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32Book Review:An Essay on Moral Responsibility. Michael J. Zimmerman (review)Ethics 101 (2): 408-. 1991.
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290Free Will, Death, and Immortality: The Role of NarrativePhilosophical Papers 34 (3): 379-403. 2005.In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a distinctive kind of value - narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us with a meaning over an a…Read more
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33Book Review:Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. R. Jay Wallace (review)Ethics 106 (4): 850-. 1996.
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39Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), viii + 271 pp (review)Noûs 33 (1): 133-143. 1999.
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Free Will and Moral Responsibility (Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29) (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.
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11Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Free Will and Moral Responsibility (edited book)Wiley-Blackwell. 2005.The essays in this volume explore various issues pertaining to human agency, such as the relationship between free will and causal determinism, and the nature and conditions of moral responsibility. Builds on and extends some of the very best recent work in the field. Features lively and vigorous debate. Forges connections between abstract philosophical theorizing and applied work in neuroscience and even criminal law.
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23XIV*—Responsibility and FailureProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 86 (1): 251-272. 1986.John Martin Fischer; XIV*—Responsibility and Failure, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 251–272, https://doi.org/1.
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130Ultimacy and alternative possibilitiesPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 15-20. 2009.I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism. Kane claims that we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations
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257Van Inwagen on free willPhilosophical Quarterly 36 (April): 252-260. 1986.I discuss van inwagen's "first formal argument" for the incompatibility of causal determinism and freedom to do otherwise. I distinguish different interpretations of the important notion, "s can render p false." I argue that on none of these interpretations is the argument clearly sound. I point to gaps in the argument, Although I do not claim that it is unsound
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78The Value of Moral ResponsibilityThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1 129-140. 1999.Moral responsibility requires control of one’s behavior. But there are different kinds of control. One sort of control entails the existence of genuinely accessible alternative possibilities. I call this regulative control. I believe that an agent can control his or her behavior without having control over it. In such a circumstance, the agent enjoys what I call guidance control, but not regulative control. He guides his behavior in the way characteristic of agents who act freely, yet he does no…Read more
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759Why immortality is not so badInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 2 (2). 1994.(1994). Why immortality is not so bad. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 257-270.
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140The Zygote Argument remixedAnalysis 71 (2): 267-272. 2011.John and Mary have fully consensual sex, but they do not want to have a child, so they use contraception with the intention of avoiding pregnancy. Unfortunately, although they used the contraception in the way in which it is supposed to be used, Mary has become pregnant. The couple decides to have the baby, whom they name ‘Ernie’. Now we fill in the story a bit. The universe is causally deterministic, and 30 years later Ernie performs some action A and thereby brings about event E. We also stipu…Read more
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539 The Transfer of NonresponsibilityIn Joseph K. Campbell (ed.), Freedom and Determinism, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2004.
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70The Metaphysics of death (edited book)Stanford University Press. 1993.Introduction : death, metaphysics, and morality / John Martin Fischer Death knocks / Woody Allen Rationality and the fear of death / Jeffrie G. Murphy Death / Thomas Nagel The Makropulos case : reflections on the tedium of immortality / Bernard Williams The evil of death / Harry S. Silverstein How to be dead and not care : a defense of Epicurus / Stephen E. Rosenbaum The dead / Palle Yourgrau The misfortunes of the dead / George Pitcher Harm to others / Joel Feinberg Reasons and persons / Derek …Read more
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1246The Metasphysics of Free Will: An Essay on ControlWiley-Blackwell. 1994.The Metaphysics of Free Will provides a through statement of the major grounds for skepticism about the reality of free will and moral responsibility. The author identifies and explains the sort of control that is associated with personhood and accountability, and shows how it is consistent with causal determinism. In so doing, out view of ourselves as morally responsible agents is protected against the disturbing changes posed by science and religion
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11The Non-Reality of Free Will, by Richard DoublePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
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23The Non-Reality of Free Will, by Richard Double (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4): 1004-1007. 1992.
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44The Mirror-Image Argument: An Additional Reply to JohanssonThe Journal of Ethics 18 (4): 325-330. 2014.We have argued that it is rational to have asymmetric attitudes toward prenatal and posthumous non-existence insofar as this asymmetry is a special case of a more general asymmetry in our attitudes toward past and future pleasures. Here we respond to an interesting critique of our view by Jens Johansson. We contend that his critique involves an inappropriate conflation of the time from which the relevant asymmetry emerges and the time of the badness of death
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3The Metaphysics of Free Will: an Essay on ControlPhilosophical Quarterly 47 (188): 373-381. 1997.
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics and Epistemology |
Value Theory |