Jonathan Dancy

This new introduction to the main themes of Berkeley′s philosophy assumes no previous knowlege of philosophy and will be accessible to first-year students and to the interested general reader. It also offers and defends its own interpretation of Berkeley′ position. Jonathan Dancy argues that we understand Berkeley′s idealism best if we take seriously his claim that realism (the view that material things have an existence independent of the mind) derives from a mistaken use of abstraction. Stress is laid on Berkelye′s determination to use idealism to bring his God as close to us as possible. Instances of this are his claims that the world we live in is a collection of ideas in God′s mind, and that natural events are divine utterances which science is the attempts to interpret. Dancy also discusses Berkelye′s attack on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and his views on perception and knowledge. There is an account of his theory of the mind and of the nature of human action, and a final chapter contrasts the interpretation offered here with others. Students who have read this book will be well equipped to understand and assess the frequent references to Berkeley in current literature.

This new edition of Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge has been designed especially for the student reader. It also includes the four letters between George Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, written in 1729-30. The text is supplemented by a comprehensive introduction, an analysis of the text, a glossary, detailed notes, and a full bibliography with guidance on further reading. Published alongside Berkeley's other masterpiece, the Three Dialogues (also edited by Jonathan Dancy) this new edition aims to give the reader a thorough introduction to the central ideas of one of the world's greatest philosophers.

Considers and rejects the view that motivating reasons are best specified in psychological form rather than in non‐psychological form. Asks how we should then explain the fact that, if S acts for the reason that p, S must believe that p. It also asks whether the fact that the agent can be mistaken forces us to prefer the psychological form of explanation. It is argued that it does not, because explanation in terms of reasons is not factive; we explain S's action by appeal to what he believed even when he is wrong.

Argues that motivating reasons are not mental states of the agent but states of affairs. The main argument for this appeals to the normative realism established earlier. Since a reason to act is a state of affairs, the reasons in the light of which we act must also be capable of being states of affairs, for otherwise it would be impossible to act for a good reason. Our reasons are what we believe rather than that we so believe, or our so believing. I also consider and reject the view that our motivating reasons are the contents of our beliefs; in this context, I argue that a good reason cannot be a proposition.

Epistemology - the theory of knowledge and of justified belief - has always been of central importance in philosophy. Progress in other areas of philosophical research has often depended crucially on epistemological presuppositions. This Companion, with well over 250 articles ranging from summary discussions to major essays on topics of current controversy, is the first complete reference work devoted to the subject. All the main theoretical positions in epistemology are discussed and analysed, tougher with the different categories of knowledge itself - scientific, historical, mathematical, a priori, moral and so on - and the special problems associated with these. There are also many entries covering individual concepts, arguments and problems, short definitions of technical terms, and biographical articles. With its unrivalled coverage of the field, supported by a comprehensive index and an extensive cross-referencing, the Companion is likely to remain the standard reference work in epistemology from undergraduate level upward for the foreseeable future.