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24Philosophy of Action: An Anthology (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2015._The Philosophy of Action: An Anthology_ is an authoritative collection of key work by top scholars, arranged thematically and accompanied by expert introductions written by the editors. This unique collection brings together a selection of the most influential essays from the 1960s to the present day. An invaluable collection that brings together a selection of the most important classic and contemporary articles in philosophy of action, from the 1960’s to the present day No other broad-ranging…Read more
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90Perceptual knowledge (edited book)Oxford University Press. 1988.This volume presents articles on epistemology and the theory of perception and introduces readers to the various problems that face a successful theory of perceptual knowledge. The contributors include Robert Nozick, Alvin Goldman, H.P. Grice, David Lewis, P.F. Strawson, Frank Jackson, David Armstrong, Fred Dretske, Roderick Firth, Wilfred Sellars, Paul Snowdon, and John McDowell.
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200Particularism in Question: an Interview with Jonathan DancyTheoria 74 (1): 3-17. 2008.Jonathan Dancy works within almost all fields of philosophy but is best known as the leading proponent of moral particularism. Particularism challenges “traditional” moral theories, such as Contractualism, Kantianism and Utilitarianism, in that it denies that moral thought and judgement relies upon, or is made possible by, a set of more or less well-defined, hierarchical principles. During the summer of 2006, the Philosophy Departments of Lund University (Sweden) and the University of Reading (E…Read more
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4Parfit and Indirectly Self-Defeating TheoriesIn J. Dancy (ed.), Reading Parfit, Blackwell. pp. 1--23. 1997.
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69On Coherence Theories of Justification: Can an Empiricist Be a Coherentist?American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (4). 1984.
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59McDowell, Williams, and intuitionismIn Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 269-290. 2012.
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210Normativity (edited book)Blackwell. 2000.This volume is built on the papers given at the 1998" Ratio" conference on normativity.
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38Mystery to me—a delightful mystery, after a while, but a mystery nonethe-less. It was not until a few months before my Final Examinations that the light dawned and I began to feel at home in the subject. Still, I went on to do graduate work (in the form of the two-year Oxford BPhil) not so much out of any passionate interest in philosophy as from (review)In David Bakhurst, Margaret Olivia Little & Brad Hooker (eds.), Thinking about reasons: themes from the philosophy of Jonathan Dancy, Oxford University Press. pp. 337. 2013.
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539Moral reasonsBlackwell. 1993.This book attempts to place a realist view of ethics (the claim that there are facts of the matter in ethics as elsewhere) within a broader context. It starts with a discussion of why we should mind about the difference between right and wrong, asks what account we should give of our ability to learn from our moral experience, and looks in some detail at the different sorts of ways in which moral reasons can combine to show us what we should do in the circumstances. The second half of the book u…Read more
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261Moral ParticularismIn Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2012.
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278I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned
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2Moore's Account of Vindictive Punishment: A Test Case for Theories of Organic UnitiesIn Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2007.
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12Ii—moral PerceptionAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 99-117. 2010.I start by examining Robert Audi's positive suggestions about moral perception, and then attempt to point out some challengeable assumptions that he seems to make, and to consider how things might look if those assumptions are abandoned.
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2Intention and Permissibility, IISupplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 74 (1): 319-338. 2000.
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107II—Jonathan Dancy: Moral PerceptionAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1): 99-117. 2010.
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83Intention and permissibility, IIAristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1). 2000.[T. M. Scanlon] It is clearly impermissible to kill one person because his organs can be used to save five others who are in need of transplants. It has seemed to many that the explanation for this lies in the fact that in such cases we would be intending the death of the person whom we killed, or failed to save. What makes these actions impermissible, however, is not the agent's intention but rather the fact that the benefit envisaged does not justify an exception to the prohibition against kil…Read more
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73On how to act - disjunctivelyIn Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge, Oxford University Press. pp. 262--282. 2008.
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213Intuition and EmotionEthics 124 (4): 787-812. 2014.I start with a brief look at what the classic British intuitionists (Ewing, Broad, Ross) had to say about the relation between judgment and emotion. I then look at some more recent work in the intuitionist tradition and try to develop a conception of moral emotion as a form of practical seeming, suggesting that some moral intuitions are exactly that sort of emotion. My general theme is that the standard contrast between intuition and emotion is a mistake and that intuitionism can happily accommo…Read more
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