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70Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-105. 2011.
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87Holism and its ConsequencesIn Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. 2004.Gives the best argument for holism in the theory of reasons, and then considers how best to establish ethical particularism on that basis. Also considers various ways of accepting holism without going so far as the particularist wants to go.
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77From intuitionism to emotivismIn Thomas Baldwin (ed.), The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945, Cambridge University Press. pp. 693-703. 2003.
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677Ethics without principlesOxford University Press. 2004.In this much-anticipated book, Jonathan Dancy offers the only available full-scale treatment of particularism in ethics, a view with which he has been associated for twenty years. Dancy now presents particularism as the view that the possibility of moral thought and judgement does not in any way depend on an adequate supply of principles. He grounds this claim on a form of reasons-holism, holding that what is a reason in one case need not be any reason in another, and maintaining that moral reas…Read more
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56Ethical intuitionismIn John Corcoran (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2nd edition, Macmillan. 2006.
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101Essentially Comparative ConceptsJournal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2): 1-16. 2005.This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an "essentially comparative" concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion is a conflation of two distinct notions which need not go together. This leads to a critical examination of Temkin’s arguments that certain central ethical concepts (equality, maximin, utility) are essentially comparative. These arguments are often found wanting, as is Temkin’s treatment of the Person Affecting View.
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277Defending the RightJournal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1): 85-98. 2007.In this paper I consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think t…Read more
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92Dropping the CatchIn Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. pp. 53-70. 2004.Argues that various standard meta-ethical positions have great difficulty in understanding the notion of a contributory reason, being largely formulated to deal with overall oughts. These positions are those of M. Smith, A. Gibbard, F. Jackson, B. Brandom, and I. Kant.
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125Discussion on the importance of making things rightRatio 17 (2): 229-237. 2004.Critical notice of 'From metaphysics to ethics' by Frank Jackson.
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50Competing PicturesIn Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. pp. 118-139. 2004.Argues against views alternative to particularism in detail, including the views of McNaughton and Rawling, Crisp, Raz, Scanlon, Hooker, Parfit, and also appeals to Aristotelian philosophy of science.
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77Contributory ReasonsIn Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. pp. 15-37. 2004.Considers the nature of contributory reasons, contrasting the contributory with the overall. Also considers attempts to characterise the nature of the contributory in terms of overall oughts, arguing that all such attempts fail. Also considers arguments that there can be oughts without reasons, and rejects these too. Concludes that reasons are best understood in terms of the relation of favouring.
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76Consequential MattersIn Practical Reality, Oxford University Press. 2000.Argues against disjunctive accounts of action‐explanation. Also considers the metaphysics of reasons and returns to the distinction between internalism and externalism in the theory of normative reasons. Ends by asking how objective our account of reasons should be.
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62Can Holism be True?In Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. pp. 94-117. 2004.Considers various attempts to show that holism in the theory of reasons must be false. Distinguishes various forms of atomism, considers various appeals to notions of complete reasons and full explanations, asks whether moral reasoning is a form of inference and whether conceptual competence requires the existence of natural patterns, and ends by asking whether a particularist can allow that some moral considerations have a default relevance.
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71Beyond FavouringIn Ethics without principles, Oxford University Press. 2004.Suggests ways of characterising the favouring relation by contrasting it with other forms of relevance, such as enabling and intensifying. Offers examples of the distinction between favouring and enabling in the theory of explanation and in epistemology.
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586Berkeley's active selfEuropean Journal of Analytic Philosophy 1 (1): 5-20. 2005.The Author considers the strengths and weaknesses of Berkeley’s account of what he calls indifferently the soul, mind, spirit or self. Such an account deserves far more credit than he has standardly been awarded for a significantly modern position, most of which has mistakenly been credited to Schopenhauer. The Aauthor relates Berkeley’s views to those recently expressed by Bill Brewer and attempts to isolate the crucial difference between Berkeley and Schopenhauer.
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74Berkeley's Doctrine of Notions: A Reconstruction Based on His Theory of Meaning (review)Philosophical Review 99 (1): 111. 1990.
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152Berkeley, an introductionBlackwell. 1987.This new introduction to the main themes of Berkeley′s philosophy assumes no previous knowlege of philosophy and will be accessible to first-year students and to the interested general reader. It also offers and defends its own interpretation of Berkeley′ position. Jonathan Dancy argues that we understand Berkeley′s idealism best if we take seriously his claim that realism (the view that material things have an existence independent of the mind) derives from a mistaken use of abstraction. Stress…Read more
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356Are There Organic Unities?Ethics 113 (3): 629-650. 2003.Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.
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76Acting in the Light of the AppearancesIn Cynthia Macdonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), McDowell and His Critics, Wiley-blackwell. 2008.This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI VII.
