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    The role of imaginary cases in ethics
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1-2): 141. 1985.
  •  101
    Two Conceptions of Moral Realism
    with Christopher Hookway
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 60 (1). 1986.
  •  94
    Mill's Puzzling Footnote
    Utilitas 12 (2): 219. 2000.
    This paper discusses various possible interpretations of a complex footnote in Mill's Utilitarianism
  •  91
    Enticing Reasons
    In R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler & Michael Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes From the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz, Clarendon Press. 2004.
  •  88
    Not Knowing Everything That Matters
    The Philosophers' Magazine (66): 94-99. 2014.
    We know what to say about the agent who knowingly does the wrong thing. But what of the wrongdoer who doesn't know everything that matters? Some of the usual criticisms may apply, if some of the usual mistakes were made. Other usual criticisms will miss the mark. One task for moral theory is to explain this variety of censures and failures. Derek Parfit proposes that we define for each criticism a sense of 'wrong', and that each new sense be defined in terms of the 'ordinary' sense. The authors …Read more
  •  84
    Defending Particularism
    Metaphilosophy 30 (1&2): 25-32. 1999.
  •  83
    When reasons don’t rhyme
    The Philosophers' Magazine 37 (37): 19-24. 2007.
  •  79
    Wiggins and Ross
    Utilitas 10 (3): 281-285. 1998.
    Ross's attempt to undermine the consequentialist understanding of the relation between duties and outcomes might give him greater defence against the danger that outcome-related duties will come to constitute a norm, to the disadvantage of all others
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    Reading Parfit
    Erkenntnis 49 (2): 237-242. 1998.
    _ Reading Parfit _ brings together some of the most distinguished scholars in the field to discuss and critique Derek Parfit's outstanding work, _ Reasons and Persons, _
  •  75
    Intention and permissibility, II
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1). 2000.
    [T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against kil…Read more
  •  75
    Holism in the Theory of Reasons
    Cogito 6 (3): 136-138. 1992.
  •  73
    Should We Pass the Buck?
    In Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent Work on Intrinsic Value, Springer. pp. 33--44. 2005.
  •  70
    Human Agency: Language, Duty, and Value: Philosophical Essays in Honor of J.O. Urmson (edited book)
    with J. O. Urmson, J. M. E. Moravcsik, and C. C. W. Taylor
    Stanford University Press. 1988.
    The essays in this volume explore current work in central areas of philosophy, work unified by attention to salient questions of human action and human agency. They ask what it is for humans to act knowledgeably, to use language, to be friends, to act heroically, to be mortally fortunate, and to produce as well as to appreciate art. The volume is dedicated to J. O. Urmson, in recognition of his inspirational contributions to these areas. All the essays but one have been specially written for thi…Read more
  •  68
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    Review: The Practice of Value (review)
    Mind 114 (453): 189-192. 2005.
  •  65
    II—Jonathan Dancy: Moral Perception
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 99-117. 2010.
  •  59
    Replies (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2). 2003.
  •  53
    Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis
    Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168): 393-395. 1992.
  •  52
    Critical notice of 'From metaphysics to ethics' by Frank Jackson.
  •  48
    Two Ways of Explaining Actions: Jonathan Dancy
    Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55 25-42. 2004.
    In my Practical Reality I argued that the reasons for which we act are not to be conceived of as psychological states of ourselves, but as real states of the world. The main reason for saying this was that only thus can we make sense of the idea that it is possible to act for a good reason. The good reasons we have for doing this action rather than that one consist mainly of features of the situations in which we find ourselves; they do not consist in our believing certain things about those sit…Read more
  •  47
    On how to act : disjunctively
    In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 262--282. 2008.