Jonathan Dancy

Different forms of ethical naturalism are distinguished, and the possibility of a blockbuster argument against all of them at once is raised. Moore’s Open Question Argument proves insufficient; more recent anti-naturalist arguments by Derek Parfit are outlined. It is necessary to get a clearer view of what normativity is before one can decide whether naturalism abolishes normativity, as Parfit claims. An initial account of normativity is therefore given, and the prospects of a blockbuster argument are reconsidered.

__A Companion to Epistemology,_ 2 Volume Set, 3rd Edition_ _A Companion to Epistemology_ provides a comprehensive, up-to-date reference for understanding the theory of knowledge. Edited by distinguished scholars, this expanded third edition explores classic questions about knowledge and justified belief alongside contemporary topics such as social and political epistemology, the ethics of belief, and the epistemology of perception. With contributions from established and younger voices in the field, each entry offers insights into key issues, definitions, and debates, creating a rich resource for both introductory and advanced exploration. Extending its reach with critical coverage of emerging and underexplored areas, this third edition contains more than 50 new survey articles and an updated "Epistemology A-Z" glossary containing hundreds of entries. It also brings in wider perspectives, covering classical Indian and Islamic epistemology and featuring new entries on historical and present-day women philosophers, for example. With clear explanations and thoughtful analysis, the _Companion_ captures the diversity and relevance of epistemology today. Ideal for undergraduate and graduate students studying philosophy, cognitive science, or ethics, _A Companion to Epistemology_ is also an indispensable reference for educators, scholars, and researchers. Its accessible yet thorough structure makes it a valuable addition to any academic collection, supporting coursework, independent study, and advanced research.

This volume presents a series of lectures given by P. F. Strawson to final-year undergraduates at the University of Wales, Bangor, in the autumn term of 1946. The manuscript of these lectures survives and is preserved in the Bodleian Library in Oxford. The lectures contain the germ of Strawson’s developed thought on freedom, moral attitudes, and ethical ideals, with an unusual level of attention being paid to contemporary psychological research. Other topics covered include the contrast between consequentialist and other moral theories, the analysis of moral judgements, and the nature of moral obligation.

This chapter focuses on Bernard Williams's ‘What does Intuitionism Imply?’ (1988). It considers the justice of certain complaints that he makes about the position he associates with John McDowell. The chapter first considers, and reject, McDowell's appeal to the analogy with secondary qualities in his ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ (1985). The chapter then considers and defends McDowell's reply to John Mackie's complaint that objective values do not pull their own weight; I try to show the justice of McDowell's reply in a way that detaches it from any reliance on the dispositional conception of value. Finally, the chapter turns to Williams's attempts to show that the objectivity of moral values cannot be sustained within the constraints of McDowell's approach, because of various explanatory failures. The chapters argues that everything that needs to be explained can be explained, and that we should prefer a sort of optimism to a Williams-style pessimism. The chapter ends by considering whether Williams is right to think of McDowell as an intuitionist.