationConceivability, Imagination, and PossibilityModal Epistemology, MiscThought ExperimentsEpistemology of IntuitionModal RationalismSpecific ExpressionsKripke's Modal Argument Against Materialism
  •  248
    II—John Hawthorne: Some Comments on Fricker's‘Stating and Insinuating’
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1): 95-108. 2012.
    This discussion piece critically examines some of the key ideology that figures in Elizabeth Fricker's ‘Stating and Insinuating’, raises a number of queries about the details of Fricker's argumentation, and develops some ideas about the normative structure of testimony that relate to the themes of that paper.
    The Nature of Testimony
  •  5
    A priority and externalism
    In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 201--218. 2007.
    Content Internalism and Externalism
  • A cura di, 2006b
    Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1). 2006.
  •  1852
    Possible Patterns
    with Jeffrey Sanford Russell
    Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 11. 2018.
    “There are no gaps in logical space,” David Lewis writes, giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a *pattern* idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a *cut and paste* idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” We use resources from model theory to show …Read more
    “There are no gaps in logical space,” David Lewis writes, giving voice to sentiment shared by many philosophers. But different natural ways of trying to make this sentiment precise turn out to conflict with one another. One is a *pattern* idea: “Any pattern of instantiation is metaphysically possible.” Another is a *cut and paste* idea: “For any objects in any worlds, there exists a world that contains any number of duplicates of all of those objects.” We use resources from model theory to show the inconsistency of certain packages of combinatorial principles and the consistency of others.
    Possible Worlds, MiscModal Combinatorialism
  •  2353
    The Necessity of Mathematics
    with Juhani Yli‐Vakkuri
    Noûs 52 (3): 549-577. 2018.
    Some have argued for a division of epistemic labor in which mathematicians supply truths and philosophers supply their necessity. We argue that this is wrong: mathematics is committed to its own necessity. Counterfactuals play a starring role.
    Subjunctive Conditionals, MiscMetaphysical Necessity
  •  112
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 1 (edited book)
    with Tamar Szabo Gendler
    Oxford University Press UK. 2005.
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a major new biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it will publish exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: *traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism,…Read more
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a major new biennial volume offering a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it will publish exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed. Topics within its purview include: *traditional epistemological questions concerning the nature of belief, justification, and knowledge, the status of scepticism, the nature of the a priori, etc; *new developments in epistemology, including movements such as naturalized epistemology, feminist epistemology, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology, and approaches such as contextualism; *foundational questions in decision-theory; *confirmation theory and other branches of philosophy of science that bear on traditional issues in epistemology; *topics in the philosophy of perception relevant to epistemology; *topics in cognitive science, computer science, developmental, cognitive, and social psychology that bear directly on traditional epistemological questions; and *work that examines connections between epistemology and other branches of philosophy, including work on testimony and the ethics of belief. Anyone wanting to understand the latest developments at the leading edge of the discipline can start here.Editorial BoardStewart Cohen, Arizona State UniversityKeith DeRose, Yale UniversityRichard Fumerton, University of IowaAlvin Goldman, Rutgers UniversityAlan Hajek, Australian National UniversityGilbert Harman, Princeton UniversityFrank Jackson, Australian National UniversityJames Joyce, University of MichiganScott Sturgeon, Birkbeck College LondonJonathan Vogel, Amherst CollegeTimothy Williamson, University of Oxford.
    Social Epistemology, MiscellaneousEpistemology of Disagreement
  •  305
    The many minds account of vagueness
    with Andrew McGonigal
    Philosophical Studies 138 (3). 2008.
    This paper presents an new epistemicist account of vagueness, one that avoids standard arbitrariness worries by exploiting a plenitudinous metaphysic.
    Epistemic Theories of Vagueness
  •  161
    Some Remarks on Imagination and Convention
    Mind and Language 31 (5): 625-634. 2016.
    Conversational Implicature
  •  35
    Philosophical Perspectives, Philosophy of Mind
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2013.
    Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research
    Philosophy of Mind
  •  32
    Philosophical Perspectives, Metaphysics (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2006.
    _Philosophical Perspectives Volume 20, Metaphysics_, contains over 15 articles from leading philosophers of Metaphysics. Brings together original essays by some of the foremost thinkers in the field, among them Theodore Sider, Peter Van Inwagen and J.R.G. Williams Explores such topics as infinity and causation, the nature and epistemology of modality, and the persistence of objects through relativistic time.
    Metaphysics, MiscellaneousEthics
  •  24
    Philosophical Perspectives, Epistemology (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.
    Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by foremost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research
  •  23
    Philosophy of Mind (edited book)
    Wiley-Blackwell. 2008.
    Philosophical Perspectives, an annual, aims to publish original essays by formost thinkers in their fields, with each volume confined to a main area of philosophical research
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