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69Responses to my criticsPhilosophical Explorations 23 (2): 187-199. 2020.Volume 23, Issue 2, June 2020, Page 187-199.
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69On Coherence Theories of Justification: Can an Empiricist Be a Coherentist?American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (4). 1984.
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67Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual SynthesisPhilosophical Quarterly 42 (168): 393-395. 1992.
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66Berkeley, an introductionBlackwell. 1987.This new introduction to the main themes of Berkeley′s philosophy assumes no previous knowlege of philosophy and will be accessible to first-year students and to the interested general reader. It also offers and defends its own interpretation of Berkeley′ position. Jonathan Dancy argues that we understand Berkeley′s idealism best if we take seriously his claim that realism (the view that material things have an existence independent of the mind) derives from a mistaken use of abstraction. Stress…Read more
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64Argues against G. E. Moore’s conception of organic unities, attempting to replace it with a conception more amenable to particularism. Considers the possibility of a form of default value acceptable to particularism. Ends by contrasting the views expressed here with those of Kagan.
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62Discussion on the importance of making things rightRatio 17 (2): 229-237. 2004.Critical notice of 'From metaphysics to ethics' by Frank Jackson.
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59McDowell, Williams, and intuitionismIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 269-290. 2012.
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57Supervenience, virtues and consequences: A commentary onknowledge in perspective by Ernest SosaPhilosophical Studies 78 (3). 1995.
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53The Presidential Address: Why There Is Really No Such Thing as the Theory of MotivationProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 95. 1995.Jonathan Dancy; I *—The Presidential Address: Why there is really No Such Thing as the Theory of Motivation, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 95
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50Caring about JusticePhilosophy 67 (262). 1992.In the post-Gilligan debate about the differences, if any, between the ways in which people of different genders see the moral world in which they live, I detect two assumptions. These can be found in Gilligan's early work, and have infected the thought of others. The first, perhaps surprisingly, is Kohlberg's Kantian account of one moral perspective, the one more easily or more naturally operated by men and which has come to be called the justice perspective. This is the perspective whose claim…Read more
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45Review of Christopher W. Gowans: Innocence lost: an examination of inescapable moral wrongdoing (review)Ethics 106 (3): 639-641. 1996.
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44Has Anyone Ever Been a Non-Intuitionist?In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative duty: British moral philosophers from Sidgwick to Ewing, Oxford University Press. pp. 87-105. 2011.
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42Intention and PermissibilityAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 301-338. 2000.It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against killing or the requ…Read more
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